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This book presents the result of the research conducted to understand the 
role of indicators in decisions of technology innovation. A gap was detect-
ed in the literature of innovation and technology assessment about the use 
and influence of indicators in this type of decision. It was important to 
address this gap because indicators are often frequent elements of innova-
tion and technology assessment studies. The research was designed to 
determine the extent of the use and influence of indicators in decisions of 
technology innovation, to characterize the role of indicators in these deci-
sions, and to understand how indicators are used in these decisions. The 
latter involved the test of four possible explanatory factors: the type and 
phase of decision, and the context and process of construction of evidence. 
Furthermore, it focused on three Portuguese innovation groups: public 
researchers, business research, development and innovation (R&D&I) 
leaders and policymakers. The research used a combination of methods to 
collect quantitative and qualitative information, such as surveys, case 
studies, and social network analyses. 
This research concluded that the use of indicators is different from their 
influence in decisions of technology innovation. In fact, there is a high use 
of indicators in these decisions, but lower and differentiated differences in 
their influence in each innovation group. This suggests that political-
behavioural methods are also involved in the decisions to different degrees. 
The main social influences in the decisions came mostly from hierarchies, 
knowledge-based contacts and users. Furthermore, the research established 
that indicators played mostly symbolic roles in decisions of policymakers 
and business R&D&I leaders, although their role with researchers was 
more differentiated. Indicators were also described as helpful instruments 
to conduct a reasonable interpretation of data and to balance options in 
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innovation and technology assessments studies, in particular when contex-
tualised, described in detail, and with discussion upon the options made.  
Results suggest that there are four main explanatory factors for the role of 
indicators in these decisions: First, the type of decision appears to be a 
factor to consider when explaining the role of indicators. In fact, each type 
of decision had different influences on the way indicators are used and each 
type of decision used different types of indicators. Results for policy-
making were particularly different from decisions of acquisition and of 
development of products/technology. Second, the phase of the decision can 
help to understand the role indicators play in these decisions. Results 
distinguished between two phases – before and after the decision – as well 
as two other phases that can be used to complement the decision process 
and where indicators can be involved. Third, the context of decision is an 
important factor to consider when explaining the way indicators are taken 
into consideration in policy decisions. In fact, the role of indicators can be 
influenced by the particular context of the decision maker, in which all 
types of evidence can be selected or downplayed. More importantly, the 
use of persuasive analytical evidence appears to be related with the dispute 
existent in the policy context. Fourth and last, the process of construction 
of evidence is a factor to consider when explaining the way indicators are 
involved in these decisions. Indicators and other evidence were brought to 
the decision processes according to their availability and capacity to sup-
port the different arguments and interests of the actors and stakeholders. In 
one case, an indicator lost much persuasion strength with the controversies 
that it went through during the decision process. Therefore, it can be argued 
that the use of indicators is high but not very influential; their role is mostly 
symbolic to policymakers and business decisions, but varies among re-
searchers. The role of indicators in these decisions depends on the type and 
phase of the decision and the context and process of construction of evi-
dence. The latter two are related to the particular context of each decision 
maker, the existence of elements of dispute and controversies that influence 
the way indicators are introduced in the decision-making process. 
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1 Introduction  
Indicators exist as a human effort to simplify understanding and govern-
ance of reality. They are conceptual instruments used to measure, evaluate 
and help with decisions by summarizing characteristics or highlighting 
what is happening in reality. Their use in human history can be traced back, 
at least, to fourteenth century historical records regarding the management 
of the Venetian sugar trade with Cyprus (Maddison 2001). Later, the rise of 
science played an important role in stimulating the need for quantification 
through an emphasis on objectivity, the written word, rigor, precision and 
transparency (Shor 2008). More recently, and particularly since the 1930s, 
the use of indicators increased with the intensification of science and the 
emergence of a real culture of objectivity. In the 1970s, the “social indica-
tors movement” was born in reaction to the economic alignment of this 
quantification culture. Since then, the use of indicators as a way of reason-
ing has spread to several areas of knowledge and human endeavour. In fact, 
they can be seen in the management of companies, administration of states, 
military works, healthcare, scientific production and accounting, among 
others (Fioramonti 2014; Porter 1995; Power 1997). Presently, there are 
thousands of indicators alone in the area of social sciences (Fioramonti 
2014), and many more can be found in other fields to support understand-
ing and governance of modern societies. 
Despite the proliferation of indicators, research about their real influence in 
decisions received less attention. Most literature aims to develop, analyse 
or evaluate them. Only a limited set of works studied their influence  
in decision-making (MacRae 1985, Gudmundsson and Sørensen 2012,  
Sébastien and Bauler 2013; Lehtonen 2013). In fact, the role of indicators 
remains almost enigmatic because little is known about how they are used 
in decision-making (Sébastien and Bauler 2013). Furthermore, research 
about the role of indicators in innovation contexts is rather limited and 
recent. Only lately have two studies provided evidence about the role  
of indicators in policy decisions related to sustainable development  
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(Gudmundsson and Sørensen 2012; Sébastien and Bauler 2013). Until now, 
little is known in relation to other innovation areas and actors. 
This gap in the innovation literature can be problematic for four main 
reasons. First, the role of indicators in innovation is important to under-
stand how decisions are made and actors behave. In fact, literature should 
identify the ways indicators are included in the decision and, at the same 
time, capture the behaviour of different decision makers when using them. 
More knowledge about the use of indicators is also important in innovation 
policies because they are intended to act upon the innovation system, 
changing the environment where private and public researchers develop 
their innovations. Additionally, existing knowledge about the influence of 
indicators in sustainable policy is not enough to allow generalizations in 
other areas of innovation and actors of the innovation system. Moreover, 
innovation policies have obvious implications for socio-economic devel-
opment through action upon the socio-economic system, where innovations 
can interact and promote economic growth. Therefore, there is the need for 
more research to enable a discerned use of indicators and to improve 
actions upon the innovation system. 
This gap in the literature is also problematic to technology assessment 
studies for several reasons. First, technology assessment frequently relies 
on indicators to address relevant societal questions about technology (Barré 
2001). For example, in a technology assessment study about the potential 
and impacts of cloud computing services, Leimbach et al. (2014) used 
indicators about the type of use and the type of cloud services in order to 
understand and explain the adoption and usage patterns of companies and 
consumers. Second, indicators are not neutral instruments to analyse 
technology problems, because they are selected by criteria that express 
values and interests of those who propose a specific description of a prob-
lem. For example, it is significantly different to observe an indicator of a 
CO2 footprint of a product than to analyse the whole chain of different risk 
factors associated with the use of a technology. Third, the description of 
complex problems and the strategies for their solution are heavily influ-
enced by the use of indicators. For example, the use of an indicator of 
1  Introduction 
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“security of livelihood” in a sustainability problem introduces a specific 
description of a selected problem, which is in this way placed as a key 
problem against which strategies for its solution are to be defined. Fourth, 
technology assessment needs a transparent and thoughtful relation with 
indicators because it can not only lead to new alternative technology 
options, but also create space for controversies between stakeholders that 
use a limited set of indicators. For example, the debate about risks of 
nuclear power plants shifted in the moment the indicator of climate neutral-
ity came in, because nuclear fission previously seemed to be an environ-
mentally friendly technology. Fifth, the applicability of indicators used and 
proven in established fields needs reflection while transferring them to a 
new or emergent technology, as conditions can change significantly and 
there might be changes in methodology or new empirical test settings 
relevant for uncover possible harm or damage. Sixth and last, the study of 
how indicators are involved in policy-making can help technology assess-
ment practitioners to understand the policy process. This can also help to 
differentiate from the scientific and business processes, to develop public 
participation practices and to improve scientific communication of find-
ings. These insights about the policy process can also help to identify 
stakeholders that influence the decisions, as well as to determine their role 
in the decision process. In essence, the knowledge gap is problematic to 
technology assessment because studies frequently rely on indicators, the 
selection of indicators is not neutral, they can open alternatives and contro-
versies, and their study can improve knowledge about policy processes. 
This work addresses this knowledge gap with research designed to under-
stand three questions: what is the extent of the influence of indicators in 
technology innovation decisions? What is the role of indicators in these 
decisions? And how are indicators used in these decisions? It will be 
argued that the extensive use of indicators is different from their real 
influence on decisions, and that indicators play mostly a minor role, ex-
plainable by the type and phase of the decision, and the context and the 
process of construction of evidence. Results will also describe the behav-
iour of the actors and their relationships in policy decisions. In sum, an-
1  Introduction 
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swers to the three research questions will provide new findings to the 
literature about indicators in decisions of technology innovation. 
The research questions focused specifically on three groups of actors and 
four types of decisions. First, the work dealt with three Portuguese technol-
ogy innovation groups that significantly invested in technology innovation. 
These groups are: a research group composed of public researchers and 
academics; a business group comprised of leaders of research, development 
and innovation departments in companies; and policymakers related to 
technology innovation. Second, research concentrated on the four types of 
decisions of technology innovation, namely: acquisition of equipment or a 
specific technology; development of a product or a specific technology; 
purchase of property rights; and design of policies (e.g. programs, 
measures, actions and projects).  
There was one noteworthy difficulty in conducting this research. The 
variety of definitions of indicators is significant (Heink and Kowarik 
2010), making it difficult to frame the object of analysis across innovation 
groups and sectors. On one hand, indicators may be selected to characterize 
the efforts undertaken by countries, regions or companies. They usually 
cover resources devoted to research and development (R&D), innovation, 
patenting, technology balance of payments, international trade in R&D-
intensive industries, etc. For example, the publication “Innovation Union 
Scoreboard” uses three indicators to measure the availability of a highly-
skilled and educated workforce: “New doctorate graduates”; “Population 
aged 30-34 with completed tertiary education”; and “Population aged 20-
24 having completed at least upper secondary education” (Hollanders and 
Es-Sadki 2014). On the other hand, in a laboratory or innovation depart-
ment context, indicators often reflect the applied nature of innovation. For 
example, innovation indicators in a business context can be related to the 
energy consumption of manufacturing a product, the cost of a machine to 
improve a process, or the amount of raw material introduced in a new 
technology. Furthermore, sometimes indicators are defined as a concept 
(e.g. climate neutrality), and in other cases they consist of measures of a 
phenomenon (e.g. population aged 30-34 with a completed tertiary educa-
1  Introduction 
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tion). Therefore, there was the need to adopt a definition of indicators 
broad enough to encompass the meanings they can have in different inno-
vation activities. 
The present work contains four more chapters. The following chapter 
presents the theoretical framework underpinning this research in two 
different blocks. The first subchapter discusses the role of evidence and 
indicators in decision-making. It first examines the use of evidence in 
decision contexts, and the emergence of a movement calling for their 
introduction in public policy. Afterwards, it addresses the difficulties in 
framing a definition of indicators, the rise of quantification in human 
reasoning and the main merits and limitations of indicators. Last, it dis-
cusses the existing knowledge about indicators’ use, influence and role in 
the decision process, and presents a proposal to address the gaps found in 
the literature about indicators in technology innovation. Furthermore, the 
second subchapter develops the main concepts associated with the decision 
process of technology innovation. It starts by introducing concepts related 
to innovation, namely the process of innovation, its main actors, the net-
works they form to innovate, and the main concepts of innovation policy. It 
also introduces the reader to the theory of the decision process, presenting a 
model to interpret decisions of technology innovation and the main factors 
influencing these decisions. Afterwards, it describes the four types of 
decisions of technology innovation, which often occur embedded in ele-
ments of complexity and uncertainty.  
The third chapter describes the methods used to test the hypotheses. It first 
describes the methodological choices made. It also concentrates on present-
ing the various methods used: surveys (with self-administered question-
naires and standardized interviews); and case studies of a decision related 
to electric mobility and a decision to create a laboratory of nanotechnology. 
The networks created to make these two latter decisions were also analysed 
using social network analysis. In the last phase, the work included  
complementary in-depth interviews with experts to answer remaining 
questions. 
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The fourth chapter presents the main results in three blocks that address the 
research questions. The first subchapter describes the extent of the use and 
influence of indicators in technology innovation decisions, based on results 
from the survey. The second subchapter presents results to characterize the 
role of indicators in these decisions. The third and last subchapter presents 
results to explain how indicators were used in these decisions. It combines 
results from the survey and the case studies to test whether the type and 
phase of the decision and the context and the process of construction of 
evidence are factors affecting the way indicators are introduced in deci-
sions. 
In the last chapter, the main conclusions of the book are described. The 
conclusions are also discussed in relation to the existing literature to 
establish the contributions of this work. Afterwards, an overview of the 




2 Theoretical framework 
This chapter introduces the theoretical framework to study the role of 
indicators in the decision process of technology innovation. The first 
subchapter argues that more research is needed about the role of indicators 
in these decisions. The second subchapter develops the main concepts 
needed to conduct research into the decision process of technology innova-
tion. The third and last subchapter summarizes research questions and 
hypotheses, and identifies the main concepts to be used in this research. 
2.1 Evidence and indicators 
This subchapter argues that there is a gap in the literature of innovation and 
technology assessment, thus requiring research into the influence and the 
role of indicators in decision-making. The discussion will show the need 
for comprehensive information about the extent of the use and influence of 
indicators in decisions of technology innovation, their role in these deci-
sions, and the way indicators are involved in decisions. Furthermore, the 
subchapter is divided into four sections: the first section examines the use 
of general evidence in the decision-making process; the second section 
discusses the historical emergence of quantification in society; the third 
section describes the main merits and limitations associated with indicators 
in decision-making; and the fourth section identifies a gap in the literature 
of innovation and technology assessment in relation to the way indicators 
are involved in decision-making. This last section proposes a process to 
clarify the extent of the use and influence of indicators in these decisions, 
the role of indicators and how indicators are used in decisions of techn-
ology innovation. 
2  Theoretical framework 
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2.1.1 The use of evidence 
“Evidence” can be operationally defined as the available body of facts or 
information indicating whether a belief or proposition is true or valid
1
. It 
follows that the truthfulness or validity of a proposition depends on the 
strength of the evidence: weak evidence does not exclude other contradic-
tory assertions; and strong evidence normally excludes contradictions and 
typically agrees with scientific findings
2
. Furthermore, evidence can 
assume various forms in different contexts. In fact, evidence can be indica-
tors, historical facts, statistics
3
, results of experiments, texts, quotes from 
secondary sources, real experiences or histories, or opinions of individuals 
in one field. These forms can also vary with the context: In policy-making 
contexts, evidence can range from numerical data to ethical/moral interpre-
tations expressing values, attitudes and perceptions of stakeholders and 
other decision makers. In health contexts, evidence can be research find-
ings, other knowledge that is explicit, systemic and replicable, or simple 
acceptable waiting times (Lomas et al. 2005). In management contexts, 
evidence can include costs, technical characteristics of materials, stake-
holders’ opinions, etc. In sum, evidence is the body of facts or information 
that supports the strength of a proposition, and can assume various forms 
depending on the contexts where they are considered. 
There is an abundance of uses for “evidence” in policy literature. In one 
extreme, evidence can be strictly identified with scientific outputs. In this 
case, evidence comprises all types of science (and social science) 
knowledge generated by research and analysis processes, either within or 
without the policy-making institution (Juntti, Russel, and Turnpenny 2009). 
On the other end of the spectrum, evidence is considered useful to support 
policy. In this case, evidence is not necessarily data or information, but 
mostly a selection of the available information introduced in an argument 
                                                          
1  “Evidence” Oxford Dictionary Online. Last accessed in 21/12/2014. 
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/de/definition/englisch/evidence. 
2  Scientific findings are qualitative and quantitative research findings produced and tested by 
means of Science and Technology. 
3  For the purpose of this work a statistic is a numerical fact or datum, especially one computed 
from a sample (Gault 2013b). 
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to persuade of the truthfulness or falseness of a statement (Flitcroft et al. 
2011). Furthermore, the use of evidence in policy-making can be a subjec-
tive process. In fact, the strength and quality of evidence can be related to 
the number of controversies it experiences during its lifetime (Sébastien 
and Bauler 2013). In these cases, evidence loses strength in the decision-
making process with any increase of controversy since creation. In addi-
tion, the selection of evidence can depend on the situations in which 
policymakers find themselves. These situations shape which information is 
used from the complex set available, and which evidence is rejected or at 
least downplayed (Perri 6 2002). In fact, policy-making “always makes use 
of some evidence, but there is a plurality […] of things that count as 
evidence, and what counts depends on where policymakers are situated” 
(Perri 6 2002, 7). Moreover, the selection of evidence can be related to 
epistemological choices of the decision maker, in terms of claims about 
valid sources of knowledge and how to judge knowledge claims. These 
choices can be related to the use of quantitative or qualitative information, 
but also ideology, as, for example, religious believers might endorse 
theological claims to knowledge. These choices often reflect ontological 
assumptions about the objectivity or subjectivity of reality. For example, 
for some, only positivistic techniques of inquiry support claims to 
knowledge as reliable facts, whereas for others the complexities of the 
social world demand an interpretation of human behaviour and intentions 
(Henn, Weinstein, and Foard 2009). In this context, policy emerges from 
the interaction of different forms of evidence, filtered and shaped by the 




                                                          
4  To the authors, policy-making is the management of rival value set and notions of evidence. 
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This filtering process is subjective and one piece of evidence can be chosen 
instead of another, leading the argument in different directions.
5
 Therefore, 
what counts as evidence in policy-making can vary from “pure” scientific 
outputs to selected information used to create an argument, depends on the 
controversies associated, can vary with the context of the policymaker and 
is subject to a complex filtering process. 
The use of evidence in policy-making practice is poorly studied. In fact, 
there is a significant body of literature about why and how scientifically 
based evidence should be used by decision makers. However, a much 
smaller set of recent studies examines the direct use of evidence in policy-
making practice (Hall and Jennings 2010). In a work about the use and 
weight of information and evidence in U.S. state policy decisions, the 
authors stated: 
We know very little about where agencies seek information, and 
how they weight information from various sources in their decision 
process. And within that sphere, the prevalence of formal scientific 
evidence use in policy decision remains somewhat a mystery. (Hall 
and Jennings 2010, 137) 
Furthermore, there are increasing calls for public policies that use evidence 
(Head 2010; Flitcroft et al. 2011; Juntti, Russel, and Turnpenny 2009; 
                                                          
5  The political system has social procedures to relativize criticisms, rejections, risks and 
failures associated with policies. According to Niklas Luhmann: “The daily struggle be-
tween government and opposition makes all causal constructions of origin and result con-
troversial anyway. There are always people around who criticize decisions. This noise, to 
which politicians are accustomed and on which they thrive, makes the prospect of post-
decisional regret a normal fact of life that has to do with the essence of politics, and not 
with the content or merit of a particular decision. The important thing is to remain accepted 
within your own power network. Hence, politicians become inured to daily criticism and 
rejection; the predominant question is from which side it comes. They develop rhetorical 
techniques and network-repairing devices in order to survive, and the causal network is 
complex enough to provide for divergent attributions. […] Politics has a high institutional 
[…] capacity for absorbing risks. It dissolves risks into noise and news. But if we continue 
to expect a political solution to the larger problems of modern society we will be disap-
pointed. The political system appears as a collective actor. It is the prime addressee for all 
kinds of problems which find no solution elsewhere”. (Luhmann 1990, 229). 
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Sorrell 2007; Hall and Jennings 2010). These calls are based on the idea 
that the inclusion of evidence leads to the best-informed decisions possible. 
According to Caitlin Porter (2010), evidence-based policy-making is a 
worthy aspiration that improves the quality of decision-making. It is based 
on the idea that knowledge can be disseminated in the policy process 
through the introduction of scientific facts, concepts and theoretical per-
spectives (Weiss 1979). Evidence-based policy is particularly attractive in 
countries with a political culture of transparency and rationality in the 
policy process, and with a research culture committed to rigorous method-
ologies using policy-relevant evidence (Head 2010). In sum, there are 
increasing calls for transparent, rational and rigorous introduction of 
evidence in policies based on the best available scientific knowledge, 
despite the fact that the extent of their use in practice is poorly understood. 
These calls for policies that include evidence are coming from profession-
als in different fields. The calls probably originated in healthcare practi-
tioners demanding policies based on the best evidence-based practices. A 
major challenge has been to translate the findings and lessons of healthcare 
research about effective treatment into clinical guidelines to be used by 
healthcare professionals (Head 2010). After, management literature called 
for an increase in the use of evidence at least in making important decisions 
(Jauch and Glueck 1988; Head 2010). Head (2010, 79) argued that business 
leaders are dependent on accurate evidence about performance, standards 
and market conditions, and that decisions should increasingly be based on 
reliable information and expert dialogues, rather than on power and per-
sonal intuition. A similar trend can be found in the field of (social) devel-
opment (see among others C. Porter 2010). Some authors have even named 
these groups an evidence-based movement (Glasner-Edwards and Rawson 
2010; Jonson-Reid 2011; Denzin 2009; Lilienfeld et al. 2013). Therefore, 
there is an “evidence-based movement” from professionals in different 
fields arguing for decisions based on the best available evidence. 
This evidence-based push can also be identified in Science, Technology 
and Innovation (STI) policy. In fact, there are signs that in Europe STI 
policies are increasingly being based on evidence-based policy, rather than 
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on rationale informed by systemic models of innovation and from economic 
theories of knowledge and technical change. In 2002, the adherence of the 
European Council to one explicit target based on an indicator symbolizes 
this shift towards policies based on evidence (Moniz 2011). In fact, all 
European countries agreed to increase the overall spending on R&D and 
innovation to approach 3% of GDP by 2010, with two-thirds of this in-
vestment coming from the private sector.
6
 Furthermore, the two main 
determinants of this push in evidence in STI policy are the increasingly 
large sums of public funding to R&D at European and national levels, and 
the ease of access to computer-based data collection (Godin 2009a). For 
example, the European Commission publishes the yearly Innovation Union 
Scoreboard for free and for more than a decade. The publication gathers 
evidence for systematic comparison of innovation performance across 
European countries/regions and promotes international policy benchmark-
ing. In another example, both PRO INNO Europe and ERA Watch
7
 pro-
grammes systematically collect and freely diffuse data, evidence, policies 
and programmes on European, national and regional levels. In addition, 
there is also a growing demand for evidence from private businesses, 
consultants and policy advisors (Mytelka and Smith 2002; Godin 2009b). 
Last, several technology assessment
8
 reports revealed the need to enhance 
existing evidence to base forecasts on the impacts of future technology 
developments (Grunwald 2007; Europäische Akademie 2004). In sum, 
there are signs that STI decisions are increasingly being based on evidence, 
driven by different stakeholders of the innovation system
9
. 
There are some disagreements with this evidence-based movement, despite 
their growing popularity in some countries. The first line of criticism is 
related to the quality of the evidence, because the explanatory scope of 
                                                          
6  European Council. 2002. “Conclusions of the Barcelona European Council 2002.”  
Vol. 35. Barcelona. Last accessed in 11/12/2014: http://ec.europa.eu/invest-in-
research/pdf/download_en/barcelona_european_council.pdf. 
7  More information about these two programmes can be found respectively at: 
http://grips.proinno-europe.eu/about/ and in: http://erawatch.jrc.ec.europa.eu/ 
8  The concept of technology assessment will be developed in the subchapter 2.2. 
9  The concept of innovation system will be developed in the subchapter 2.2. 
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most evidence is often more limited than its use in policy decisions. Hall 
and Jennings (2010, 139) argued that information of dubious reliability or 
validity may be used to justify public programs. This line of criticism can 
also include evidence being used for rhetorical purposes, while adopting 
policies that may not adequately utilize the evidence that is available or 
obtainable. The second line of criticism is epistemological and relates to 
the overreliance on quantitative studies for evidence-based policies. De-
spite the limitations of quantitative findings, qualitative research continues 
to play a small role in circles of evidence-based policy. In fact, qualitative 
findings remain accepted only to provide nuances to most quantitative 
studies (Veltri, Lim, and Miller 2014).
10
 A third line of criticism relates to 
the lack of research supporting the claim that, for example, evidence-based 
management leads to real improvements. In management studies, evidence-
based supporters “simply restate the dominant discourse and make unsub-
stantiated claims that there is an evidence base without producing the 
actual evidence” (Stacey 2011, 180). Therefore, although growing  
in popularity, the use of evidence in policy-making still faces relevant 
criticism. 
2.1.2 The rise of quantification 
There is a significant number of types and definitions of indicators (Heink 
and Kowarik 2010). These varieties challenge the framing of analysis both 
in an innovation
11
 policy context and in a laboratory. First, in innovation 
policy contexts, indicators are commonly understood as variables selected 
to characterize the efforts undertaken by countries, regions or companies in 
the field of science, technology and innovation. These indicators measure 
                                                          
10  According to Veltri, Lim, and Miller (2014), qualitative findings can contribute to evi-
dence-based policy in different ways. First, qualitative research offers a commitment to 
observe and explain phenomena from the perspective of those being studied, providing 
them with a “voice”. Second, this type of research provides reflexive awareness and con-
sideration of the researcher’s role and perspective. Third, the authors argued that qualitative 
research is not methodologically orthodox and can use flexible research strategies. Fourth, 
qualitative research offers a contextualization of the data collection and of its analysis. 
Fifth, qualitative research is thoughtful of emerging categories and theories rather than 
relying upon a priori concepts and ideas. 
11  The concepts of innovation will be developed in the subchapter 2.2. 
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resources devoted to research and development (R&D), innovation, patent-
ing, technology balance of payments, international trade in R&D-intensive 
industries, etc. There is a significant amount of innovation indicators freely 
available for comparisons over time and across countries, regions, sectors 
and companies.
12
 For example, the Innovation Union Scoreboard captures 
the economic success of innovation using five indicators: “Employment in 
knowledge-intensive activities”, “Contribution of medium and high-tech 
product exports to the trade balance”, “Exports of knowledge-intensive 
services”, “Sales due to innovation activities”, and “License and patent 
revenues from selling technologies abroad” (Hollanders and Es-Sadki 
2014). Second, in a laboratory or innovation department context indicators 
often reflect the applied nature of innovation. For example, in a business 
environment, innovation indicators can be related to the energy consump-
tion to manufacture a product, the cost of a machine to improve a process, 
or the amount of raw material introduced in a new technology, as men-
tioned. In addition, definitions are bound to the level of analysis of indica-
tors. In fact, sometimes indicators are defined as a concept (e.g. climate 
neutrality and human toxicity), and other times they consist of measures of 
a phenomenon (e.g. population aged 30-34 with a completed tertiary 
education and gross domestic expenditures on R&D). Therefore, the 
variety of types and definitions of indicators suggest adoption of a defini-




Indicators can be defined as conceptual instruments used to measure, 
evaluate and help with decisions by summarizing characteristics or high-
lighting what is happening in reality. In this context, an indicator is an 
instrument to support decisions related to equipment, a product, a process, 
                                                          
12  Indicators are systematically published and downloadable from most public institution 
working with innovation policy (e.g. OECD, the European Commission, Eurostat, national 
statistical institutes and UNESCO). There are also many official publications, such as Main 
Science and Technology Indicators, Innovation Union Scoreboard, and EU Industrial R&D 
Investment Scoreboard. 
13  The concepts of decision-making and of technology innovation will be developed in 
subchapter 2.2. 
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a technology, a patent or an innovation system. Indicators are often a 
compromise between scientific accuracy and the information available at a 
reasonable cost. Furthermore, the definition of indicator can also include 
qualitative indicators such as certifications, submissions and other catego-
ries, as well as other more subjective measures such as satisfaction, worries 
or trust (Rammstedt 2009). Nevertheless, indicators are frequently based on 
quantitative measures that can be linked to the emergence of objectivity in 
human reasoning. 
Indicators exist as a human effort to simplify the understanding and gov-
ernance of the realm. They are inherently connected with the social need of 
quantification
14
 for public as well as for scientific purposes. The sociologist 
Max Weber emphasized the rise of capitalism and the rational spirit in 
western societies to explain a move towards a more rational, bureaucratic 
and calculative life, and the increased tendency to quantify social entities 
and behaviours (Shor 2008). Theodore Porter (1995, 74) argued that these 
quantification efforts were generally allied with the raise of the “spirit of 
rigor”. According to the author: 
Strict quantification, through measurement, counting, and calcula-
tion, is among the most credible strategies for rendering nature or so-
ciety objective. It has enjoyed widespread and growing authority in 
Europe and America for about two centuries. In natural science its 
reign began still earlier. It has also been strenuously opposed. This 
ideal of objectivity is a political as well as a scientific one. Objectivity 
means the rule of law, not of men. It implies the subordination of per-
sonal interests and prejudices to public standards. (Porter 1995, 75) 
Other explanations about the proliferation of quantification can be found in 
the rise of the modern centralized state. In France and the USA in particu-
lar, public officials faced the need to efficiently manage increasing popula-
tions and large-scale social institutions (Shor 2008). In this context, strate-
                                                          
14  Quantification is the act of giving a numerical value to a measurement of something, that is, 
to count the quanta of whatever one is measuring, producing a standardized form of meas-
urement that allows statistical procedures and mathematical calculations (Shor 2008). 
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gies of impersonality drove the transition to more explicit decision criteria 
(i.e. objective decisions) in public governance, instead of the old practice of 
expert judgment (subjective decisions) (Porter 1995). The rise of objective 
decisions appears to be linked more to external pressures to use explicit 
criteria, than to the need for better decisions arising from powerful insiders 
interested in better decisions, according to the author. In addition, Power 
(1997) suggested that accountants and the rise of bureaucracy also played a 
significant role spurring the growth of quantification, particularly during 
the twentieth century. In sum, the rise of indicators is connected to the 
emergence of quantification efforts that resulted from rationalization 
practices, scientific thinking, social need to produce impersonal and explic-
it decisions, and the rise of accountants and bureaucracy in society. 
The origins of indicators as modes of knowledge and governance are 
difficult to trace back in history. In the fourteen century, indicators related 
to the size and carrying capacity of galleys were used to control and man-
age the sugar trade between Venetia and Cyprus (Maddison 2001). Later, 
the rise of the scientific mentality played an important role, as mentioned 
before, by stimulating the need for objectivity, the written word, rigorous 
quantification, precision and transparency. For a long time, the quantifica-
tion efforts of science remained associated with the practical world of 
administration and commerce. For example, although in 1648 Pascal 
discovered that a barometer’s mercury would fall when carried to a higher 
elevation, it was only in eighteenth-century that military engineers devel-
oped rigorous barometric measurements of land elevation to draw topo-
graphical maps of mountainous regions (Porter 1995). During this time 
“the art of reasoning by figures on things relating to government” was 
called political arithmetic (Maddison 2003, 15). Afterwards, indicators 
were used in connection with the raise of the modern nation-state in the 
beginning of the nineteenth century, and their need to govern objectively, 
impartially and transparently (Merry 2011). In fact, an increase in demands 
for indicators came from the need of engineers and technocrats enrolled in 
the development of administrative culture in modern France. These groups 
were highly interested in administrative management, and had considerable 
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enthusiasm for the work on efficiency by Frederick Winslow Taylor, 
among other managerial writers (Moniz 2007; Porter 1995). 
In the 1930s, a significant emphasis was placed on quantification with the 
growth of science in the USA and the culture of equidistance and imper-
sonal objectivity in decision-making. In the US, important efforts of quanti-
fication were implemented with the systematic use of Intelligence Quo-
tient
15 
tests to classify students, opinion polls to quantify the public mood, 
elaborate statistical methodologies for licensing drugs, and even cost-
benefit and risk analyses to assess public works (Porter 1995). Later in the 
1950s, a significant stimulus was given to the need of objectivity and 
quantification by the US Corps of Engineers, concentrating their “failed 
engineers” in economic activities around all district offices “where they 
were likely to do less harm” (186). At the same time, the US Corps began 
employing increasing numbers of economists and other social scientists. 
This resulted in a takeover of economists and the emergence of cost-benefit 
analysis in modern economic studies. This type of analysis began with 
water projects and transport studies (Scigliano 2002), but were later signif-
icantly disseminated by RAND’s
16
 military studies. 
In the 1970s, a “social indicators movement” was born in reaction to the 
economic orientation of the above-mentioned quantification culture (Land 
2000). A group of intellectuals, mostly social scientists, considered the 
word “social” to be restrictively defined and meant only “outside the realm 
of economics” (Sheldon and Parke 1975, 695). According to this group, 
science (or quantification in general) created a new sort of “philistines” 
encouraged by the relative ease of expressing quantities in dollars and, 
                                                          
15 Intelligence Quotient, commonly known as IQ, is a score derived from standardized tests 
designed to assess intelligence. 
16 According to Linstone (2008) the RAND Corporation is an influential American think-tank 
of the second half of the twentieth century. The company was established in 1946 to deal 
with useful applications labelled “operations research”, which applied mathematics to 
problems such as interceptor vectoring and convoy protection.  Presently, RAND is well 
accepted in decision-making corridors of Washington, DC, and offers vast research and 
analysis to the U.S. armed forces. RAND is currently financed by the U.S. government and 
private foundations, corporations including the healthcare industry, universities and private 
individuals. 
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consequently, giving an exaggerated importance to these numbers in the 
interpretation of reality (695). Therefore, scientists linked to this movement 
argued for a change in conceptual frameworks, shifting the emphasis from 
economics to measures of social change, which included different subsys-
tems in society like education, health, economics, etc. The arguments were 
focused on the controversy that resulted from an economic-centred per-
spective, and mainly concentrated on what this new wave of indicators 
should measure. 
The controversy eventually faded-out and the quantification rationale 
started to be applied to several parts of life, broadening its scope to many 
areas of knowledge and human endeavour. Presently, it is possible to find 
this quantification rationale applied to global scales (Misuraca, Codagnone, 
and Rossel 2013; Maddison 2001) and even in our personal lives. For 
example, Robichaud, Durand, and Ouellet (2006) reported on the existence 
of indicators for personal quality of life, such as measures of verbal com-
munication interaction, well-being, participation level in social activities or 
engagement and integration in the community. Furthermore, this new 
quantification trend should not be interpreted as an attempt against qualita-
tive methods of reasoning. In fact, the production of a quantitative indicator 
primarily reflects values of an ethical, moral, political, economic or finan-
cial nature existing in society before their creation. Their significant expan-
sion in recent years was based on an existent societal will expressed, for 









 and universities). Despite its problems, quantification is an im-
portant and viable component of today’s social world, and there are few 
who would argue for returning to a pre-quantification world (Shor 2008). 
                                                          
17  OCDE is the acronym of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 
18  ILO is the acronym of the International Labour Organization. 
19  UNDP is the acronym of the United Nations Development Programme. 
20  WHO is the acronym of World Health Organization. 
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2.1.3 Merits and limitations of indicators 
Indicators are commonly understood as containing knowledge that can be 
used. At the individual level, an actor positions him/herself personally in 
relation to an indicator after having read, digested and interpreted the 
knowledge it contains; at the collective level, the use of indicators is part of 
an organisation’s operational routines with stabilised ways of thinking and 
acting about knowledge (Sébastien and Bauler 2013). Technology deci-
sions
21
, in particular, can be supported by the use of indicators at least 
theoretically, since indicators are seen as containing knowledge to help the 
decision maker achieve a more efficient decision. For example, the use of 
the number of graduates in S&T is a commonly used indicator when 
deciding about innovation policies. In fact, the indicator can help under-
stand the amount of available scientific skills in the labour force when 
facing a policy decision. In another example, the use of the financial cost of 
energy in a factory is an accepted indicator to decide about the acquisition 
of wind turbines for an industrial plant. Therefore, many of our perceptions 
about innovation
22
 can be informed by this type of quantitative knowledge 
(Katz 2006). Furthermore, the repetition of these measures enables the 





 and the American National Science Board collect 
measures related, for example, to population, GDP
25
, Gross Expenditures 
on R&D and numbers of scientific papers and citations. The ratios between 
these measures are used as performance indicators such as national wealth 
(GDP per capita), Business R&D intensity (BERD/GDP) and scientific 
impact (citations/paper). In the end, these measures, combined with a set of 
performance criteria, can be used to evaluate programmes and projects and 
in benchmarking exercises. With these measures the state of a system is 
compared with a desired future state or another comparable system (e.g. 
country and region) (Gault 2010). Last, indicators (preferably disaggregated) 
                                                          
21  The concept of technology decisions will be developed in subchapter 2.2. 
22  The concept of innovation system will be developed in subchapter 2.2. 
23  Statistical Office of the European Commission. 
24  United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. 
25  Gross domestic product. 
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can also be used to provide background support to foresight exercises. In 
sum, indicators are an accepted instrument of useful knowledge that can 
help to make different types of social, scientific and technological deci-
sions. 
Literature about indicators also includes four arguments about their useful-
ness in decision-making. First, indicators can lead to better decisions and 
more effective actions by simplifying, clarifying and making aggregated 
information available to decision makers (United Nations 2007). For 
example, when taken as a system, they can guide experts and society in 
vast and complex issues, such as urban quality of life and sustainable 
development (Feller-Länzlinger et al. 2010). Second, indicators can be 
reference tools for social thinking and can useful in communicating ideas, 
thoughts and values. In fact, they can help to measure and calibrate pro-
gress towards societal goals, and provide an early warning to prevent 
economic, social and environmental setbacks (United Nations 2007). 
Innovation indicators were described as a “technology” selected by consen-
sus, produced by institutional or individual users, and governed by a set of 
rules in manuals that guide the collection and interpretation of data for 
international comparisons (Gault 2013). Third, the systematic use of 
indicators can introduce knowledge in decisions. In fact, when used to shed 
light about phenomena, indicators can facilitate the incorporation of physi-
cal and social science knowledge into decision-making (United Nations 
2007). Fourth, indicators are inherently connected with the need to make 
less controversial decisions. In fact, many believe that quantification 
minimizes prejudice, favouritism and nepotism in decision-making (Shor 
2008). In short, arguments for the usefulness of indicators in decision-
making include better decisions, more social thinking and introduction of 
knowledge and consensus in the decision process. 
However, despite their merits, there are also a number of limitations 
associated with indicators. These limitations can be divided into five 
different types of problems: 
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 One of the main problems with indicators is related to the variety 
found in their definitions, as previously mentioned. The variety is sig-
nificantly contingent upon the topic and objective of the study in ques-
tion. For example, Heink and Kowarik (2010) revealed that other au-
thors in the same specific field of ecology and environment had often 
used different definitions and different indicators. The variations found 
under the definition of ecology and environmental indicators were sig-
nificantly dependent on the topic under observation, the objective and 
the intended final user (e.g. politicians, researchers, companies, ex-
perts, general public and media). The authors also pointed out that 
none of the available definitions of indicators could completely cover 
the variety of concepts the term can have within the ecology and envi-
ronment arena. Furthermore, the variety of possible typologies to study 
indicators is significant. In general, the categories are linked to the ob-
jectives of each study. There are three relevant examples of a distinc-
tion between different objectives of the works and typologies created. 
First, in an environmental work, Smeets and Weterings (1999) classi-
fied indicators into four groups: a descriptive group (where indicators 
address what is happening), a performance group (where they answer 
whether it is relevant), an efficiency group (where they show if there 
are improvements), and a composite indicators group (where the ag-
gregation of several indicators show if the overall situation is better). 
Second, Heink and Kowarik (2010), in a study dedicated to understand 
differences in ecological indicators, found indicators classified as de-
scriptive measures, normative measures, hybrid measures, parameter 
values, measurements or measurement of results on hybrid concepts, 
descriptive components and hybrid components. Third and last, in a 
study about global governance by indicators, K. Davis, Kingsbury, and 
Merry (2012) defined two categories wherein indicators were used for 
evaluation and judgment. In sum, the variety of typologies created to 
classify indicators is significantly diverse, and related to the objective 
of each study. Therefore, it is difficult to find a common definition and 
typology to classify indicators. 
2  Theoretical framework 
22 
 The second order of problems of indicators is related to the general 
effects of their use. There are at least six main types of general effects: 
1. Measurements to construct indicators may produce fatigue in re-
spondents (Power 1997). They may also change the object of 
measurement given that once something is measured it changes its 
characteristics.  
2. Indicators may give rise to resistance when perceived as a threat 
or seen as a cause for social, economic or ecological instability or 
even damage. For example, indicators can provoke resistance 
when they are set up to control or monitor
26
 controversial labour 
or economic issues (e.g. working hours and sectoral productivity 
related to pay raise). In another example, if respondents to surveys 
fear their answers will be used against them or threaten their status 
quo, individuals may try to bias their responses. 
3. Indicators can suffer from excessive use, pressures deriving from 
material and organisational interests, and clashes of basic values 
and ideologies subject to political conflict (e.g. general orienta-
tions towards government, the state, quality of life, morality and 
inequality) (MacRae 1985). 
4. Indicators can be subject to political influence. In fact, if an organ-
isation or a profession is a constituency of either the collector or 
reporter of the data, it can be expected to exert the same kind of 
influence as if they were directly handling the data themselves 
(MacRae 1985). In some cases, indicators can suffer from confi-
dentiality problems or even the public’s suspicion of violations of 
privacy. Apart from the threat of direct (i.e. governmental) manip-
ulation, there is also the danger that rigid governmental rule by an 
indicator may undermine political debate (indicators can precipi-
tately justify measures by bypassing a broad public debate), and 
prevent reinterpretations of the world (when a problem does not 
exist anymore). 
                                                          
26  Monitoring is an activity involving repeated observation, according to a predetermined 
schedule, of one or more elements of the environment to detect their characteristics (status 
and trends) (United Nations Environment Programme 2010). 
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5. The development of indicators impacts its users. In fact, indicators 
are a “technology” which governs behaviour, can be modified by 
users (outside the producer community), and be developed in re-
sponse to the user’s needs (Gault 2011). Some types of indicators 
were developed to address a perceived need of a community that 
wants to use them, and is influenced by them in two major ways: 
Firstly, the development and evolution of an indicator involves 
consensus-building activities and the establishment of a common 
language to construct a discourse (with an agreed vocabulary and 
grammar) (Gault 2011). These activities impact the practitioners 
as they learn to use the language and advance the subject at hand. 
Secondly, after the development phase, the use of language and 
feedback from users also has an impact on society (Gault 2011). 
As a result of using indicators, users may change their behaviour 
or provide suggestions for later revision of indicators. 
6. Indicators can create a reality that is put on stage, fixing and re-
stricting the way the world can be defined. In fact, indicators can 
have a subliminal effect, setting fixed pathways for society 
through their use that sets political effects in motion. For example, 
the concept of scientific activity in bibliometry
27
 is sometimes de-
fined exclusively in terms of publications undermining other im-
portant activities. By focusing on an indicator of research output, a 
view is enhanced where scientific activity is similar to industrial 
production and other important activities are not accounted, such 
as scientific inquiry, reading, collecting data, serving as an editor 
or reviewer, giving advice or engaging in debates (Dahler-Larsen 
2013). Furthermore, indicators can produce constitutive effects on 
reality. In fact, an indicator has an interactive constitutive relation 
with the reality it seeks to describe, and is not a neutral representa-
tion of an existing concept, according to the author. An indicator 
helps define the concept it claims to measure in an operational 
way, similar to how intelligence tests contribute to define our con-
                                                          
27  See van Raan (1993). 
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cept of intelligence. In addition, there are three main mechanisms 
through which indicators can lead to constitutive effects of reality: 
indicators can create organizational procedures which structure an 
otherwise messy reality; indicators can shape language, establish-
ing particular meanings, definitions, incentives and regulations in 
which professionals and lay people have to respond; indicators al-
so enforce institutional lock-ins with incentives and sanctions, re-
warding pushes for standards, norms and procedures in affected 
groups, according to the author. An observable case of these con-
stitutive effects are the publishing of school rankings: A type of 
school quality is created through the actions (e.g. reactions to po-
sition in the league) and interactions between the actors in schools 
that follow the publication of school rankings (Dahler-Larsen 
2013, 15). An unintended effect of the rankings is to create a reali-
ty where the concept of quality is oriented towards competitive-
ness rather than to the inclusion needs of some schools. 
In sum, the use of indicators can produce general effects (e.g. fatigue, 
resistance, pressures and clashes), be subject to political influence, im-
pact users, and be a straitjacket to parts of society. 
 The third order of problems of indicators is related to the consequences 
of their systematic use. Indicators can impose a moral and ethical be-
haviour through the silent assimilation of their implicit values and du-
ties into society (Merry 2011). In fact, the repetition of a prescription 
encoded in an mechanism - in this case an indicator - can, in the long 
run, change established values and patterns of thought (Latour 1992). 
Some examples of these effects can be found in the systematic use of 
innovation rankings, school rankings, New Public Management pre-
scriptions, the European Commission’s excessive deficit procedure
28
, 
etc (Dahler-Larsen 2013). Furthermore, the systematic repetition of an 
indicator can contribute to the establishment of the view of the world 
                                                          
28  Under the provisions of the Stability and Growth Pact, Members-states agreed to respect 
targets for two indicators: a deficit-to-GDP ratio of 3% and a debt-to-GDP ratio of 60%, in 
order to avoid excessive budgetary deficits. See 
 http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/sgp/deficit/index_en.htm.  
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embedded in its definition (Dahler-Larsen 2013). For example, an in-
dicator emphasizing consumer satisfaction in public service is an ef-
fective way to import market principles into the public sector, despite 
problematic effects on civic virtues, according to the author. 
 The fourth order of problems relates to the potential for deception 
existent in the use of indicators. In fact, an incautious observation of 
reality through indicators can lead to deception about phenomena. C. 
Freeman (1995) provided two examples of how quantitative indicators 
could not explain changes in innovation systems. In a first example, 
the author showed that comparisons of R&D indicators were an inade-
quate method to explain the Japanese institutional and technical 
changes of the 1970s and 1980s. In his opinion, these changes needed 
qualitative description because the Japanese quantitative performance 
erroneously identified a concentration in the fastest growing civil in-
dustries (e.g. electronics), with patent statistics showing their leading 
role at world level. However, these measures of research and inven-
tiveness did not explain how these activities led to higher quality in 
new products and processes, to shorter lead times and to more rapid 
diffusion of technologies such as robotics. The second example came 
from the other side of the former iron curtain. According to Freeman, 
the former Soviet Union’s commitment to greater R&D did not in it-
self guarantee successful innovation, diffusion and productivity gains, 
as the fall of the Berlin Wall would later show. In short, the use of in-
dicators might lead to deception if only qualitative factors can describe 
the phenomenon. 
 The fifth and last order of problems with indicators relates to the 
sensitive nature of their selection process. In fact, the selection of indi-
cators can be a sensitive process for three main reasons: The selection 
of indicators can present significant methodological problems, which 
may arise from lack of data, the cost of information collection, super-
position of indicators, reliability issues or time pressure, among others 
(Merry 2011; Gault 2013). Furthermore, the selection of indicators can 
produce constitutive effects in the future, as mentioned previously. In 
fact, the use of indicators can structure organizational activities; pre-
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scribe values and interpretations of reality embedded in indicators; 
create new meanings for words and vocabulary; project incentives, 
sanctions, norms and regulations, etc (Dahler-Larsen 2013). Third and 
last, the selection process can entail activities that are not trivial, con-
scious nor neutral, creating an implicit and sometimes controversial 
space for “politics”, particularly if stakeholders use a different selec-
tion of indicators (this can be notably difficult in technology assess-
ment studies - see next section). The criteria used to select indicators 
may be based on several factors, such as indicators’ policy relevance, 
utility, analytical soundness and measurability (OECD 2003), as well 
as on other (sub)conscious factors allowing space for “politics”. There-
fore, there is the need for a clear formulation of the initial problem, 
which will enable a transparent selection of indicators that describe the 
problem to avoid controversies with stakeholders. Furthermore, the se-
lection of indicators should also include space to reflect about the in-
clusion and the non-inclusion of certain indicators. For example, the 
use of composite indicators
29 
for impressionistic propaganda (and 
oversimplification) by policymakers is an example of how indicators 
can be used (or rejected/downplayed) to suit political intent. The rele-
vance of composite indicators to policy is perhaps best captured by the 
idea of indicators that become “policy-resonant” (Hezri and Dovers 
2006, 87). According to the authors, an indicator that “strikes a chord” 
with its intended audience is easier to communicate, and often appro-
priated by policymakers and by the media (92). Sometimes, policy-
makers can claim that some indicators are difficult to interpret, and pe-
ripheral to the issues that generate political concern (Munda and Nardo 
2005). However, the claim can also be interpreted as an example of 
how evidence is rejected because it does not suit a policy argument. In 
short, the selection of indicators is an important and sensitive process, 
and even sometimes a hazardous procedure that needs careful consid-
eration. 
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The literature also revealed problems specific to innovation indicators, 
relevant in the context of technology innovation
30
. First, innovation indica-
tors can present dangers to society through their increased complexity, 
ambivalence of interpretation, or decontextualisation; may present prob-
lems of confidence, comparability and overlaps; and may lead to “shaming 
and blaming” of countries and to media oversimplification (Feller-
Länzlinger et al. 2010; Grupp and Schubert 2010; Nardo et al. 2008; Grupp 
and Mogee 2004). Second, there are limits to the use of indicators as an 
evaluation method of impacts of research and innovation funding and 
policies. In fact, Kuhlmann (2003) warned against using indicators alone to 
perform these evaluations, because they are not compatible with the ten-
dency to pursue complex political goals. In fact, the evaluations should 
combine various social science methods with indicators, according to the 
author. Third and last, there are problems associated with the aggregation 
of indicators in composites or indexes. In STI, there is an academic discus-
sion about the purpose and methodologies used to gather data and build 
these types of indicators (Godin 2008; Nardo et al. 2008; Grupp and Mogee 
2004; Barré 2004). Grupp and Schubert (2010) argued that some composite 
indicators in innovation were not subject to extensive research and may 
present confidence, comparability and overlapping problems. Nevertheless, 
scoreboards or composite indicators are often preferred by policymakers, as 
they can function as strategic instruments to influence policy change and 
communicate. In essence, the literature identified several problems related 
to innovation indicators and composite innovation indicators that should be 
taken into account in decision-making processes. 
2.1.4 The role of indicators 
The influence of indicators in general decision-making is largely unknown. 
Most literature aims to develop indicators, to analyse them or to evaluate 
them. However, only a few authors provided clues regarding the extent to 
which they are used to make a decision. These qualitative studies were 
mostly restricted to policy-making. In 1985, Duncan MacRae argued that 
                                                          
30  The concept of innovation and technology innovation will be developed in subchapter 2.2. 
2  Theoretical framework 
28 
the most frequent problem of indicators was their non-use in policy-
making. The reasons for this disregard of indicators could be found in the 
lack of interest, or communication, information overload, or even opposi-
tion to what is being measured. A significant part of the existing literature 
about the influence of indicators in policy-making is, however, recent and 
resulted from two European projects: POINT - Policy Influence of Indica-
tors and PASTILLE - Promoting Action for Sustainability through Indica-
tors at the Local Level in Europe (Bell and Morse 2013). The existing 
studies in policy contexts revealed that most indicators were often ignored 
or that their use was limited in policy decisions (MacRae 1985; Lehtonen 
2013; Sébastien and Bauler 2013). Sébastien and Bauler (2013, 3) empha-
sized that policy indicators remain largely enigmatic regarding patterns of 
embeddedness in institutional decision-making processes. In sum, literature 
about the extent of the use of indicators is meagre and mostly concentrated 
in policy-making. There is also some evidence that policy indicators were 
largely ignored. 
Literature in innovation contexts is scarcer than in general policy-making. 
The two existing studies were published only recently and are centred in 
sustainable policy. In two case studies of sustainable transport policy at the 
national and EU-level, Gudmundsson and Sørensen (2012) found that 
indicators played a significantly limited direct instrumental role. The 
research revealed that the use of indicators does not automatically mean 
influence on this type of policy or process. In fact, indicators may be used 
but are not really influential in the decision. Furthermore, in a second study 
about the significance of composite indicators for sustainable policy at the 
EU institutions, Sébastien and Bauler (2013) were convinced that compo-
sites were not systematically used directly, but had an indirect influence on 
policy-making that needs to be better understood. Most importantly, their 
conclusion emphasized the need to study the process of construction of 
evidence, rather than the technical quality of indicators and their independ-
ence from their producers (two factors initially presumed important). This 
latter work, however, dealt only with policy use of composite indicators by 
EU institutions. As mentioned previously, composite indicators can be 
controversial and present methodological problems. In fact, some authors 
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considered composite indicators more adequate for policy communication 
and serving a competition function (Grupp and Schubert 2010). The latter 
authors pointed to the need for combining composites with information 
from other indicators to understand what to do in innovation policy. Hence, 
the existing literature about the use of indicators in innovation decisions is 
scarce and concentrated in two studies about sustainable policy. The 
limitations of these studies point to a need to understand the use of all types 
of indicators in innovation decisions. 
The scarcity of literature about the role indicators play in innovation 
decisions is problematic. In fact, understanding the role of indicators in 
innovation decisions is important along three different lines. First, because 
the existing knowledge about the influence of indicators is based on only 
two case studies specifically about sustainable policy, it is difficult to 
generalize to other innovation topics. Critically, a broader understanding is 
needed because sector conditions might change significantly. For example, 
in a mature topic such as pharmaceutical policy there is a significant 
amount of accessible data, the political context is known and the stakehold-
ers and policy impacts are relatively easy to identify. By contrast, in an 
emerging technology field such as nanotechnology there is less information 
available, the field has a different political context and it can involve 
unspecified stakeholders or consequences. Second, innovation policies 
have implications for other actors of innovation.
31
 These policies are 
intended to act upon the innovation system, changing the environment in 
which private and public researchers develop their innovations. The impact 
of innovation policies is also important for socio-economic development in 
society. In fact, these policy decisions act upon the socio-economic system, 
where innovations can interact and promote economic growth.
32
 Hence, 
there is the need to understand how these decisions are made because they 
impact other actors and society. Last, the role of indicators in innovation 
decisions is important in understanding how these decisions are made and 
how actors behave. In fact, literature should identify the ways indicators 
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are included in innovation decisions to enable an understanding of the 
behaviour of different decision makers in these processes. In sum, there is a 
need for further knowledge in innovation studies in order to make a dis-
cerned use of indicators and to improve actions in the innovation system. 
The gap in the literature is also problematic for technology assessment 
(TA) studies. In fact, understanding the role of indicators is important to 
TA for six main reasons: 
 The reflection about indicators is central to TA practitioners because 
problem-oriented studies frequently rely on indicators to address rele-
vant societal questions about technology (Barré 2001). For example, in 
a TA study about the potential and the impacts of cloud computing 
services, Leimbach et al. (2014) used indicators of the type of use in 
cloud computing services and the type of cloud services to understand 
and explain the adoption and usage patterns of companies and con-
sumers. Furthermore, while using a specific indicator the attention is 
focused on a selected aspect of the problem and ignores others. This 
raises the question on whether the existing indicators are contradictory 
or not, what can be known about a problem at stake while combing all 
the existing indicators and what are the limits of this knowledge. Thus, 
there is the need to reflect about indicators because they are often a 
main conceptual tool for analysing technological problems. 
 Indicators cannot be seen as normatively neutral instruments to analyse 
problems. In fact, although indicators are tools for describing and ana-
lysing a problem methodically, their selection is driven by criteria used 
by the actors proposing a focused description of a problem. These cri-
teria evaluate indicators against the background of main cultural values 
or interests. For example, it is significantly different to observe an in-
dicator of a CO2 footprint of a product than to analyse the whole chain 
of different risk factors associated with the use of a technology. Fur-
thermore, a TA position strongly oriented towards the precautionary 




 will also be expressed in the utilization of hazard indicators, 
because these address possible harm (e.g. with indicators of persisten-
cy or bioaccumulation potential) and not only concrete damage (e.g. 
with indicators of toxicity or carcinogenicity) (Böschen 2014). There-
fore, the selection of indicators is not normatively neutral and is driven 
by specific criteria used by the actors proposing a focused description 
of a problem. 
 The description of complex TA problems and the strategies for their 
solution are heavily influenced by the use of indicators. For example, 
the use of an indicator of “security of livelihood” in a sustainability 
problem introduces a specific description of a selected problem, which 
is in this way placed as a key problem, influencing the definition of 
strategies for its solution. In another example, the use of the indicator 
of toxicity as a central problem of the regulation of chemicals intro-
duces both a specific description of the problem and a strategy to deal 
with it (Böschen 2014). In many cases, the description through indica-
tors and the classification of safety or precautionary strategies are in-
terlinked. 
 The selection of indicators needs to be as transparent and thoughtful as 
possible. The selection may not only lead to open new alternative 
technology options, but also may trigger significant controversies be-
tween TA practitioners and stakeholders that are used to a limited set 
of indicators. In fact, the group of stakeholders may be accustomed to 
frame the problem using indicators according to their cultural norms 
and/or their economic-political interests. For example, the debate 
about risks of nuclear power plants shifted in the moment the indicator 
of climate neutrality came in, because nuclear fission previously 
seemed to be a “green technology”. In this context, the selection of a 
“new” indicator can trigger controversy, because those involved with 
nuclear interests may tend to dismiss an indicator of climate neutrality. 
Thus, the selection procedure of indicators needs transparency and re-
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flection to both open policy alternatives and reduce room for unneces-
sary controversies. 
 The selection of indicators in TA requires substantial consideration 
because conditions for selection may change significantly in different 
fields of work. As mentioned before, in a mature field (e.g. pharma-
ceutics) there is accessible data, a known political context and identifi-
able stakeholders and policy impacts; however, in an emerging tech-
nology field (e.g. nanotechnology, synthetic biology) there is less 
information available, a different and evolving political context and 
unspecified stakeholders or consequences (cf. Torgersen 2009). More-
over, the use of indicators in mature fields needs continuous reflection, 
as there might be changes in methodology or new empirical test set-
tings relevant for uncover possible harm or damage (Böschen 2014). 
Therefore, the applicability of indicators in established fields needs re-
flection while transferring them to a new or different technology, as 
conditions can change significantly and/or there might be changes in 
methodology or new relevant empirical test settings. 
 Last, an understanding of how indicators are involved in policy-
making can help TA practitioners to better adapt their analysis to the 
specific need of the policy processes. In fact, insights about the policy 
process can help to differentiate from scientific and business process-
es, develop public participation practices and improve scientific com-
munication of findings. In the policy process indicators are the corner-
stones of the problem description and the solution process, and 
consequently of the problem which will be addressed politically and 
the strategies to solve it. Hence, it is decisive to make transparent and 
explicitly consider choices and the opt-outs of indicators. Furthermore, 
the insights resulting from the understanding of the policy process can 
help identifying stakeholders and their interests, which is an important 
step to produce factual and neutral TA studies.  
In addition, such a critical reflection is even more significant as TA in 
a policy analysis perspective has its own limitations. In fact, there are 
several constrains on the use of TA in policy-making, mostly related to 
the resources needed to facilitate the interaction between TA research-
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ers and policymakers, as well as time restriction on the collection, con-
solidation and dissemination of results (Reber 2006). The scientific 
staff of a TA organization often lacks experience of policy culture, alt-
hough some lead double career paths and are trained both in the hard 
sciences and in policy-making, according to the author. Additionally, 
scientific analysis and political action are also based on significantly 
different logics. Scientific knowledge is likely to be strategically used 
(or ignored) opportunistically in the negotiation of different policy-
making interests (Reber 2006). Policy processes also face significant 
demands for justification, especially in the media, insisting on reasons 
after or before political actions, according to the author. Therefore, it is 
important to link these two different spheres of action. TA, and in par-
ticular Parliamentary TA, has the comparative advantage of demand-
ing deeper justifications for policies options and providing a structure 
where normative and scientific issues are granted a clearer voice 
(Reber 2006). 
Nevertheless, for displaying this advantage a transparent system for 
structuring knowledge is needed. This is why a clear distinction has to 
be drawn between the general problem descriptions (which are offered 
by indicators) and their empirical foundation as well as their normative 
consequences. Böschen (2014) proposed to use a model build on three 
categories: criteria, indicators and observables. These three qualifiers 
of knowledge allow for reflecting on the construction and use of indi-
cators. They can be defined as follows:  
- Criteria evaluate indicators against the background of main cul-
tural values or interests, and can be related to the indicators’ poli-
cy relevance, utility, analytical soundness and measurability and 
other (sub)conscious factors.  
 
- Indicators are representing an effect-related aspect of a problem, 
which should be considered or solved. 
 
- Observables concretize indicators by providing specified methods 
for empirical observations or test strategies. 
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This scheme allows clarifying to which layers the different arguments 
or empirical evidence are related to. Therefore, the model enables the 
classification of any sort of knowledge with respect to the description 
of a problem. Moreover, it offers an insight into the values seen as rel-
evant for constructing the respective problem horizon.  
In sum, the gap in the literature of the use of indicators in TA needs to be 
addressed because indicators are central to TA practitioners, are not neutral 
and can frame problems and strategies to solve them, the selection of 
indicators needs to be transparent and thoughtful to open alternatives and 
avoid unnecessary controversies, and the insights about the policy process 
can help in the development of TA studies. A structure of criteria, indica-
tors and observables can be used to clarify the choices in TA studies. 
In this context, there is a need to conduct research about the role of indica-
tors. An understanding of the influence of indicators in both innovation and 
in TA studies implies a special focus on technology innovation
34
. In fact, 
this focus extends the analysis to other areas of innovation and other 
innovation actors (e.g. researchers and business R&D&I leaders)
35
 not 
previously covered by the literature, maintaining a focus on TA. Therefore, 
the analysis will first concentrate on disentangling the use of indicators 
from their factual relevance in decision-making
36
, because separately they 
allow an understanding of their real importance in the decision process. 
Research will need to provide information about the extent of use and 
influence of indicators in the decision process of technology innovation by 
each innovation group
37
. Thus, the first research question can be expressed 
as follows:  
(Q1)  Is the use of indicators different from their influence in decisions of 
technology innovation made by the three innovation groups?  
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The literature reviewed previously suggests the formulation of the follow-
ing hypothesis: (H1) Despite their high level of use, indicators have low 
influence in decisions of technology innovation made by the three innova-
tion groups. The hypothesis contains several concepts already introduced 
(e.g. indicators, use of indicators and influence of indicators), and others 
that will be developed in subchapter 2.2 (e.g. decision-making, technology 
innovation and innovation groups). 
The literature reviewed also points to the need to determine the role that 
indicators play in those decisions made by each innovation group. The 
literature provided partial qualitative results. Thus, it is important to deter-
mine a quantitative background about the role of indicators in technology 
innovation. In this context, the second research question can be expressed 
as follows: 
(Q2)  What is the role of indicators in decisions of technology innovation 
by the three innovation groups?  
The literature points to the following formulation of the hypothesis: (H2) 
Indicators have a symbolic role in decisions of technology innovation made 
by the three innovation groups. This hypothesis contains several concepts 
already introduced (e.g. indicators, use of indicators and influence of 
indicators), and others that will be developed in subchapter 2.2 (e.g. deci-
sion-making, technology innovation and innovation groups).  
There is another concept related to the role of indicators where the litera-
ture can provide immediate guidance. In fact, the role of indicators in 
policy contexts was categorized by Gudmundsson and Sørensen (2012) 
into four groups: instrumental, conceptual, process and symbolic. The 
authors first state that the instrumental role of an indicator is its direct 
influence and direct use as a tool in forming a decision. Second, an indica-
tor’s conceptual role is its contribution to shaping knowledge or introduc-
ing new ideas, while being neither immediately used nor influential in 
decisions. Third, the process role: an indicator used over time affects the 
way some aspect of policy-making is conducted, regardless of what the 
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indicator reveals directly. Fourth and last, its symbolic role, as the indicator 
is used to justify decisions that have already been taken, or to give a ration-
al appearance to the decisions. According to the authors, this latter role 
may still embody policy influence in terms of policy legitimacy or in terms 
of the balance of power. 
Nevertheless, the conceptual and process roles present significant difficul-
ties for technology innovation decisions, probably because they were 
formulated to analyse specific policy cases. There are four types of difficul-
ties within these two categories: First, there is significant difficulty in 
distinguishing conceptual influence from process role, because an indicator 
that contributes to shaping knowledge or introducing new ideas (conceptual 
role) may also affect the way some aspects of how policy-making is con-
ducted (process role). Furthermore, an indicator may be used over time 
(process role) while not used immediately or influentially in the decision 
(conceptual role). Second, a conceptual role may not exist in practice for a 
scientist, an engineer, a manager or a policymaker. In fact, when reflecting 
upon the role of an indicator in a technology decision, it is difficult to state 
that an indicator was not influential if a decision maker admits it contrib-
utes to shaping knowledge and introducing new ideas. To her/him an 
indicator that contributed to shape new knowledge and ideas inevitably 
produces changes in the framework of decision,
38
 and consequently was 
influential in the decision. Third, it is difficult to admit that an indicator 
influenced some aspect of the decision regardless of what it directly 
demonstrates. Fourth and last, from a practical point of view, an indicator 
is an objective concept that is either present or not in a concrete technology 
decision. Indicators can hardly be a part of a decision, through shaping 
knowledge or introducing new ideas used over time, without being imme-
diately used in a decision. Therefore, these distinctions between conceptual 
and process role are difficult to use in the analysis of the role of indicators 
in decisions of technology innovation. 
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Consequently, indicators can only be considered to have an instrumental 
role, a symbolic role or no role at all in decisions of technology innovation: 
 An instrumental role means that indicators had direct influence and 
were used as a tool to make a decision. The instrumental role of indi-
cators in a decision implies that a rational-analytical method
39
 was 
used. In addition, this role also suggests that a rational-analytical ap-
proach was applied alone or combined with a political-behavioural 
and/or an emotional-intuitive approach (these concepts will be devel-
oped in the next subchapter). 
 A symbolic role means that indicators were used to justify decisions 
after they have been taken, or to give a rational appearance to deci-
sions. The symbolic influence implies that a rational-analytical method 
was not predominantly used to decide. This role shows that the pre-
dominant decision approach was political-behavioural or emotional-
intuitive, either alone or in interaction with a rational-analytical meth-
od (see next subchapter). 
Some authors argued that quantification needs are mostly symbolic at 
policy-level, where they can have a relative influence (Gudmundsson 
and Sørensen 2012; Perri 6 2002). Perri 6 (2002) claimed that decision 
makers use a certain amount of knowledge when making a decision, 
and their judgments are dependent on where actors are socially situated 
and integrated. This view implies that the influence of indicators is de-
termined by the social “cage” of users, where social relations act upon 
individuals constraining and guiding them both consciously and un-
consciously in their decisions. Therefore, to understand the role of in-
dicators, it is necessary to inquire about the influence of social rela-
tions in the decisions of different groups. 
 Last, indicators had no role at all is a category that can be associated 
with situations where information does not exist, is incomplete or am-
biguous. It can also be related to situations where the consequences of 
the decisions are significantly unpredictable, such as when high levels 
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of uncertainty, disagreement or complexity exist (see next subchapter). 
The absence of indicators reveals a lack of rational-analytical tools in 
the decision process. These conditions have been associated with pre-
dominantly emotional-intuitive approaches, such as judgement or gut 
feeling, but can also include political-behavioural approaches (see next 
subchapter). Therefore, “no role at all” for indicators shows that  
an emotional-intuitive and/or political-behavioural approach existed, 
either alone or in interaction. 
As discussed previously, the way indicators are involved in decision-
making has been scarcely studied, despite its significance for innovation 
and TA studies. Thus, research will also focus on understanding the way 
indicators are involved in decisions of technology innovation. Hence, the 
third and last research question can be formulated as follows: 
(Q3)  How are indicators used in decisions of technology innovation?  
There are four possible explanatory factors that can affect the way indica-
tors are used in these decisions: 
The first explanatory factor considers the type of decision
40
 to be potential-
ly helpful in describing the way indicators are used in decisions of technol-
ogy innovation. Each type of decision contains different characteristics that 
determine the way indicators are used. For example, in an acquisition of 
equipment/technology it can be expected to involve indicators related to the 
financial context of the decision. Besides financial indicators, the acquisi-
tion might require indicators about technical characteristics of the prod-
uct/technology, or related to human resources or suppliers needed to 
operate it. Other types of decisions might not be so dependent on financial 
indicators, however. A policy decision about technology regulations might 
not involve economic indicators and might be more based on technical 
indicators, work organization, market share or benchmarking. The availa-
bility of information (studies, opinions, sectoral information, etc.) can also 
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be relevant in policy contexts. Furthermore, a decision to acquire a patent 
in a business or laboratory context might be based on technical indicators, 
qualification of human resources, the use of technology by competition or 





, or Payback. In addition, a company decision about 
development of product/technology can be based on judgement and con-
siderations of colleagues and not involve indicators at all. Therefore, the 
type of decision may be important to explain the role indicators can have in 
decisions of technology innovation. Consequently, the following hypothe-
sis can be formulated as: (H3) The type of decision helps to explain how 
indicators are used in decisions of technology innovation. 
The second explanatory factor is that the phase of the decision can help 
explain the way indicators are involved in technology innovation. There are 
four main reasons to suggest that the phase of the decision process is 
relevant in understanding the way indicators are used: First, decisions of 
technology innovation can require different considerations for indicators, 
not just before but also after the decision. For example, the decision to buy 
expensive equipment for a research laboratory may require previous 
intensive considerations about the cost, and no such deliberation after-
wards. In other cases, however, indicators can also be used afterwards. This 
use is often related to the need to justify, monitor, control or evaluate the 
outcomes of the decision. For example, a decision to develop a new prod-
uct in a company can cause intensive concerns after the decision, based on 
indicators of cost or weight; a leader of a research project might need to use 
indicators to justify expenditures to the European Commission; even 
policy-related indicators may be intensively used after the final decision in 
order to monitor, control or evaluate policy effects. Second, some decisions 
may include the use of indicators more or less intensively in different 
phases. For example, a decision to develop a new product in a company 
may not need an intensive use of indicators of cost and weight in the 
preparation phase. Afterwards, the decision may require an intensive use of 
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these indicators to adjust the product for the future market. Third, Sébastien 
and Bauler (2013) found that composite indicators had the most relevance 
during early descriptive phases of a policy-making process (i.e. to identify 
gross policy problems). Fourth and last, Frederiksen and Gudmundsson 
(2013) suggested the existence of two or more phases where a conceptual 
role is prominent in the preparation phase, where indicators are conceived, 
selected and developed, while instrumental and strategic roles dominate 
policy implementation phases. Therefore, the phase of the decision process 
may explain the way indicators are used in decisions of technology innova-
tion. Consequently, the following hypothesis can be formulated: (H4) The 
phase of decision helps to explain how indicators are used in decisions of 
technology innovation. 
A third explanatory factor for the way indicators are used can be found in 
the context
43
 of the decision. As it will be argued in subchapter 2.2, there 
are contextual factors that can influence the way a decision-making process 
occurs. In fact, an adversarial political context may influence the way 
indicators are included in the decision by stimulating the need for indica-
tors to support arguments; a lack of economic resources may push for 
formal evidence to support a decision of technology innovation; and other 
organizational factors can influence the decision process (e.g. structure and 
qualifications). Consequentially, the following hypothesis can be formulat-
ed: (H5) The context helps to explain how indicators are used in the deci-
sions of technology innovation. 
A fourth explanatory factor for the role of indicators may be found in the 
process of construction of evidence, as suggested by Sébastien and Bauler 
(2013). There are two mains reasons for this: First, the selection or the 
disregard of an indicator can be a controversial choice, particularly in 
contested policy arenas. Furthermore, the “strategic and political use of 
indicators, manipulation or even abuse of indicators is not necessarily a 
problem, but rather an essential part of the production of valid and reliable 
evidence” (Sébastien and Bauler 2013, 10). For example, a significant 
                                                          
43  The concept of context will be further expanded in subchapter 2.2. 
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increase in the number of patents of a country in a year can be introduced 
as evidence of governmental efforts to promote innovation. The example 
makes a controversial assertion
44
 that governments can directly claim to 
promote innovation, despite the efforts of companies and research institu-
tions. If this controversy is brought to the debate, the policy process will 
determine the influence of the indicator in providing rational-analytical 
support to an innovation policy decision. Second, in policy contexts, 
indicators are used to reduce ambiguity (Sébastien, Bauler, and Lehtonen 
2014) and may be introduced to reduce the number of variables observed, 
to simplify and facilitate communication, and to build clear and unambigu-
ous visions of the desired future (Sébastien and Bauler 2013). In these 
processes, indicators are expected to communicate evidence in a form 
suited for policy actors that simplify the description of complex systems 
(Sébastien and Bauler 2013). In these cases, the role of indicators will be 
dependent on their availability and capacity to play a role in the debate. 
Therefore, the present work will also focus on understanding the process of 
constructing evidence in decisions of technology innovation in order to 
explain the way indicators are used. Consequently, the following hypothe-
sis can be formulated: (H6) The process of construction of evidence helps 
to explain how indicators are used in decisions of technology innovation. 
Last but not the least, the main concepts that need to be articulated with 
these four hypotheses are introduced: type of decision, phase of decision, 
context of decision and process of construction of evidence. Furthermore, 
other concepts are already described, such as indicators and the role of 
indicators. In addition, the following subchapter will develop remaining 
concepts, such as technology innovation, decision-making, decision-
making models of technology innovation and innovation groups. 
                                                          
44  It can also be said to be a simplification of reality, because innovation efforts can be 
measured using evidence other than patents. 
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2.2 Decisions of technology innovation  
This subchapter introduces concepts needed to understand the decision 
process of technology innovation. It will be argued that technology innova-
tion can be understood as a phenomenon occurring in a process of innova-
tion, where interactions occur between different actors. These interactions 
form a network of relationships between decision makers and other stake-
holders, who can support policies to influence the innovation system. The 
subchapter is composed of three sections. The first section deals with 
technology innovation, defining the process of innovation, its actors, 
networks and innovation policy. Afterwards it presents a model to interpret 
decisions of technology innovation and identifies possible methods for 
making decisions. The third section discusses the types of decisions of 
technology innovation, and conditions of uncertainty and complexity 
affecting these decisions. 
2.2.1 Technology innovation  
An innovation is commonly defined as a new idea, device or method.
45
 The 
result of an innovation is normally a technological product/service, or the 
significant improvement of a product or process. Innovation is distinct 
from an invention or technical prototype, and refers to a technology actual-
ly being used or applied for the first time (Utterback 1974). Most innova-
tions occur embedded in innovation processes, where a set of inventions 
and implementation of new ideas are developed by individuals, who 
engage in transactions with others, over time, within an institutional con-




                                                          
45  “Innovation” Oxford Dictionary Online. Last accessed in 21/12/2014. 
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/innovation. 
46  Innovation process should not be confused with process innovation. The former refers to 
the process of introducing new ideas, devices or methods. The latter is a formal classifica-
tion of innovation targeting the process of production and/or delivery of goods and services. 
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Furthermore, there are several types of innovations such as product, pro-
cess, organizational and marketing. The present work will focus only on 
technological product or process innovations. These type of innovations 
comprise the implementation of new products and processes or significant 
technological improvements in products and processes (OECD, European 
Commission, and Eurostat 2005).
47
 The present focus is based on the idea 
that technological innovation is important to society and firms. In fact, the 
new technological products and processes can induce technological change 
which, in turn, can promote growth and development in societies (Poole 
and Van de Ven 2004). These technology innovations can offer 
opportunities to firms to capture new markets, achieve high profits and 
build dominant positions in the marketplace (von der Gracht and Stillings 
2013). Innovations also act upon organizations, being a route to 
revitalization through exploitation and exploration of competencies in the 
firms (Cheng, Chang, and Li 2013). In sum, technological product and 
process innovations are important to social and economic development, 
firms’ opportunities and to the revitalization of organizations. 
Technology innovation can, however, create problems that cause question-
ing of the relationship between the goals of technology and its unintended 
consequences. Thalidomide, Seveso, Bhopal, Chernobyl and Fukushima 
remain historical, world-renowned examples of the unintended effects of 
technology. In fact, these and other cases have been responsible for chang-
ing perceptions and stimulating the discussion about undesirable conse-
quences of technology innovation since at least the 1950s. Reflection on 
this problem shows the extent to which science and technology have 
become risky and are being driven into more complex designs, “in a 
society which has no other way out but to accept risks” (Bechmann et al. 
2007, 18). In Germany, for instance, the recognition of this problem led the 
government to institutionalize technology assessment activities to investi-
                                                          
47  An innovation has been implemented if it has been introduced on the market (product 
innovation) or used within a production process (process innovation), and involves scien-
tific, technological, organisational, financial and commercial activities (OECD, European 
Commision, and Eurostat 2005:31). 
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gate scientific and technological developments, with a focus on their 
impacts and possible systemic and unintended effects. An example of this 
institutionalized activity is the Institute for Technology Assessment and 
Systems Analysis of the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology, founded in 
1995 as successor of different institutions with similar roles in Germany 
since 1950s (Wingert 2005). 
The context where technology innovations occur is frequently named the 
innovation system. This system encompasses all institutions engaged in 
research and the accumulation and diffusion of knowledge, educating and 
training the population, developing technology, producing innovative 
products and processes and distributing them (Kuhlmann, Shapira, and 
Smits 2010). Smits, Merkerk, and Guston (2010) described this encompass-
ing perspective as follows: 
According to this [systemic] view, we can no longer see innovation as 
a given thing – as an invention. Instead, innovation is a systemic pro-
cess involving a heterogeneous set of actors who are inspired by both 
the potential that science and technology offer and by the context in 
which they have to function. These actors are involved in a complex 
decision-making process that leads to innovative activity. (Smits, 
Merkerk, and Guston 2010, 1) 
Thus, the study of an innovation system is a heuristic attempt developed to 
analyse all subsystems in society, actors and institutions that contribute, 
directly or indirectly, intentionally or not, to the emergence of innovation 
(Hekkert et al. 2007). Furthermore, this broad conception of the boundaries 
of innovation in society is based on the idea that institutions can affect the 
development of innovations. In fact, institutions can influence
48
 the pace 
and direction of innovation, with time delays in the decision-making 
process or with lock-in effects to prevent technological developments 
                                                          
48  According to Knoke (1993), influence occurs when one actor provides information to 
another with the intention of altering the latter’s actions. Influence is a relational dimension 
of power, because a two-way communication channel must exist between an action and its 
consequences (Knoke 1993). 
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(Stirling 2007; Samara, Georgiadis, and Bakouros 2012). This institutional 
view, however, is not so dominant in the US as it is in Europe (Kuhlmann, 
Shapira, and Smits 2010). To some critics this conceptualization implies 
institutional determinism, disregards the power of the entrepreneur to act in 
the system, and might lead to a static approach of a dynamic system 
(Hekkert et al. 2007). Nevertheless, bearing these criticism in mind, the 
innovation system approach remains one of the most referred concepts in 
literature for understanding and reflecting upon innovation (Fagerberg, 
Fosaas, and Sapprasert 2012). 
2.2.2 Innovation actors 
Most individuals involved in innovation activities can be classified into 
three different groups
49
. First, innovation processes often occur within a 
business context. Here, privately hired scientists and engineers are usually 
involved in innovation, working either in R&D contexts or in specialized 
innovation departments. Second, innovation also occurs in the context of 
R&D projects developed by groups working in the public sector, namely 
scientists, engineers, academics and medical doctors. Third, technology 
innovations also depend on the decisions of policymakers, who make 
decisions that normally play a significant role within the innovation system 
by defining the context where innovations occur. Their decisions are 
directly related to innovation policies, which can produce (or constrain) 
significant technological developments. For example, a “locking-in” effect 
can occur when a government prioritizes certain areas of scientific enquiry 
over others Stirling (2010, 1031). Furthermore, the interactions between 
policymakers and other groups of innovation actors have been identified in 
the literature. For example, Kuhlmann, Shapira, and Smits (2010) pointed 
out that innovators have not only asked for and received public financial 
support, but also pushed for changes in regulation, in order to facilitate the 
adoption of their solutions and to exploit state-guaranteed intellectual 
property rights. In addition, there are other individuals or entities that can 
                                                          
49  In this context a group consists of a finite set of actors who for conceptual, theoretical or 
empirical reasons are treated as a finite set of individuals on which network measurements 
are made (Wasserman and Faust 1994). 
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play a role in the innovation system, although their role tends to be more 
indirect. For example, venture capitalists, banks or activists can promote or 
constrain innovations through their indirect actions in the system or, more 
generally, in society. Nevertheless, their influence in technology innovation 
is mostly indirect and significantly influenced by interactions with the three 
groups. 
Consequently, the main units of analysis for this research are the three 
main groups of an innovation system: (1) The group composed of public 
researchers, academics, and R&D health personnel, hereafter named 
researchers; (2) Business Research, Development and Innovation 
(R&D&I) leaders: a group composed by team leaders of R&D&I depart-
ments in companies, hereafter named business; and (3) Policymakers 
related to technology innovation: a group broadly involved in technology 
decisions from a policy perspective, such as the design of strategies to 
address the innovation system.  
It should be noted that the main difference between public researchers and 
business R&D&I leaders is the goal to financially profit from their deci-
sions in technology innovation. This different emphasis is important for 
understanding the role of indicators in the decisions. Furthermore, there are 
both common and individual reasons to target these three groups. The main 
reason for this selection is that the groups were composed by individuals 
who reported technology decisions recently; have access to and use vast 
amounts of techno-scientific knowledge; normally have contact with 
indicators; and possess skills to deal with indicators. These groups are also 
closely linked with the innovation system and play important roles in its 
functioning. In addition, there are individual reasons to focus on these 
innovation groups: 
1. Researchers were selected because they influence technology devel-
opments in at least four different ways. First, they are involved in 
R&D projects that can lead to new technologies and innovations. Sec-
ond, the group is partially involved with students before they reach de-
cisive positions, where they will influence other communities in tech-
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nology options. Third, these individuals are frequently called to decide 
upon significant investments that directly or indirectly influence tech-
nology choices (e.g. research programs and projects; setting up new 
laboratories, universities, hospitals, clinics and other specialized insti-
tutes; and acquiring powerful microscopes, jet printers and diagnosis 
machines). Fourth and last, this group informs and helps decision 
makers with technology options. For example, they assist in important 
public and private choices, such as the development of satellites, 
transport systems, and other research-related facilities; acquisition of 
submarines, supercomputers, helicopters and airplanes; the construc-
tion of highways, bridges and dams, etc. 
2. Business R&D&I leaders were selected because they are most fre-
quently found leading innovation departments of firms or in charge of 
R&D projects. They are responsible for most choices regarding the de-
velopment of new products or new technologies, and are frequently in 
charge of important strategic decisions in innovative companies. 
3. Policymakers were selected because they are involved in technology 
decisions, such as the design of policies that address the innovation 
system. These policies can involve programs, projects, ideas, legisla-
tion and other regulatory frameworks that directly or indirectly affect 
the development of technology innovations. For example, the policy-
makers deal with policies and legislation designed to promote Science 
& Technology (S&T) graduates, support patenting efforts, backing 
high-tech companies, financing R&D projects, etc.  
The research will not target other individuals or groups that can interact 
with an innovation system, however. In fact, inventors working alone were 
not included in the research because some only have a one-time relation-
ship with the innovation system. For example, some inventors were not 
inventors before the invention or are not long-term inventors. Second, 
inventors are significantly difficult to approach in a survey because they 
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are not cohesive enough to be called a group of actors.
50
 Furthermore, other 
actors, such as business angels and financial investors, are not normally 
directly involved in making technology decisions. In fact, they often make 
investment-related decisions within their frameworks of business opportu-
nities, leaving technology innovation decisions to business R&D&I leaders 
or researchers. In addition, the non-governmental organizations, lobbies, 
networks and other groups that exist in an innovation system do not make 
technology decisions directly, although they can influence the suc-
cess/failure of a technology. 
The innovation process can be influenced by individuals, firms and society 
in different ways. Companies can be influenced by the culture where the 
organization is embedded and by individuals who act upon firms. Nation 
states are the origin of most firms, which tend to develop and evolve in 
compatible ways with the surrounding national culture (Černe, Jaklič, and 
Škerlavaj 2013). According to Černe, Jaklič, and Škerlavaj, national culture 
is manifested in the collective beliefs and shared values by individuals 
within a certain national environment. Naturally, the national culture 
affects and interplays with corporate culture, and has been directly related 
with various aspects of innovation, in particular investments in innovation 
(Hogan and Coote 2013; Černe, Jaklič, and Škerlavaj 2013).  
An innovation process influences other actors in the innovation system. In 
fact, the actors of an innovation process influence other actors, directly or 
indirectly, through the behaviour of the innovator and the effects produced 
by the innovation itself in the system. These relationships of influence 
                                                          
50  Generally, social groups are a collection of individuals who interact and form social 
relationships (Abercrombie, Hill, and Turner 1984). Some of these inventors do not interact 
with one another significantly enough to form these relationships. Furthermore, a group can 
be defined narrowly as “a number of individuals, defined by informal or formal criteria of 
membership, who (a) have some shared sense of identity or (b) are bound by relatively 
stable patterns of social interaction” (Bruce & Yearley, 2006, 128). In this case also, some 
of these inventors do not share a sense of identity and are not bound by relatively stable 
patterns of social interaction to be considered as a group. 
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among actors constitute a network of innovation.
51
 A network assumes that 
actors affect each other through interactions that enable them come to hold 
similar views and/or become aware of similar bits of information (Borgatti, 
Martin, and Johnson 2013).
52
 These networks can capture innovation 
efforts both in an action and across time. Hence, the collective and individ-
ual efforts in an innovation policy can be depicted as a network that cap-
tures all interactions and efforts leading individuals to act and hold similar 
views and/or become aware of the same information. 
Network theory presents a valuable relational view of social phenomena, 
based on the structure of the network and the position of actors. In theory, 
the actor’s position determines in part the constraints and opportunities that 
an actor will encounter, and can help to predict the actor’s outcomes, such 
as performance, behaviour or beliefs (Borgatti, Martin, and Johnson 2013). 
At the group level, what happens to a group of actors is in part a function 
of the structure of the connections among them, according to the authors. A 
social network, therefore, consists of a finite set or sets of actors and the 
relationship or relationships defined by them (Wasserman and Faust 1994; 
Marin and Wellman 2011). Social network analysis is a systematic frame-
work to retrieve meaningful information from a given social network (Park 
2011).
53
 Furthermore, the network structure is shaped by actors to specifi-
cally achieve their own outcomes. It is not an actor’s intentions and actions 
taken in order to occupy a certain position that creates the outcome, but the 
actual occupation of the position (Borgatti and Halgin 2011). In fact, 
occupying a specific structural position carries certain potentialities, but the 
actual outcomes may depend on a number of additional factors, including 
                                                          
51  Networks are a way of interpreting social systems that focus attention on the relationships 
among the entities (i.e. actors) that make up the system (Borgatti, Martin, and Johnson 2013). 
52  These innovation networks are organizational forms which serve for information, 
knowledge and resources exchange and which help to implement innovation by mutual 
learning between network partners (Koschatzky 2001). The advantage of networks lies in 
the acquisition of complementary resources, which an individual actors does not have at his 
own disposal, according to the author. 
53  Social network analysis may also be viewed as a broadening or generalization of standard 
data analytic techniques and applied statistics which usually focus on observational units 
and their characteristics (Wasserman and Faust 1994). 
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how the actors play their role. Therefore, network theory can help in 
understanding the network structure and the outcomes in a decision. 
A social network is composed of a set of socially relevant nodes connected 
by one or more relations (Marin and Wellman 2011). The study of these 
networks allows us to “map” the interactions between the decision makers 
in the networks used to make a decision. This type of analysis also provides 
empirical metrics for the networks developed to make decisions. For 
example, the measures of the whole network (e.g. centralization, density 
and connectedness) allow a critical view of how a network is structured and 
how it works. Other measures can also be useful to interpret a network, 
with metrics about the centrality and core-periphery of actors in relation to 
the network, and the existence of factions within the network. Overall, 
social network analysis reveals insights on how decision makers organize 
themselves to conduct a decision process about technology innovation. 
Some measures have been proposed to analyse the characteristics of social 
networks. In fact, the two main characteristics of networks are their cohe-
sion and shape (Borgatti, Martin, and Johnson 2013). Cohesion measures 
describe characteristics of cohesion among actors. The shape of the net-
work allows the examination of its centrality, as well as the detection of the 
existence of sub-structures within the network, such as a core and periphery 
and the existence of factions. An important dimension of position in the 
network can be captured through centrality, both at the network and indi-
vidual/node level. Conceptually, centrality identifies which nodes are at the 
“centre” of the network. Centrality measures are a family of node-level 
properties relating to the structural importance or prominence of a node in 
the network (Borgatti et al. 2009). However, identifying the meaning of 
“centre” in practice is complicated. The simplest notion of centrality 
focuses on degree of centrality: the actor with most ties
54
 is the most 
important. Unfortunately, the degree of centrality can be deceiving, be-
cause it is a localized measure failing to account for the whole network 
                                                          
54  The network ties serves as a bond that aligns and coordinates action, enabling groups of 
nodes to act as a single node, often with greater capabilities (Borgatti and Halgin 2011). 
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(Borgatti, Martin, and Johnson 2013). There are several ways to construct 
such measures, but one that has become standard is the Freeman’s general 
formula for centralization that takes into account the whole network 
(Wasserman and Faust 1994; L. C. Freeman 1979).
55
 Another measure of 
centrality is closeness centrality, where an actor is considered important if 
she/he is relatively close to all other actors. Closeness is based on the 
inverse of the distance of each actor to every other actor in the network.
56
 
A third measure of centrality is the Eigenvector centrality, where the 
actor’s centrality or prestige is equal to a function of the prestige of those 
she/he is connected to (Bonacich 1987; Bonacich 2007). In this case, actors 
who are tied to very central actors have higher centrality prestige than those 
who are not. The Eigenvector centrality is a measure of popularity in the 
sense that a node with high Eigenvector centrality is connected to nodes 
that are themselves well connected (Borgatti, Martin, and Johnson 2013).
57
 
In sum, there are two main characteristics of networks - cohesion and shape 
- that help to understand the network and the actors’ outcomes. The shape 
allows the determination of centralities (Freeman’s, closeness and Eingen-
vector), as well as the cores and factions of the networks. 
There are networks specifically organized to make policy decisions 
(Rhodes 1990). Like in any social network, a policy network consists of a 
bounded set of actors and one or more sets of relations that connect these 
actors (Knoke 2011). The difference in these networks is that the ties 
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represent interactions created to provide advice and to help those involved 
in the decision process (Borgatti et al. 2009). These policy networks can 
help in understanding the processes of decision-making through character-
izing and comparing decision networks. Some authors have shown that 
policy networks help identify the influence each actor has on another, 
detect the most salient actors involved in decision-making, and determine 
influences in the use of evidence (Christopoulos and Ingold 2014; Fischer 
2011; Drew et al. 2011; Knoke 1993). Therefore, the analysis of policy 
networks can help understand how decision networks and individual actors 
are formed and behave. 
There is another theory related to networks of innovation that should be 
mentioned: the actor-network theory. In fact, the theory considers that 
actors include not only living persons but also non-living technological 
entities (Winner 1993). An example used to introduce “things” in a net-
work was electric vehicles. In fact, the introduction of electric vehicles in 
France in the early 1970s helped in explaining the interplay between 
technology and its actors (Callon 1989 and 2012). Michel Callon (2012) 
argued that actors form networks of action that arise in everyday life, and 
should not be reduced to purely social relations. To the author, these 
networks need to include “things” or heterogeneous elements, animate and 
inanimate, such as engineers, contaminated catalysts and fuel cells. They 
have all been linked to one another for a certain period of time, and 
“things” function as intermediaries between humans (Callon 2012). How-
ever, the concept - advanced by Callon (1989 and 2012) and other authors 
such as Bruno Latour and John Law (Callon and Law 1989) - was signifi-
cantly criticized because the authors insisted on the contradicting capacity 
of nonhumans to be actors (Winner 1993). Furthermore, actor-network 
theory remains difficult to apply, particularly in terms of boundaries of the 
system and the complexity involved. In addition, the analysis of decision-
making in a policy network usually occurs without non-living technologi-
cal entities, and it requires a defined boundary of relationships of influence. 
Therefore, actor-network theory is not significantly useful for understand-
ing policy networks, which by definition involve policymakers and lack 
nonhuman entities. 
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A policy network is created to design an innovation policy. The term policy 
generally signifies an intentional course of action followed by a govern-
ment, institution or officials for resolving an issue of public concern 
(Cochran et al. 2009). In this interpretation as a public action, policy 
requires laws, public statements, official regulations, and/or widely accept-
ed and publicly visible patterns of behaviour. Furthermore, some policy 
actions are intended to influence the innovation system. These policies can 
thus be defined as a set of policy actions to increase or improve the quanti-
ty and efficiency of innovative activities
58
 (Cowan and van de Paal 2000). 
The mainstream rationale for these policies is that innovation generates 
more economic growth, which in turn promotes higher levels of employ-
ment and job creation (Colombelli, Haned, and Le Bas 2013). In addition, 
the notion that new knowledge leads to innovation, and therefore more 
growth and knowledge, is a commonly accepted rationale for implementing 
innovation policies in both Europe and America (Colombelli, Haned, and 
Le Bas 2013). 
A process of innovation can be significantly complex, slow and difficult to 
influence. However, policymakers can act as enabling actors and catalysts:  
The challenge of governments is not to maximize some imaginary wel-
fare function, but to ensure that the processes of co-evolution of tech-
nological supply and demand lead to desirable outcomes, in both the 
short term and the long run. (Kemp et al. 1998, 191) 
There is no guarantee of success in these actions because changing circum-
stances may render the technology less attractive and technological prom-
ises may never materialize (Kemp et al. 1998). Furthermore, the active 
involvement of stakeholders is crucial to success (Chan 2013). Governmen-
tal action is not per se sufficient to promote technology change, particularly 
when the problem requires the integration of different actors. In addition, 
there are two other mechanisms limiting the dynamics of policy interven-
                                                          
58  By innovative activities, the latter authors meant the creation, adaptation and adoption of 
new or improved products, processes or services. 
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tions in innovation systems (Hoppmann, Huenteler, and Girod 2014). One 
mechanism relates to the role of politics and interest, where politicians 
anchored in an existing socio-technical regime are unlikely to support 
emerging technologies that cannot yet provide them with a constituency. 
These policymakers may also hold different opinions on system failures 
and how to remove them. Another mechanism likely to constrain the 
dynamics of policy intervention is the limited capacity and foresight of 
policymakers. In this case, Hoppmann (2013) stressed that, even when 
there is political consensus regarding goals and means, the inherent com-
plexity of socio-technical systems may limit or hinder the degree to which 
consequences of policy interventions can be foreseen. In fact, the focus of 
policy interventions requires a careful analysis of the socio-technical 
system to identify system failures or bottlenecks that could be difficult to 
enact. Policymakers generally have a limited capacity to obtain and evalu-
ate all possible policy measures and outcomes (Kemp et al. 1998). Conse-
quently, they tend to design policies based on learning from past experi-
ences. The problem with learning from past policy experiences is that 
innovation systems evolve in a non-linear and often unpredictable way, 
which can create unexpected effects. 
2.2.3 Decision process 
Decision-making is a general term applied to the process of making a 
choice between options, through which individuals arrive at a decision 
(Nitta 2013). Mintzberg and Westley (2005, 75) described it as the process 
of gaining an insight, in the sense of “seeing into”, which suggests that 
decisions, or at least actions, may be driven as much by what is “seen” as 
by what is thought. Furthermore, on a general level, the decision-making 
process can be described as based on three different activities (Andersson, 
Grönlund, and Åström 2012; Simon 1979): intelligence activity, where the 
need for a decision is identified; design activity, which starts when the need 
for a decision is identified and the problem is investigated by developing 
the domain to find possible alternatives; and last, the choice emerges when 
a decision is ready to be made through the selecting of the most appropriate 
course of action from the alternatives previously found. The process is 
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complex and can include returning to the intelligence phase, or include the 
same cycles inside one single phase.  
There are many models of decision-making. Decision-making models are 
conceptual frameworks for understanding how decision makers deal with 
information and arrived at conclusions (Harren 1979). They are simplified 
descriptions of a psychological process in which a decision maker organiz-
es information, deliberates alternatives and makes a commitment to a 
course of action, according to the author. Decision-making is a multidisci-
plinary topic that has received significant contributions from various 
disciplines and fields of science. For example, concerns about the bounds 
of rationality of economic agents came from economics; efforts to under-
stand impacts of decisions in firms came from management science; 
impacts and implications of decisions for political action came from politi-
cal science; and concerns about internal decision mechanisms of individu-
als came from psychology. It is therefore not surprising that most explana-
tions about decision-making are bounded to the disciplines and fields of 
research of the authors, such as economics (Simon 1959; Simon 1979; 
Menzel 2013; Kahneman 2011), business (Jauch and Glueck 1988; Swami 
2013; Schoemaker and Russo 1993; Sull and Eisenhardt 2012), and psy-
chology (Curseu and Schruijer 2012; Schwartz et al. 2002; Starcke and 
Brand 2012), as well as health (Smith, Higgs, and Ellis 2008; Murray et al. 
2007), education (Galotti et al. 2006; Harren 1979) and military studies 
(Thunholm 2004; Scott and Bruce 1995).  
The literature does not provide a model for understanding decisions of 
technology innovation. There are various decision models, which can 
include an extensive variety of dimensions for decision-making (see among 
others Scott and Bruce 1995; Hunt et al. 1989; Harren 1979; Swami 2013). 
For example, in an organizational study of decision-making models with 
senior managers, Turpin and Marais (2004) described nine existing ap-
proaches to decision-making: rational, bounded rationality, incrementalist 
view, organizational procedures view, political view, garbage can model, 
individual differences perspective, naturalistic decision-making and multi-
ple perspective approach. Other studies were less abundant in the number 
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of possible ways to make a decision. For example, in a military-oriented 
study, Peter Thunholm (2004) described five ways to make a decision 
(independent and not mutually exclusive): rational, intuitive, dependent, 
avoidant and spontaneous.
59
 However, although the rational and emotional-
intuitive approaches were unproblematic from a theoretical point of view, 
the intellectual foundations of the other were unclear (Thunholm 2004). 
The author admitted, for instance, that his spontaneous decisions “might 
perhaps be viewed as a kind of high-speed intuitive decision-making style” 
(Thunholm 2004, 934). Nevertheless, the literature reveals that most 
models of decision-making propose a rational-analytical and an emotional-
intuitive approach, to explain the major considerations dominating the 
attention of an individual during the decision. Therefore, given the variety 
of approaches that can be considered in a decision model, there is a strong 
case for using a rational-analytical and an emotional-intuitive approach in a 
technology innovation decision model. 
A decision model of technology innovation should also include a political-
behavioural approach to the decision. In fact, stakeholders
60
 often have an 
impact on these decision processes through discussions, negotiations, 
networking, consensus building and/or other social activities that influence 
the decision. Although sometimes these political process are hidden and/or 
difficult to unveil (Cray et al. 1991), several authors have argued about the 
importance of political processes in decision-making (Linn, Man, and 
Bossink 2013; Jauch and Glueck 1988; Ilori and Irefin 1997; Dill 1975; 
Gray and Ariss 1985; Narayanan and Fahey 1982; Aram and Noble 1999). 
Furthermore, the political aspect of decision-making is very important 
because a “bad” decision can be costly. In fact, an erroneous decision can 
cost a manager, researcher or politician her/his credibility, promotion, 
bonuses or even her/his job; backing a wrong alternative can cost a depart-
                                                          
59  The Swedish General Decision-making Style (GDMS) inventory was created based on a 
Scott and Bruce (1995) work, and validated with 1441 male military officers on career 
decision-making and, later, with samples of students, engineers and technicians on im-
portant decisions in general. 
60  The term stakeholders is here referred sensu lato which includes shareowners, employees, 
customers, suppliers, lenders and society (Freeman and Reed 1983). 
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ment or political faction its political future; and a serious error can acceler-
ate the death of an organization, a department and even a political faction. 
Therefore, a decision model of technology innovation should include a 
political-behavioural approach to encompass the impact of these types of 
activities in the decisions. 
A decision model for technology innovation can be inspired by a strategic 
decision model. In fact, most technology innovation decisions have a 
strategic
61
 nature because they can carry high stakes for those involved, 
affect the organizations where decisions are made, and/or might have 
potential effects for large segments of society (Cray et al. 1991). Further-
more, these decisions are strategic to an innovator, a lab, a firm, institutions 
or even society, because technology innovation can significantly impact 
them (Gebauer, Worch, and Truffer 2012; Sainio, Ritala, and Hurmelinna-
Laukkanen 2012). In 1988 Jauch and Glueck proposed a model for under-
standing a strategic management decision comprising combinations of 
three decision-making approaches. Literature review suggests, however, a 
small adaptation of these three approaches used by the author to capture 
recent research about decision-making. The following figure depicts three 
approaches to technology innovation decisions and their interactions: 
                                                          
61  The term strategic is often used in decision-making to indicate important or key decisions 
made in organizations of all types. 
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Figure 2.1: Decisions of technology innovation 
Source: Adaptation from Jauch and Glueck (1988, 23) 
The figure presents a model for technology innovation decisions composed 
of three approaches that can occur in parallel and interact during the deci-
sion process: rational-analytical, emotional-intuitive and political-
behavioural. There are four main ideas about these approaches: 
First, the rational-analytical approach (see reference 1 in Figure 2.1) 
describes a rational, conscious, systematic and analytical approach. It is 
based on all available and feasible alternatives to maximize advantages 
(Jauch and Glueck 1988). Rationality
62
 is the extent to which the decision-
making process reflects a desire to make the best decision possible under 
                                                          
62  Rationality will not be used in this work in the sense of a sensible, reasonable and sane way 
of deciding, as opposed to foolish, absurd or extreme ways, as mentioned by Stacey (2011). 
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the circumstances (Dean and Sharfman 1993). This intended rationality (or 
procedural rationality) is characterized by an attempt to collect the infor-
mation necessary to form expectations about various alternatives, and the 
use of this information in the final decision (Dean and Sharfman 1993). It 
involves setting clear objectives, gathering the facts, generating options and 
choosing one that maximizes the objective (Stacey 2011).
63
 Rational 
behaviour can be personified in a decision maker who has: 
Knowledge of the relevant aspects of his environment, …a well-
organized and stable system of preferences, and a skill in computa-
tion that enables him to calculate, for the alternative courses of  
action that are available to him, which of these will permit him  
to reach the highest attainable point on his preference scale.  
(Simon 1979, 99) 
In this sense, the ideal “rational” man behaves and decides only on the 
basis of propositions that can be consciously reasoned about, rather than on 
the basis of customs, norms, emotions and beliefs (Stacey 2011). In com-
plex cases, it requires a close collaboration between the analysts and other 
potential users of the decision. Therefore, a rational-analytical approach to 
decision-making in technology innovation is characterized by a degree of 
involvement in collection of information relevant to the decision required 
during the innovation process. In these cases, the use of indicators signals 
the presence of rational-analytical thinking during the decision (see next 
subchapter). 
Furthermore, there are some criticisms to this approach: the decision maker 
is not always alone and is often a part of a multiparty decision situation; 
decision makers are not rational enough or well enough informed, or 
information can be too costly to consider all alternatives and consequences 
of the decision; and decision makers have more goals than just the maximi-
zation of objectives (Jauch and Glueck 1988). For example, they can be 
                                                          
63  The opposite, irrationality, is any behaviour that is not preceded by fixing objectives and 
weighing up options based on observable facts (Stacey 2011). 
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simply aiming for their decision to suffice, instead of finding the optimal 
solution. It should also be stressed that the objectives might change, which 
may undermine the optimal solution. In addition, Herbert Simon developed 
the concept of bounded rationality in recognition of the restrictive circum-
stances in which pure technical rationality could be applied (cf. Simon 
1979). In fact, most managers take short-cuts: they employ trial-and-error 
search procedures to identify the most important bits of information in 
particular circumstances; identify a limited range of the most important 
options; and then act knowing only some of the potential outcomes of their 
actions (Stacey 2011). Moreover, the lack of realism of pure rationality was 
recognized in other ways. There are numerous occasions where objectives 
and interests conflict, and the most powerful coalition will decide in a 
political process (Stacey 2011). 
Second, the emotional-intuitive approach (see reference 2 in Figure 2.1) is 
based on habit or experience, gut feeling or instinct, and can be guided by 
unconscious mental processes (Jauch and Glueck 1988; Starcke and Brand 
2012). Emotional-intuitive decision makers often consider only a number 
of alternatives and options because it leads to a better decision than using 
analytical techniques. When confronted with a problem: 
The machinery of intuitive thought does the best it can. If the indi-
vidual has relevant expertise, she will recognize the situation, and 
the intuitive solution that comes to her mind is likely to be correct. 
(Kahneman 2011, 12) 
Furthermore, emotional-intuitive decision makers can also involve other 
factors or timings that can lead to a better overall decision than simply 
following what a quantitative model prescribes (Ilori and Irefin 1997). 
In innovation contexts, intuition can potentially lead to creative results 
(Policastro 1999).
64
 In fact, intuition is important in tasks related to innova-
tion, which can involve high complexity, short time horizons, ill structured 
                                                          
64  The term intuition can be defined as a tacit form of knowledge that guides decision-making 
in a promising direction (Policastro 1999). 
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problems and moral evaluations (Linn, Man, and Bossink 2013).
65
 Intuition 
involves the ability to quickly synthesize, integrate information and use 
decision makers’ experience. According to Schoemaker and Russo (1993) 
intuition can be brilliant when based on extensive learning from past 
experience, probably reflecting an automated expertise. It seems to be most 
useful when there are high stakes, a high level of uncertainty, and pressure 
to make the right decision in a limited amount of time. Some authors prefer 
to name this type of approach only as emotional, which excludes the 
enriching aspect of intuition important to innovation. Therefore, it seems 
more appropriate to use the label emotional-intuitive because it not only 
captures the emotional nature of the approach, but also involves the intui-
tion concept often linked to innovation contexts. 
This approach has been criticised because: it does not effectively use all 
tools available to decide; and the use of a rational model instead ensures 
that proper attention is given to consequences of decisions before signifi-
cant mistakes are made (Jauch and Glueck 1988). According to Policastro 
(1999) intuitions are not infallible, since they are like rough estimates, 
which necessarily entail some margin of error. A significant danger exists 
because most individuals, when, for example, faced with a difficult ques-
tion, “often answer an easier one instead, usually without noticing the 
substitution” (Kahneman 2011, 12). 
Third, the political-behavioural approach (see reference 3 in Figure 2.1) is 
based on the pressure of different stakeholders and their impact on the 
decision process. During a decision, stakeholders can be suppliers, trade 
unionists, owners, workers, competitors, colleagues, experts, governments 
or other institutions (e.g. parliaments, committees and agencies.). The 
political-behavioural approach implies that there is a limited number of 
choices available as determined by the organization and institutional 
arrangements. In this approach, decisions are made when several stake-
                                                          
65  The term has been also used to capture emotions such as people relying on “gut feeling” to 
make decisions, a “strong feeling about it” or the self-righteous “people just know that they 
are right” (Schoemaker and Russo 1993, 10). 
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holders agree that a solution has been found, through adjustments and 
negotiations. The approach assumes that the real decision makers must 
consider a variety of pressures from other people affected by their deci-
sions, and likewise reflect whether the decision can be implemented politi-
cally (Narayanan and Fahey 1982; Ilori and Irefin 1997; Jauch and Glueck 
1988). In fact, an organization has to interact with a variety of stakeholders, 
who hold different degrees of power, and who give an individual or an 
organization something and expect something in return. Examples of these 
interactions can occur during negotiation activities, consensus-building, 
networking, workshops, discussions, coalition-building, compromise 
and/or other type of social activities that can influence the decision-making 
process. Naturally, the more power stakeholders have, the more influence 
they will exert over decisions, because organizations are more dependent 
on them (Jauch and Glueck 1988). Therefore, decision makers meet stake-
holders’ demands through political compromise, mutual adjustments and 
merging competing demands to create a coalition of interests that will 
support the decision. 
Decision-making can be made in a process of mutual influence, which may 
involve actors with different, sometimes even opposing, interests. Strategic 
decisions are often made in a social process of interaction of different 
actors and groups. Some authors stressed that, in reality, when decisions 
are made, it is the product of social relations that matter, through network-
ing activities, different forms of social pressure, expression of values and 
norms, etc. According to Perri 6 (2002), decision makers only use a certain 
amount of knowledge when making a decision, and their judgments are 
rather dependent on where actors are socially situated and integrated.  
Perri 6 (2002) supports the view that forces of social regulation and social 
integration exist, and shape the individuals’ decisions. These forces can be 
used to explain how several social actors use information, behave and 
judge. The result of social relations acts upon individuals, both consciously 
and unconsciously, constraining and guiding them throughout their deci-
sion-making. The term “social relations” is a central concept of sociology 
and here it is used broadly to refer to the multiple ways people are connect-
ed and influence one another (Hall and Lamont 2013). In this study, the 
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term relates to all social activities that can influence a technology decision, 
such as networking activities, hierarchical or peer pressures, marketing 
activities, expression of values and norms, discussions, etc. 
This approach has been criticized for implying that institutions play a real 
role in limiting the choices available to a decision maker, assuming deci-
sion makers accept and recognize the power of stakeholders. However, 
decision makers might pretend to negotiate and will not accept mutual 
adjustments and real negotiations. Furthermore, the approach idealistically 
implies that all decision makers previously consider whether the decision 
outcome might be implemented politically. Other criticism to this approach 
include the damaging consequences of decision-making based on interests, 
seeking a lower common denominator in the decision, limiting decisions to 
incremental changes, disregarding information and evidence and the 
possibility of paralysis in the decisions process. 
Fourth and last, the use of two or three approaches in combination can 
occur in a decision process. In fact, different approaches may need to be 
combined to different extents to explain the decision-making process (Linn, 
Man, and Bossink 2013). In some contexts, the rational-analytical compo-
nent is very large and, in others, the emotional-intuitive can dominate, or 
decisions can be made mostly according to political realities. For example, 
the rational-analytical and political-behavioural approaches can interact 
(see reference 4 in Figure 2.1) in a process simultaneously high/low in 
politics and high/low in rationality. In these cases it may be rational to 
behave politically, or it may be political to behave rationally (Dean and 
Sharfman 1993; Linn, Man, and Bossink 2013). Furthermore, politics may 
frequently obstruct the flow of information, particularly in high-velocity 
environments where timely and accurate information is only shared 
amongst selected members of the group (Eisenhardt and Bourgeois III 
1988; Perri 6 2002). In these cases, political behaviour may block the 
rational assessment of a situation, as decision makers are not able to take 
into consideration all alternatives. In addition, the interaction between 
rational-analytical and emotional-intuitive approaches exists (see reference 
5 in Figure 2.1), but is based on assumptions by researchers in the literature 
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who, according to Linn, Man, and Bossink (2013), failed to provide rigor-
ous empirical data. In addition, the interaction between political-
behavioural and emotional-intuitive approaches is plausible (see reference 
6 in Figure 2.1) but, according to the latter authors, there are no empirical 
studies about this interrelation. Moreover, the latter authors found that a 
process dominated by rationality and supported by intuition yields more 
effective political processes (see reference 7 in Figure 2.1). In the same 
train of thought, Jauch and Glueck (1988) stated that decisions can be made 
using the three approaches: a rational-analytical approach combined with 
an emotional-intuitive consideration in light of political realities. For 
example, managers were found to purposely blend behavioural, political 
and formal analytical processes together to improve the quality of decisions 
and implementations (Stacey 2011). 
The degree to which each approach dominates the mind of the decision 
maker can vary significantly due to a diversity of factors. These factors can 
range from those related to the context of the decision to the personal 
characteristics of the decision maker (Meijer, Hekkert, and Koppenjan 
2007). The personal characteristics can vary significantly, but the demo-
graphic characteristics and in particular the person’s educational level can 
significantly affect decisions, according to Musso and Francioni (2012). 
Higher levels of education facilitate the use of rational decision-making, 
whereas lower levels tend to lead to the use of intuition. Other personal 




The context of the decision can significantly influence the selection of 
approaches to be used by the decision maker. This contextual factor in-
cludes the political environment, the economic conditions of a decision and 
the type of organization where the decision occurs. The organisational 
literature proposes three different types of structures for complex decision-
                                                          
66  This study requires more resources than the ones presently available. More information 
about other personal characteristics can be found in the works of Musso and Francioni 
(2012) and of Meijer, Hekkert, and Koppenjan (2007). 
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making: the functional organisation, the matrix organisation, and the 
organisation by project (Aubry, Hobbs, and Thuillier 2007). Another 
important component of the organizational context is the level of qualifica-
tions of the team involved in the decision. In fact, qualifications play a role 
when selecting an approach to make a decision (Meijer, Hekkert, and 
Koppenjan 2007). The qualifications are particularly important because the 
team has to deal with different levels of uncertainty, agreement and com-
plexity present in technology innovation decisions. The following figure 
captures the contexts of decisions according to the degree of uncertainty 
and agreement associated with each decision. 
 
Figure 2.2: Zones of decision-making by certainty and agreement 
Source: Stacey (1996, 47). 
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The figure shows that when conditions are close to certainty (zone 2), 
agreement (zone 3) or both (zone 1), the dominant management styles and 
theories based on planning and power relations can be employed (Aram 
and Noble 1999). In other words, in these zones all approaches can exist or 
co-exist. However, when a team have to operate far from both certainty and 
agreement (zone 4), decision-making becomes more intuitive, hard to 
programme, and possibly a messy discontinuous process (Aram and Noble 
1999). This vast central region (4) can be named the zone of complexity 
because it is a region of high creativity, innovation, and change to create 
new modes of operating (Stacey 1996). There are several methods that can 
be applied in zone 4, when moving towards uncertainty and disagreement. 
In zone 4 the latter author depicted two interesting examples to be consid-
ered in more detail, because they provide theoretical ground for under-
standing various differences between decision-making processes: 
 “Garbage can” decision-making suggests that an organization is seen 
as a collection of solutions looking for appropriate problems in the 
garbage (Cray et al. 1991). It suggests that (chaotic) human organiza-
tions tend to produce many discarded “solutions” due to an absence of 
appropriate problems. The main idea is that the substance of the prob-
lem is irrelevant except for the stakes that can be attached to it by vari-
ous interests, according to the authors. Problems may eventually  
appear for which a search in the garbage can might provide fitting  
solutions. The idea was developed in reference to explanations/ 
interpretations of behaviours in decision situations that appear to con-
tradict classical theory of rational decision (Cohen, March, and Olsen 
1972). In fact, the garbage can idea was influenced by extreme cases of 
uncertainty in decision environments (i.e. higher education institu-
tions) that would trigger responses, which, from a distance, appear  
“irrational”. The garbage can model/method reveals the importance of 
political aspects expressed by the “internal wrangling and external  
negotiation often present in strategic decision-making” (Cray  
et al. 1991, 231). 
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 “Muddling through” decision-making is a method, described by 
Charles Lindblom (1959), highlighting a long-standing division in 
public administration approaches. “Muddling through” comes from the 
British expression in “muddling through somehow”. The expression 
means the act of facing a complex bureaucratic decision process and 
“getting the job done”. At the time, the dominant approach to public 
administration followed the belief that scientific analysis could solve 
the political problems faced by public administrators, putting strong 
faith in rationalism through various forms of rational or technical anal-
ysis. According to Lindblom, a rational approach is often not possible, 
and he argued that the frequently despised political manoeuvring char-
acteristic of administrative decision-making might not be as bad as it 
appears to many. 
In zone 4, where garbage can and muddling-through can occur, control is 
decentralized and contradictory forces need to be implemented to avoid the 
destructive forces and disintegration of the system represented in zone 5 
(Aram and Noble 1999). Zone 5 represents an area with high levels of 
uncertainty and disagreement in organizations, where disintegration, 
breakdown or anarchy can occur if avoidance measures are not implemented 
(Stacey 1996). 
Conditions of uncertainty, furthermore, might be connected to situations 
where only implicit consequences are given, or when the entirety of the 
information cannot be processed by an individual. If uncertainty exists to a 
moderate degree then both emotional-intuitive systems and the rational-
analytical may act in concert (Starcke and Brand 2012). Importanly, a 
rational-analytical approach can be useless if the decision faces significant 
uncertainty (Starcke and Brand 2012). Nevertheless, rational-analytical 
approaches can still promote decisions to develop new products. In fact, 
rational-analytical approaches can be helpful “when technological uncer-
tainty is high, intuitive judgments may differ considerably and politics may 
lead to the continuation of unsuccessful R&D projects” (Linn, Man, and 
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Bossink 2013, 5-6). A typical example of decisions under uncertainty is the 
case of emerging technologies
67
 such as nanotechnology, synthetic biology 
or brain-computer interfaces. In these cases, the high degree of uncertainty 
surrounding the technologies signifies both the large variety of opportuni-
ties that a new technology has to offer, and a threat of not knowing what 
comes next and not being able to ex ante determine the success or failure of 
a technological path (Meijer, Hekkert, and Koppenjan 2007). 
It can generally be concluded that, on one hand, decisions can be made in 
knowledge-intensive environments where information gathering and 
evaluation occurs extensively. In cases where information is useful, a 
rational-analytical approach can lead to or help in a decision. On the other 
hand, information about product concepts and impacts is often insufficient 
in the early phases where innovative ideas can occur. In this case, decisions 
can be based on judgments and incomplete evaluations involving not only 
many actors and interactions, but also politics, conflicts, confusions and 
other noise (Kihlander and Ritzén 2012). In short, decision-making in 
technology innovation is seldom about correct answers, but mostly satisfac-
tory answers that eliminate bad alternatives rather than the best possible 
one (Kihlander and Ritzén (2012).  
In summary, a decision model for technology innovation will be used to 
understand the relevance of the context of the decision (and the process of 
construction of evidence). The context will be investigated in terms of 
political setting, economic environment and organizational structure and 
competences. The personal characteristics of the decision maker will not be 
taken into consideration in this study. 
2.2.4 Types of decisions of technology innovation  
There are four types of technology decisions that can occur in a decision 
process of technology innovation. In these contexts there can be, first, 
decisions about the acquisition of new equipment and/or technology. This 
                                                          
67  I.e. technologies that are still in an early phase of development (van Merkerk and Smits 2008). 
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type of decision can involve public as well as private researchers judging 
about economic and financial impact of the decision. However, these 
decisions can also comprehend significant strategic aspects about the future 
of the organization. For example, the acquisition of a powerful jet printer 
for a public laboratory requires considerations beyond the financial cost, 
and includes technology characteristics, availability of human resources, 
skills to operate and/or the relationship with the suppliers. In another 
example, policymakers may be involved in this type of decision to promote 
R&D&I activities associated with significant acquisitions, often named 
compensatory measures. In fact, these acquisitions can be related to the 
military (e.g. submarines, tanks and frigates), healthcare (e.g. MRI
68
 and 
robots), or communications (e.g. cloud computing services and telecom-
munications). Therefore, decisions about the acquisition of new equip-
ment/technology can be significantly important to a research laboratory, a 
department, a company involved in R&D&I activities, and in some policy 
decisions. 
Second, innovations can occur after decisions about the development of a 
new product and/or a technology. Companies involved in R&D&I activities 
as well as (public) research laboratories or departments are often involved 
in these types of decisions. These decisions are strategic for the company 
or laboratory because they will set up the direction of the forthcoming 
works, and significantly impact those involved at all levels. In a company, 
the outcome of this decision can lead to success or significant losses. In a 
laboratory, it can lead to a successful product/technology or to the aban-
donment of activities in the field after a significant investment. In addition, 
sometimes policymakers decide upon the development of a new product 
and/or technology. These decisions can include the decision to integrate 
more security features in national passports, the introduction of new ticket-
ing in public transports, or the development of national technology related 
to the military or biological hazards. Therefore, decisions of development 
of product/technology can involve public researchers, companies with 
R&D&I activities, as well as policymakers. 
                                                          
68  MRI is the acronym of Magnetic Resonance Imaging. 
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Third, innovations may be the outcome of decisions about the acquisition 
of intellectual property. In fact, companies or (public) research institutions 
can involve themselves in decisions to buy patents, trademarks, industrial 
designs or copyrights. Like the previous decision types, this decision can 
contain significant strategic aspects for the future of the organization. This 
type of decision can involve financial considerations, but also important 
elements related to existing skills within the organization and human 
resource management. Therefore, decisions about acquisition of intellectual 
property can involve companies or other research institutions in strategic 
considerations. 
Fourth and last, there may be decisions about innovation, technology or 
industrial policy. These types of decisions can produce effects in the 
innovation system and, consequently, in technology innovation, as dis-
cussed earlier. For example, a decision to introduce tax benefits can impact 
the amount of R&D&I activities in companies. In another example, a 
decision to increase admissions into science and engineering degree pro-
grammes impacts the future quality of the labour force available to (public) 
departments/laboratories and companies. Therefore, policy decisions can 
involve a broad range of areas of intervention, and may have significant 
impact on technology innovation. 
A technology innovation decision is expected to be embedded in elements 
of complexity and uncertainty: First, technological innovation is often 
associated with complexity
69 
(Chapman and Hyland 2004; Rycroft 2007; 
Waelbroeck 2003; Wonglimpiyarat 2005). In the technology innovation 
context, complexity can be understood as components that, integrated 
together, cause difficulties for the transformation into successful prod-
ucts/processes (Wonglimpiyarat 2005). Complexity in innovation has been 
associated with experiences where information is incomplete or ambigu-
ous, and the consequences of actions are highly unpredictable (Aram and 
Noble 1999). In these contexts, complexity is contained in technologies, 
                                                          
69  “Complexity” is the state or quality of being intricate or complicated (“Complexity” Oxford 
Dictionaries Online. Last accessed in 21/12/2014). 
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products, customer interfaces and organizational setups (Chapman and 
Hyland 2004). In these situations, muddling through or garbage can models 
will probably be more useful for understanding the decision process, as 
discussed earlier. Second, technological innovation is also often associated 
with uncertainty
70
 (Böhle 2011; Jalonen and Lehtonen 2011; Fusari and 
Reati 2013; Meijer, Hekkert, and Koppenjan 2007; Dosi 1982; Nelson and 
Winter 1977; Carbonell and Rodríguez-Escudero 2009; Sainio, Ritala, and 
Hurmelinna-Laukkanen 2012). Innovation involves uncertainty in an 
essential way because “different people, and different organizations, will 
disagree as to where to place their R&D chips, and on when to make their 
bets” (Nelson and Winter 1977, 47). Although uncertainty might motivate 
an individual to seek information, the “information about innovation is 
often sought from near-peers, especially information about their subjective 
evaluations of the innovation” (Rogers 2003, xix). This exchange of per-
ceptions about a new idea occurs through a convergence process involving 
interpersonal networks (Rogers 2003). There are numerous types of uncer-
tainty associated with the innovation process, although technological, 
market and regulatory uncertainties have an established status (Jalonen and 
Lehtonen 2011; Sainio, Ritala, and Hurmelinna-Laukkanen 2012).
71
 There-
fore, complexity and uncertainty are central elements of decisions in 
technology innovation. 
2.3 Conclusion 
This chapter discussed the need to conduct research to study the role of 
indicators in the decision process of technology innovation. The first 
                                                          
70  “Uncertainty” can be defined as the degree to which a number of alternatives are perceived 
with respect to the occurrence of an event and the relative probabilities of these alternatives 
(Rogers 2003). 
71  But many more can be identified. For example, Carbonell and Rodríguez-Escudero (2009) 
considered only two aspects of uncertainty: technology novelty and technological turbu-
lence. In their study on innovation in biomass gasification projects in the Netherlands, 
Meijer, Hekkert, and Koppenjan (2007) argued that technological, political and resource 
uncertainty are the most dominant sources of perceived uncertainty influencing entrepre-
neurial decision-making. 
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subchapter argued that more research is needed about the role of indicators 
in these decisions. The second subchapter developed the main concepts 
needed to conduct the research. This third and last subchapter intends to 
summarize the research questions and the hypotheses formulated, and to 
identify the main concepts to be articulated by the hypotheses. The litera-
ture reviewed in the first subchapter indicated the need to conduct research 
to describe and explain the role of indicators in decisions of technology 
innovation. In fact, a gap was detected in the literature of innovation and 
technology assessment about the influence and role of indicators in this 
type of decision. It is important to address this gap because indicators are 
often important elements of these studies. Thus: 
 The research will first answer the question: (Q1) Is the use of indica-
tors different from their influence in decisions of technology innova-
tion made by the three innovation groups? The hypothesis formulated 
is: (H1) Despite their high level of use, indicators have low influence 
in decisions of technology innovation made by the three innovation 
groups. The concepts needed to articulate this hypothesis (reviewed in 
both the first and second subchapter) include indicators, use of indica-
tors, influence of indicators, decision-making, technology innovation, 
and innovation groups. 
 The discussion in the subchapter 2.1 also pointed to the need to con-
duct research in order to answer the question: (Q2) What is the role of 
indicators in decisions of technology innovation by the three innova-
tion groups? The hypothesis formulated is: (H2) Indicators have a 
symbolic role in the decisions of technology innovation made by the 
three innovation groups. There are several important concepts needed 
to articulate in this hypothesis such as indicators, the role of indicators 
(instrumental role, symbolic role or no role), decision-making, tech-
nology innovation, and innovation groups. 
 Last, the discussion also identified a third research question: (Q3) How 
are indicators used in decisions of technology innovation? There were 
four possible hypotheses to be tested: (H3) The type of decision helps 
to explain how indicators are used in decisions of technology innova-
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tion; (H4) the phase of decision helps to explain how indicators are 
used in decisions of technology innovation; (H5) the context helps to 
explain how indicators are used in the decisions of technology innova-
tion; and (H6) the process of construction of evidence helps to explain 
how indicators are used in decisions of technology innovation. These 
hypotheses contain same concepts of the latter questions (e.g. indica-
tors, technology innovation, decision-making, and innovation groups), 
as well as news ones such as the type of decision, phase of decision, 
context of decision (political, economic and organizational) and pro-
cess of construction of evidence. The latter two concepts will be articu-
lated through the decision-making model of technology innovation and 
the network theory described earlier. These two theoretical concepts 
will help to understand the influence of the context and the process of 
construction of evidence in the way indicators are used to make deci-




This chapter discusses the methods selected to test the hypotheses de-
scribed previously. Methods refer to the range of techniques available to 
collect evidence about the world. They are tools or lenses to be applied to 
different kinds of research questions researchers seek to address. The use of 
quantitative, qualitative or combined methods relies on epistemological 
choices derived from different scientific traditions.
1
 There is presently an 
increased permissiveness in this division (Alasuutari, Bickman, and 
Brannen 2008): on one hand, researchers are willing to learn more about 
the possibilities of applying survey methods and statistics to their analysis; 
on the other, different methods of analysing talk, texts and social interac-
tion amplify the lenses available to study social reality from different 
points of view. In this context, different methods can be combined not only 
to gain from individual strengths of each method, but also to compensate 
for the particular faults and limitations of a single method, overcome biased 
interpretations in research, and provide a complete overview of the matter 
under investigation (Henn, Weinstein, and Foard 2009). The selection of 
methods to collect data depends on the nature of the inquiry and the type of 
information required. In this study, a combination of methods was used to 
answer the three research questions. The following table summarizes the 
hypotheses formulated earlier, the variables at stake, and the methods and 
measures employed to test them. 
  
                                                          
1  There are two dominant epistemological positions for what counts as knowledge within the 
social sciences and the best way to acquire this knowledge: the positivistic approach and 
interpretivism (Henn, Weinstein, & Foard (2009). Positivism is usually associated with 
techniques such as experiments and surveys, often called quantitative methods. Interpreta-
tive approach usually includes qualitative techniques such as participant observation, in-
depth interviewing, focus-group interviewing, projective interviewing and personal docu-
mentary analysis. 
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Table 3.1 reveals six main ideas about the analytical model that will be 
used in this research:  
 Hypothesis 1 contains two independent variables (e.g. use of indicators 
and influence of indicators in the decision) and one dependent variable 
(e.g. innovation group). The measurement of the variable “use of indi-
cators” is made in Question 2 of the survey (more details about the 
survey can be found in subchapter 3.1 and in the Annex 1 – Question-
naires). In fact, Question 2 ascertains whether indicators were used in 
the decision.
2
 Furthermore, the measurement of the variable “influence 
of indicators in the decision” is made in Question 7 of the survey put 
to researchers and business, and in Question 9 of the survey put to pol-
icymakers. In fact, this question asked whether the indicators were 
more important than social relations in the decision.
3
 The contrast be-
tween these two questions allows testing Hypothesis 1 by identifying 
the difference between the levels of use and the real influence indica-
tors had on decisions by innovation group.  
 Hypothesis 2 contains one final variable (e.g. role of indicators) and 
one dependent variable (e.g. innovation group). As described in Chap-
ter 2, the role of indicators is divided into three categories: an instru-
mental role, a symbolic role or no role in the decision at all. These cat-
egories were identified using the same aforementioned questions 
(2 and 7) of the survey for researchers and business, and Questions 2 
and 9 of the survey for policymakers. In fact, an analysis of the use 
and non-use of indicators as well as their influence in the decision  
allows the categorization of the role indicators in the decisions. The 
categorization tests if indicators have a symbolic role in decisions by 
innovation group (see subchapter 3.1 and in the Annex 1 – Question-
naires for more details). 
                                                          
2  It was possible to answer yes and no in this closed compulsory question. The selection of 
the latter option required respondents to proceed to question six (see Annex 1 – Question-
naires). 
3  In this closed question respondents had to answer yes or no. 
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 Hypothesis 3 contains one independent variable (e.g. type of decision) 
and three dependent variables (e.g. influence of indicators in the deci-
sion, role of indicators, and type of indicators). As described in Chap-
ter 2, there are four types of decisions (i.e. acquisition of equip-
ment/technology, development of product/technology, acquisition of 
intellectual property, and policy design). The measurement of this var-
iable - type of decision - was made in Question 1 of the survey, where 
respondents had to describe the type of decision they were referring to. 
The measurement of the variable “influence of indicators in the deci-
sion” was made in interviews and Question 7 (or 9 for policymakers), 
where respondents were asked whether the indicators were more im-
portant than social relations to the decision.
4
 The measurement of the 
variable “role of indicators” was made during the same questions  
(2 and 7 of the survey for researchers and business, and Questions 2 
and 9 of the survey for policymakers). The analysis of both the use and 
non-use of indicators, as well as their influence in a decision, allows 
the categorization of the role of indicators in a decision. Last, the 
measurement of the variable “type of indicators” was made in Ques-
tion 4 of the survey for researchers and business, and Questions 3  
and 7 of the survey for policymakers. The question(s) inquired the  
respondents about the types of indicators used in decisions. Thus, the 
relevance of the type of decision to explain the way indicators are used 
was tested with the combination of information collected in the survey 
about the type of decision where indicators were influential, the role of 
indicators by type of decision, and the type of indicators by type of de-
cision (see subchapter 3.1 and in the Annex 1 – Questionnaires for 
more details). 
 Hypothesis 4 contains one independent variable (phase of decision) 
and two dependent variables (influence of indicator in the decision and 
type of decision). The interviews and the survey (Question 3 for re-
searchers and business, and Question 4 for policymakers) inquired 
about the phase of decision. There were three options available to iden-
                                                          
4  It was possible to answer yes and no in this closed compulsory question. 
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tify the intensity of the use before and after the decision: never, some-
times and many times.
5
 As mentioned, the measurement of the variable 
“influence of indicators in the decision” was made in Question 7 (or 9 
in the case of policymakers), where respondents were asked whether 
indicators were more important than social relations to the decision.
6
 
The measurement of the variable “type of decision” was made in 
Question 1 of the survey, where respondents had to describe the type 
of decision they were referring to. Thus, the relevance of the phase of 
decision to explain the way indicators are used was tested with the 
combination of information collected about the phases of decision in 
cases where indicators were influential in the decision and in  
different phases by type of decision (see subchapter 3.1 and in the An-
nex 1 – Questionnaires for more details). 
 Hypothesis 5 contains one independent variable (context of decision) 
and one dependent variable (influence of indicators in the decision). 
Questions 1 through 9 of the case studies allowed a description of the 
context in terms of their most relevant elements: political environment, 
economic circumstances and organizational context (more details in 
subchapter 3.2). The latter was complemented by a social network 
analysis of the organizational structures that made the decisions. In 
fact, questions 6, 7, 8 and 9 of the case studies allowed the mapping of 
those structures through the construction of sociograms
7
 and identifica-
tion of factions and core-peripheries. The social network analyses also 
allowed for comparing the two structures with measures of general 
centralization, density, connectedness and compactness, and individual 
Eigenvector centrality and betweenness (see subchapter 3.2 for more 
details). In sum, the analysis of the information collected in two case 
studies allows intensive, detailed and in-depth research about the con-
                                                          
5  A three-point Likert scale was appropriate to inquire about the behaviour of the decision 
maker, according to Lehmann and Hulbert (1972). 
6  It was possible to answer yes and no in this closed compulsory question. 
7  A sociogram is a sociometric chart plotting the structure of interpersonal relations in a 
group situation (“Sociogram.” Last accessed in 21/12/2014. http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/sociogram). 
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text of the decisions to test its relevance in understanding the way in-
dicators were used in the decision. 
 Hypothesis 6 contains one independent variable (process of construc-
tion of evidence) and one dependent variable (influence of indicator in 
the decision). The two case studies collected information about the ev-
idence and indicators used in the decision (Question 10), their purpose 
(Question 11), controversies (Question 12), phase of the decision 
(Question 13), and other details important to understand the way  
evidence and indicators were introduced in the decision process (Ques-
tion 14). The analysis of this information allowed a comprehensive 
view of the process of construction of evidence to test its relevance in 
understanding the way indicators (and other evidence) were used in the 
decision process (subchapter 3.2 for more details). 
3.1 Surveys  
Surveys were designed to collect data to test hypotheses. Surveys are a 
method of gathering similar information from a large number of people  
at the same time with either a descriptive and/or explanatory nature  
(Henn, Weinstein, and Foard 2009). A “descriptive” survey was used to 
describe a sample in terms of proportions and percentages of people  
(Punch 2006, 75). The preparation of the surveys included the development 
of twelve exploratory interviews to formulate and calibrate the questions. 
These exploratory interviews were qualitative and in-depth, with signifi-
cant latitude to discuss the topic of the use of indicators and decision-
making. These interviews were prepared based on literature review and 
analysis of official documents and other grey literature. Interviewees were 
composed of experts identified as having sound knowledge of and experi-
ence in the use of indicators and decision-making. The interviews occurred 
in Germany, Switzerland and Portugal, lasted from one to four hours, and 
were developed between October 2011 and January 2012. 
After, the surveys were prepared for launch through self-administered 
questionnaires and standardized interviews. The questionnaires and inter-
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views employed fixed formats for questions and answers to ensure con-
sistency of data collection (Leeuw 2008). The difference between self-
administered questionnaires and standardized interviews is the presence of 
the interviewer and the ability to see the questions. The presence of an 
interviewer, in particular, can be a doubled-edged sword to a survey, since 
it can increase the proper implementation of the questions, reduce non-
response and improve data quality; but it can also influence responses and 
cause unwanted interviewer effects, especially when sensitive issues are at 
stake (Leeuw 2008). Consequently, this survey was conducted with a 
balanced number of questionnaires (65) and interviews (26) to improve 
response rate and to minimize interviewer effects. 
It should be stressed that no bias was found in answers about the use of 
indicators in the survey. There were five precautionary measures to prevent 
any bias: First, bias towards a positive answer regarding the use of indica-
tors was avoided by separating the question of use from the question of 
influence of indicators. In fact, the separation of these questions forced the 
respondent to consider and indicate with precision when indicators were 
used, which and what for, and the importance of other individuals in the 
decision before evaluating the influence of indicators. Second, the survey 
was preceded by a clear explanation that the objective of the work was to 
determine how the decisions were made and not to detect the use of indica-
tors. Third, to deter any partiality for answering affirmatively, the second 
question of the questionnaires and interviews (related to the use of indica-
tors) was followed by explicit instruction to continue answering in question 
number 6 in the case of a non-use of indicators during a decision (see next 
sub-section). Fourth, the online questionnaires were anonymous to discour-
age any feeling of pressure to answer affirmatively. Fifth, the interviews 
were confidential (and anonymized), which discouraged fabricating or 
strengthening of responses per an anticipation of desired answers (see 
section 3.1.2). Therefore, there is little or no ground to think that there was 
bias towards answering affirmatively towards the use of indicators. 
The samples for the survey were only composed of individuals who were 
involved in confirmed technology decisions and belonged to the innovation 
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groups. The samples were created using non-probability sampling methods 
(Saumure and Given 2008) in the following way: 
 The samples of business R&D&I leaders and public researchers were 
selected using purposive criterion sampling (Palys 2008), and were 
based on the 2010 National R&D Survey.
8
 There were three criteria: 
first, the presence of a scientific leader in an R&D project in 2010; 
second, the existence of expenditures in equipment (i.e. instruments, 
equipment or software equal to or higher than 1500€ for business 
R&D&I leaders and 3000€ for researchers); and third, the re-
search/innovation team needed to have at least one PhD (full-time 
equivalent). In this way, the criteria confirmed that a real technology 
decision was made in one existent R&D&I project with a minimum fi-
nancial effort (the National R&D survey captures efforts that are ex-
cessively low to worth analysis). The magnitude of the financial effort 
selected is the minimum acceptable for a company or a laboratory to 
run for a year with R&D&I project. Furthermore, the criteria also 
guaranteed that the research team had proper skills to conduct a sound 
R&D project (the National R&D survey captures contexts where the 
levels of skills are excessively low to worth analysis). The samples 
were considered significantly representative because they were only 
composed of scientists (or equivalents) who made a confirmed tech-
nology decision in a reliable R&D&I environment. In these contexts, 
there were 57 leaders of R&D&I departments of companies in the Na-
tional R&D Survey, and 36 responses were received corresponding to 
a response rate of 63%.
9
 There were also 78 public researchers that 
met the criteria, and 31 responses were received corresponding to a re-
sponse rate of 40%. 
                                                          
8  The National R&D Survey (named IPCTN) is a reliable long-term survey that captures with 
detailed data any existing projects, researchers and companies involved in R&D in Portu-
gal. The survey has internationally comparable standards, a reliable quality, is based on the 
Frascati Manual and is regularly checked by OECD, Eurostat and the National Institute of 
Statistics. 
9  The 2010 national R&D survey database detected 59 companies in the country that met the 
criteria. The business questionnaire was sent, however, only to 57 due to the closer of 2 firms. 
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 The sample of policymakers was created using snowball sampling 
(Morgan 2008) for two main reasons: there were no other sources for 
locating the members of this population; and almost all members knew 
each other. The initial set of participants (serving as informants about 
potential participants) was significantly diverse and was complement-
ed by Google searches to avoid possible bias. Two successive waves 
of snowballing assured a more representative sample (Schutt 2008). 
Thus, the final sample was composed of the vast majority of individu-
als directly involved in innovation policy decisions in the period 2005-
2011 in the country. The sample was considered significantly repre-
sentative given the reduced number of individuals involved in innova-
tion policy at the time. In this context, there were 59 individuals listed 
as being definitely involved in innovation policy, and 24 responses 
were received corresponding to a response rate of 41%.
10
 
The response rates obtained for the three groups were considered signifi-
cant by normal standards in social research, where they are traditionally 
lower (cf. Shih and Fan 2009 and  Baruch 1999). Furthermore, to account 
for effects on response rates, there were three personalized email cam-
paigns with three reminders each, and personal contacts to sensitize indi-
viduals to answer, from February 2012 to mid-June 2013.
11
 No differences 
were detected between online replies and direct answers. In addition, the 
answers were not compulsory by law, there were no economic incentives to 
answer, and the questionnaires were not part of the national statistical 
system. Thus, only volunteers could reply to the survey. Moreover, the 
online answers did not allow for establishing any relationship with specific 
individual technology decisions. Finally, the questions of the questionnaire 
were short (it took an average of five minutes to answer all of them), with 
closed questions (with two exceptions for the policymakers group) and 
related to concrete technology options (see below).  
                                                          
10  The sampling technic allowed the identification of 65 policymakers but, after a significant 
number of attempts to locate the policymakers, 6 were considerable unreachable. 
11  See Fan and Yan (2010) for methodology of online questionnaires. 
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3.1.1 Self-administered questionnaires 
The work involved self-administered questionnaires, as mentioned previ-
ously. They are a data collection technique carried without the presence of 
an interviewer and can be conducted as web questionnaires, postal surveys 
or a psychological surveys (Leeuw 2008). In this work, the survey included 
three online questionnaires, similar but not identical to each other, in order 
to adjust to the context and differences of each innovation group. The 
questionnaires addressed representatives of the three Portuguese groups 
under analysis, collecting 65 answers (out of overall 91 surveys) from 
February 2012 to June 2013. The difference between the two question-
naires of researchers and business R&D&I leaders was considerably minor. 
In fact, it consisted only of small adaptations of the text to the context of 
each innovation group. There were, however, two distinct features in the 
case of policymakers. These features were based on the need to understand 
in detail the use of indicators in the decision of each policymaker. First, a 
pre-question was introduced to identify the position occupied during the 
technology policy decision.
12
 Second, three questions were added to 
understand the level of knowledge about the indicators used in the policy 
decision, namely: (i) “Please name the indicators used or recommended to 
make the decision”; (ii) “Did you use other type of information in the 
decision (e.g. studies, advices or sectorial information)?”; and (iii) “In case 
you used other type of information, please name indicators that were used”. 
Nevertheless, all questionnaires (and standardized interviews) shared the 
same structure composed by nine parts (see Annex 1 – Questionnaires):  
 The questionnaires inquired about type of technology decision related 1.
to the adoption and/or investment in technology (choosing the most 
important one for her/his activity). In this closed compulsory question, 
it was possible to choose (as response) between acquisition of prod-
uct/technology, development of product/technology, acquisition of in-
                                                          
12  The options were Minister, Secretary of State, Political advisor to the Minister, Political 
advisor to the Secretary of State, Consultant; Director-General, Civil servant, Parliamentar-
ian, City Mayor and Other position. 
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tellectual property rights, and conception of policies (e.g. ideas, pro-
grammes, measures, actions and projects). 
 The questionnaires inquired whether any indicators were used in the 2.
decision, such as indicators related to financial, technical, organiza-
tional aspects, among others. In this closed compulsory question, it 
was possible to answer yes or no. The selection of the latter option re-
quired respondents to proceed to question six. 
 The questionnaires inquired about the intensity of the use of indicators 3.
in the decision. In a closed question, there were three options about the 
intensity of use before the decision: never, sometimes and many times. 
The same question was asked after the decision, with the same options. 
The three-point Likert scale was enough for inquiring about the behav-
iour of these groups (Lehmann and Hulbert 1972). 
 The questionnaires asked to select up to three typologies of indicators 4.
used in the decision. The twelve typologies available were: (a) Use of 
technology by partners; (b) Use of technology by competition; (c) 
Suppliers (existence of an easy relationship, their characteristics, their 
type, etc.); (d) Technical characteristics of the technology collected 
over the internet, brochures, exhibitions, public events, etc.; (e) Tech-
nical characteristics of the technology collected through intermediaries 
such as R&D centres, technology centres, consulting services, industry 
associations, etc.; (f) Availability of information (studies, opinions, 
sectoral information, etc.); (g) Qualification of human resources; (h) 
Factors related to work organization; (i) Costs (acquisition, mainte-
nance, etc.); (j) Indicators of market share, benchmarking, etc.;  
(k) Other financial indicators (accounting, Internal Return Rate, Net 
Asset Value, payback, etc.); and last (m) Other typology not described 
before. 
 The questionnaires asked about the use given to indicators in the 5.
decision of technology innovation. In this question respondents had to 
classify the intensity of the influence in a four-point Likert scale to 
force a choice identifying the agreement or disagreement with their 
use. In a closed question respondents had to totally disagree, disagree, 
agree or totally agree with the following seven statements: (a) Did in-
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dicators help to deal with the future (increased competitiveness, scien-
tific advances, technology development, etc.)?; (b) Did indicators help 
to understand the current situation?; (c) Did indicators help to charac-
terize your policy/development/acquisition?; (d) Did indicators help to 
confirm your policy/development/acquisition?; (e) Did indicators help 
to justify your policy/development/acquisition decision (to the financ-
ing entity, politicians, management, colleagues, etc.)?; (f) Did indica-
tors help to comply with formalities (with donors and national projects 
in Europe, the supervisory bodies, legislation, etc.)?; and last, (g) Were 
indicators unhelpful. 
 The questionnaires asked for a compulsory rating of the intensity of 6.
the influence of indicators. The rating was measured in a four-point 
Likert scale to force a choice between irrelevant, less important, im-
portant or very important to the decision. In this way respondents rated 
the influence in the decision of fourteen individuals/groups: Liable 
politicians/management/managers; Liable financier and accountants; 
Experts; Colleagues; Personal relationships (acquaintances, friends, 
etc.); Technology users; Salesmen/account managers/consultants; 
Business/industrial groups; (9) Researchers/academics; Other political 
decision makers; Consumers; Groups of citizens (associations, pres-
sure groups, etc.); Society in general; and The media. 
 The questionnaires asked whether the indicators were more important 7.
than social relations to the technology innovation decision. In this 
closed question respondents had to answer yes or no. 
 The questionnaires asked compulsorily how the decision was per-8.
ceived by the respondent regarding five topics: hierarchically; lonely; 
competitively; collaboratively; and with participation of other stake-
holders. This closed question allowed responders to characterize their 
perceptions rating each as never, sometimes and many times. This 
three-point Likert scale was sufficient to measure the behaviour of the 
respondents in terms of their perceptions regarding the decision pro-
cess (Lehmann and Hulbert 1972). 
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 The questionnaires allowed the naming of other factors important to 9.
the technology decision. This was the only non-compulsory question 
common to the three questionnaires. 
3.1.2 Standardized interviews 
The survey also included standardized interviews, as mentioned previously. 
They were a data collection technique carried out in the presence of an 
interviewer to collect the same standardized data gathered in the self-
administered questionnaires, and to allow room to develop other issues that 
could be relevant for the research (Leeuw 2008). In fact, the 26 face-to-face 
interviews were conducted not only to collect standardized data, but also to 
gather other information expressed in the interviews. Similar to the ques-
tionnaires, the interviews targeted researchers, business R&D&I leaders 
and policymakers, from February 2012 to June 2013. The majority of the 
interviews (13 interviews or 50%) targeted policymakers, followed by 
researchers (7 interviews or 27%) and the business community (6 inter-
views or 23%). The emphasis on interviews with policymakers was a way 
to collect responses, given the reluctance to respond to information consid-
ered sensitive by some respondents. Hence, confidential (and later anony-
mized) interviews provided ground to establish a trust relationship with the 
interviewees, which avoided their suspicion of misuse of information. The 
interviews lasted on average one hour. The interviews were important not 
only to collect the same information as the questionnaires, but also to give 
space for new issues to arise during the conversation and to reach satura-
tion of information. 
3.2 Case studies 
A case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries 
between the phenomenon and context are not clearly evident (Simons 
2009). The aim of practice-oriented case studies is not to prove whether a 
theoretical relation exists, but whether the hypotheses are “correct for the 
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practice for which the study wants to be locally relevant” (Dul and Hak 
2008, 220-221). In this case, the objective is to contribute to knowledge 
regarding the relevance of the context and the process of construction of 
evidence to understand the way indicators are used in decisions by the 
innovation groups (H5 and H6). An in-depth analysis of these processes 
can provide qualitative insights about actors’ use of information in practice, 
how information is valued and the prevalence of formal scientific evidence 
use in policy decision.  
The first case selected was a policy decision to build an electric mobility 
infrastructure across Portugal. In this work the decision was named Mo-
bi.E. The case of electric mobility is a frequent example of innovation in 
the S&T studies, and a preliminary examination detected the use of evi-
dence in the media and other grey literature. The second case study was 
related to the creation of a nanotechnology laboratory. This decision was 
named INL. A preliminary scrutiny revealed a small number of decision 
makers and a site geographically accessible in the north of Portugal. The 
selection of both cases also considered operational restrictions, such as the 
possibility to review documents and access to potential data and records, as 
well as the ability to contact and interview decision makers. Furthermore, 
these two cases involved complex decision process with the three main 
actors of technology innovation. Last, the case of electric mobility revealed 
that researchers were left out of the decision process. Thus, the selection of 
a second case study needed to guarantee (and complement) the in-depth 
study of all three groups, since it was a policy decision aimed mostly at the 
researchers group.  
It should be noticed that the selection of policy cases strengthened the 
study of policy-making. There were four reasons for this focus: First, 
policy decisions were probably the most complex type of decisions identi-
fied. Second, the importance of the context and of the process of construc-
tion of evidence was more explicit in policy-making literature. Third, 
survey results revealed that the context and the process of construction of 
evidence were more emphasized by policymakers than by other groups. 
Fourth, policymakers were a difficult group to observe because they were 
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less prone to answer surveys, needed substantial explanatory introduction 
to the research project and revealed the need for more secrecy. By coinci-
dence, four policymakers were also involved in both case studies. Although 
this situation might restrain the number of actors in analysis, it also enrich-
es the study of the use of evidence to decide, by presenting two examples 
where the same actors participated in different decisions. 
In-depth interviews were conducted to answer open questions about the 
context of the decision and the process of construction of evidence. The 
interviews included the same guiding questions to analyse the context in 
relation to the political, economic and organizational environments, and the 
process of construction of evidence in relation to the way evidence and 
indicators were used. Thus, the first block included the following questions 
related to the context of the decision:  
 “Please describe how the decision was made”; 1.
 “Please describe the political context of the decision?”; 2.
 “Please describe the economic context of the decision?”; 3.
 “Please describe the difficulties and controversies faced during the 4.
decision”; 
 “Please describe the different phases of the decision”; 5.
 “Can you name those involved in the decision?”; 6.
 “Please describe your role in the decision”; 7.
 “Please describe the relationships between those involved in the 8.
decision”; and  
 “Please describe other details related to the context of the decision that 9.
might occur to you”. 
The second block of questions was related to the process of construction of 
evidence, and included the following questions:  
 “Please describe the evidence and indicators used to make the decision”; 
  “What was the purpose of those evidence and indicators?”; 11.
 “Do you remember of any controversies related to those evidence 12.
and/or indicators?”; 
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 “Were the evidence and indicators collected before or after the deci-13.
sion?”; and 
 “Please describe other details related to the use of evidence and/or 14.
indicators used to make the decision”. 
The interviews were conducted to cope with the sensitive nature of the 
information requested, avoid any suspicion of misuse of information, and 
provide confidentiality to sources when that was possible. The first case 
study on electric mobility included 9 in-depth interviews to decision 
makers: 1 to researchers, 4 to business R&D&I leaders and 4 to policy-
makers. These interviews lasted from one hour up to four hours, and were 
conducted between February 2011 and March 2013. In the end, two com-
plementary interviews were made to scholars with expertise on the case in 
March 2012 and in April 2013. Furthermore, the second case about the 
nanotechnology laboratory included 4 interviews with decision makers: 2 
with researchers and 2 with policymakers. These interviews were conduct-
ed in March 2014 and lasted from one hour up to three hours. In the end, 
one complementary interview was made to a scholar in March 2014. In 
addition, the interviews created trust to talk with those linked with the 
decisions; enabled the collection of data until confidence and saturation of 
information was felt; and provided space for other questions to arise and to 
reveal insights. Some interviewees were asked to check the reports from 
their perspectives to ensure validation of information.  
A social network analysis (SNA) was also developed for each case study. 
The SNA was conducted to complement the description of the organiza-
tional context of the decision, and to allow a comparative analysis of the 
measures found in the networks. It clarified the structure of the organiza-
tional context of the decision process with sociograms of the decision 
network (useful for understanding the actors’ involvement and positioning 
in the network); the calculation of measures about the networks (useful in 
characterizing their cohesion, centrality, etc); and the identification of 
factions and core-periphery in the networks (useful for understanding the 
dynamics of the process of decision-making). Furthermore, the questions 
raised in the interviews enabled extensive actor identification to apply SNA 
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in case studies. Questions 6, 7, 8 and 9 were intended to gather data for the 
construction of SNA in both cases. The socio-matrixes describing the 
relationships within the network are presented in Table A.1 for Mobi.E and 
in Table A.2 for INL in Annex 3 – Supplementary tables. 
The identification of actors was developed during interviews through 
snowballing until full network saturation was achieved (see Morgan 2008). 
This method provided access to “hidden” populations of decision makers 
and, at the same time, avoided sampling bias. Furthermore, the information 
presented in the case studies allowed the use of various established meth-
ods for constructing sociograms of the decision (presented in Figure 4.2 
and Figure 4.3); to calculate metrics characterizing the networks and 
individual actors (the logs are presented in Annex 4 – Ucinet files); to 
recognize subgroups in the network such as factions; and to identify the 
equivalence patterns in these social networks using core-periphery models. 
These sociograms and measures were calculated using Ucinet 6 for Win-
dows Version 6.528.
13
 The figures were plotted using Netdraw Version 
2.141.
14
 The factions and core-periphery figures were not considered 
essential to describe the social networks, and were presented in Annex 2 – 
Supplementary figures (Figure A.1, Figure A.2, Figure A.3 and Figure A.4). 
The literature indicates that there is often a methodological issue in SNA 
that should be addressed from the start. The point relates to the criteria 
defining the relationships in a social network. In fact, the researcher makes 
these definitions in an analytical selection procedure. The selection is based 
on the choices of the set of nodes and the types of ties established through 
empirical data collected in the interviews of the case study (Marin and 
Wellman 2011; Borgatti and Halgin 2011). The choices comprise the initial 
elements determining the influence between decision makers in the two 
cases studies. According to Borgatti and Halgin (2011), there is often an 
inaccurate concern that researchers may select nodes “incorrectly”, thereby 
                                                          
13  Borgatti, Everett, and Freeman (2002) Ucinet 6 for Windows:  Software for Social Network 
Analysis. Harvard, MA: Analytic Technologies. 
14  Borgatti, Everett, and Freeman (2002) Netdraw Network Visualization. Analytic Technolo-
gies: Harvard, MA. 
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possibly accidentally excluding important nodes and including other less 
relevant relations. However, the authors argued that, in reality, the choice 
of nodes should not be regarded as an empirical question, because those 
choices are dictated by the research question and explanatory theory. 
Furthermore, unlike a group, networks do not have “natural” boundaries, 
neither do they have to be connected (Borgatti and Halgin 2011), which 
allows for a better fit with the research questions. 
3.3 Complementary interviews 
Last, the research also included complementary interviews to discuss the 
findings with known specialists and answer remaining questions resulting 
from the previous work. The interviews were in-depth, during which 
individual respondents were questioned at length about a particular issue 
and their own experience. This work included four complementary inter-
views conducted with researchers who were renowned experts in the field 
of indicators and technology innovation located in Portugal, Germany and 




This chapter presents results that answer the three research questions 
mentioned in Chapter 2. The first subchapter provides results on determin-
ing the extent of the influence of indicators in decisions of technology 
innovation. The next provides results on determining the role of indicators 
in these decisions. The last subchapter presents results concerning the way 
indicators were involved in these decision-making processes. 
4.1 What is the influence of indicators? 
This sub-subchapter addresses the extent of the influence of indicators in 
decisions of technology innovation. As mentioned previously, there are no 
records of quantitative information about the use and influence of indica-
tors in the technology innovation literature. Therefore, results presented 
here focused on the quantification of the major characteristics associated 
with the use and influence of indicators by surveying individuals directly 
involved in decisions of technology innovation. This effort allows for the 
ascertaining of the initial background information necessary to understand 
indicators’ reach in practice. The following section presents results con-
cerning the use of indicators in these decisions by innovation groups. The 
second section addresses the influence of indicators in these decisions. 
4.1.1 Use 
The use of indicators provides information about the extent of their use 
during a significant decision of technology innovation. The following table 
summarizes the answers and percentages obtained in the survey by innova-
tion group. 
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Table 4.1: Number and percentage of answers to the question “Did you use indicators 
during a technology decision?” by group 
 
Table 4.1 reveals a clear pattern of use of indicators during decisions of 
technology innovation. In fact, the vast majority (84%) of all answers 
revealed that indicators were used during these decisions. Only 16% of the 
respondents said that they did not use them. Furthermore, a closer look into 
the three groups under observation revealed differences: the vast majority 
of policymakers (92%) revealed they used indicators in their decisions; 
89% of the business R&D&I leaders answered that they used indicators to 
decide; and 71% of researchers answered that they used indicators during 
their decision. In sum, the extent of the use of indicators in these decisions 
is significantly high, although slightly differentiated in each group: the vast 
majority of policymakers use indicators followed closely by business 
R&D&I leaders and soon after by researchers. The measures to prevent 
bias in results were described in Chapter 3. 
4.1.2 Influence 
The intensive use of indicators might not necessarily mean that they were 
influential in the decision, as mentioned in Chapter 2. Therefore, it is 
important to distinguish the use of indicators from the real influence of 
indicators in these decisions. The following table presents results from the 
survey on the influence of indicators. 
Answers % Answers % Answers %
Researchers 22 71% 9 29% 31 100%
Business R&D&I 32 89% 4 11% 36 100%
Policy makers 22 92% 2 8% 24 100%
All groups 76 84% 15 16% 91 100%
Yes No Total
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Table 4.2: Number and percentage of answers to the question “Do you think that indicators 
were more influential than social relations during the technology decision?” by 
group 
 
Table 4.2 reveals three main features: First, indicators were more important 
than social relations to the majority (59%) of all respondents involved in 
these decisions. Second, the majority of both policymakers and the busi-
ness group (68% and 59% respectively) answered that social relations were 
more important than the use of indicators. Third, the answers of the re-
searchers were even (50%), which suggests that indicators can be as im-
portant as social relations in the decision process. In sum, social relations 
were more important than indicators to policymakers and business R&D&I 
leaders, but as important for researchers. 
There is a gap between the use and influence of indicators in these deci-
sions. The following table compares results from the survey about the use 
and influence of indicators in decisions by group. 
Table 4.3: The use and influence of indicators in decisions by group 
 
Table 4.3 reveals that the more indicators were claimed to have been used, 
the less influential they were in technology innovation decisions. In fact, in 
Answers % Answers % Answers %
Researchers 11 50% 11 50% 22 100%
Business R&D&I 13 41% 19 59% 32 100%
Policy makers 7 32% 15 68% 22 100%
All groups 31 41% 45 59% 76 100%
Yes No Total
Yes % Total Yes % Total
Researchers 22 71% 31 11 50% 22
Business R&D&I 32 89% 36 13 41% 32
Policy makers 22 92% 24 7 32% 22
All groups 76 84% 91 31 41% 76
Did you use any indicators in your 
decision?
Were indicators more important 
than other individuals/groups? 
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comparison, more policymakers claimed to use indicators (92%) and to be 
less influenced by them (32%); business R&D&I leaders slightly less often 
used indicators (89%) and were slightly more influenced by them (41%); 
and researchers answered to use indicators less (71%) but were said to be 
more influenced by them (50%). Therefore, the gap between use and 
influence is larger for policymakers (92% and 32%); it decreases for 
business R&D&I leaders (89% and 41%); and is smaller for researchers 
(71% and 50%). These different gaps suggest a different decision process 
for each group. 
Results showed that social relations can significantly influence decisions of 
technology innovation, hence the need to identify in detail the origin of 
these social influences. The following table presents results from the 




                                                          
1  Only results classified as “Very important” are shown in the table. 
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Table 4.4 reveals different influences in each innovation group. First, 
researchers indicated that experts were the most important influence on 
their decisions (52%), followed by technology users and research-
ers/academics (ex aequo 42%). These responses suggest significant rele-
vance of knowledge sources and users in the decisions of this group. 
Second, the business R&D&I leaders indicated that managers (69%) were 
their most important influence, followed by consumers (42%). These 
answers suggest that hierarchies and users were the main influence in this 
group. Third, policymakers indicated that politicians (63%) and, to a lesser 
extent, experts (29%) were their most important influences. These answers 
suggest that hierarchies and knowledge sources were the main influences in 
this group.  
The following figure summarizes these results aggregating the type of 
influence during the technology innovation decisions. 
 
Figure 4.1:  The most relevant types of influences in the decisions by group   
User Hierarchies
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Figure 4.1 reveals that groups are significantly influenced by hierarchies, 
knowledge sources and users. First, the hierarchies were the most relevant 
influence on the decisions of business R&D&I leaders and policymakers. 
In fact, these two groups declared managers and politicians to be the most 
relevant influence in their technology decisions (1
st
 choices). Second, 
knowledge sources were also a significant influence on decisions. In fact, 
not only did researchers reveal that experts and researchers/academics 
were one of the most significant influences to their decisions, but policy-
makers also indicated that experts were significantly influential (2
nd
 
choice). Third, users of the technology were also a significant type of 
influence in these decisions. In fact, both researchers and business R&D&I 
leaders indicated users as a relevant influence in their decisions (ex aequo 
2
nd
 choice). In sum, results revealed that the most important influences in 
technology innovation decisions came from hierarchies, knowledge sources 
and users of technology, although as a different combination for each 
group. 
To conclude, Hypothesis 1 was confirmed: Despite their high level of use, 
indicators have low influence on decisions of technology innovation made 
by the three innovation groups. 
4.2 What is the role of indicators? 
This sub-section presents results concerning the role of indicators based on 
the questionnaires and supplemented with results from the interviews. 
Chapter 2 defined three categories for understanding the role of indicators: 
instrumental, symbolic and no role. The following table presents results 
from the survey related to the role of indicators by group.  
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Table 4.5: The role of indicators in decisions of technology innovation by group 
 
Tabel 4.5 reveals different features generally and at the group level. Over-
all, the table presents a heterogeneous pattern for all groups with three 
main features: indicators played mostly a symbolic role in all decisions 
(49%); a smaller portion of all decisions used indicators instrumentally 
(34%); and only 16% of all answers revealed that indicators played no role 
at all. Furthermore, at the group level the table reveals four main ideas: 
First, indicators were symbolic to the majority of policymakers and busi-
ness R&D&I leaders (63% and 53%, respectively). Second, indicators were 
instrumental to circa one third of decisions in the three groups (i.e. varying 
in the interval [29% to 36%]). Third, results for researchers were distribut-
ed evenly between instrumental and symbolic (each 35%). Fourth and last, 
only a few revealed that indicators had no role in the decision, although the 
percentage was higher for researchers (29%). In short, the role of indicators 
was mostly symbolic in general, they were instrumental to approximately a 
third of the decisions, and policymakers and business R&D&I tend to use 
indicators symbolically more often than researchers. 
The interviews can also complement these results with findings regarding 
the role of indicators in these decisions: 
 Interviews with researchers can help to explain the pattern of relative 
significance of indicators found in the survey when compared to the 
other two groups. In fact, two researchers revealed an instrumental use 
of indicators and another a symbolic use: one researcher pointed out 
that her decision to buy an expensive jet printer to create biosensors in 
the laboratory involved previous discussions with her colleagues, in-
Answers % Answers % Answers % Answers %
Researchers 11 35% 11 35% 9 29% 31 100%
Business R&D&I 13 36% 19 53% 4 11% 36 100%
Policy makers 7 29% 15 63% 2 8% 24 100%
All groups 31 34% 45 49% 15 16% 91 100%
Instrumental Symbolic No role Total
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strumentally centred on the cost of acquisition (I6
2
); another researcher 
revealed an instrumental use of indicators related to technology char-
acteristics and to the qualification of human resources in his acquisi-
tion of electro-technical software (I8); and yet another researcher re-
vealed that his decision to develop technology was symbolically based 
on indicators related to technology characteristics, suppliers and quali-
fication of human resources (I5). In sum, results from researchers in-
terviewed also confirm that indicators can have an instrumental and 
symbolic role in their decisions. 
Indicators can be highly valued by researchers in fields related to in-
novation studies and technology assessment. In fact, one researcher
3
 
consider that the contextualised use of indicators is helpful to conduct 
a reasonable interpretation of data and to balance options (PI6). To this 
interviewee, using indicators implies dealing with what is possible to 
measure, which is a limited perception of reality with restricted relia-
bility. The researcher also considered not being free from abuse or 
misinterpretation of data, and argued that these problems can arise 
from other types of research as well. Furthermore, two academics ar-
gued that indicators capture only a parcel of reality because a substan-
tial part of reality can be left out of any indicators analysis (CI1 and 
CI2). This idea corresponds with the potential for deception in the use 
of indicators mentioned in subchapter 2.1.  
 Interviews with business R&D&I leaders can help explain the pattern 
of decision-making found in the survey, described as similar although 
less intense than the pattern of policymakers. In fact, among the inter-
viewed business R&D&I leaders who had made the same type of deci-
sions (development of product/technology), the influence of indicators 
                                                          
2  References to information collected through interviews are hereafter made using an 
acronym and a number to maintain both anonymity and internal control. As described 
previously, the acronym PI indicates Preliminary Interview, I designates Interview and CI 
specifies Complementary Interview. The number that follows these acronyms indicates the 
number of the interview. Direct quotations will also include a reference to the line numbers 
where the quotation can be found in the transcription document. 
3  The interviewee was a senior German researcher of one reputed research institute deliver-
ing innovation policy services. 
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varied, from symbolic in three cases to instrumental in another. One 
interviewee working for a large oil company, which considered indica-
tors to be mostly symbolic in the decision process, described the influ-
ence of indicators as follows: 
Obviously, we use indicators. But, in the end, all companies have 
the same numbers. And economic models depend too much on our 
assumptions. […] Either [the CEO
4
] believes [in the new product] 
or not, even if we put all those numbers. Numbers can be fantastic 
but if [the CEO] doesn’t believe in [the product], it will not be de-
veloped. (I22, lines 408-409 and lines 423-424) 
According to this interviewee, decisions are dependent on her prelim-
inary judgment of the potential benefits of a product in terms of its 
competitiveness in the market. The decision also depends on the abil-
ity to convince/influence the CEO of the company that the product 
will sell. The interviewee later conceded that, to some extent, political 
and market-share pressures (i.e. the political and economic context) 
can determine participation in some innovation projects. Furthermore, 
in three small and medium companies, the opinion of their clients was 
also described as important to the final decision (PI11, I3 and I4). Ac-
cording to one interviewee from a medium-sized consultancy compa-
ny, some technology decisions resulted from managers’ own interests 
and agendas rather than any objective criteria (PI11). 
These variations in the role of indicators in business R&D&I leaders’ 
decisions may not be so much related to sector differences or to the 
size of the company, but more associated to the culture of the firm, ac-
cording to the interviewees. First, the sector of performance does not 
appear to be significant to understand the role of indicators. For exam-
ple, one interviewee working with healthcare clinics described indica-
tors as symbolic (PI11), whereas another interviewee working also 
with healthcare clinics considered indicators instrumental to the deci-
sion (I4). In addition, interviews suggest that the sector of activity 
                                                          
4  CEO is the acronym of Chief Executive Officer. 
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might not be so significant to the role of indicators. For example, three 
interviewees in companies working in technology applications, consul-
tancy and oil sectors described the influence of indicators as symbolic 
(PI9, I3 and I22), and one in an open-source software company re-
vealed that the influence of indicators was instrumental (I3). Second, 
the size of the company does not appear to be significantly determinant 
to the role of indicators in decisions by business R&D&I leaders. For 
example, two interviewees in medium companies and two in a large 
firm described the influence of indicators as symbolic (PI11, I3, I19 
and I22); and one in a small company revealed that the influence of in-
dicators was instrumental (I3). In all these cases, however, interview-
ees significantly highlighted that the culture of the company had some 
influence over the role of indicators in the decisions. Some even com-
plained about the difficulties to persuade managers and other decision 
makers in Portuguese companies (PI11, I3, I19 and I22). 
 Interviews with policymakers may help explain the major symbolic 
role of indicators detected in the survey. As mentioned previously, two 
case studies will be presented in the next section to deepen the under-
standing of context and process of construction of evidence in policy 
decisions. Nevertheless, experts revealed five main ideas about policy-
making that worth mention separately from the case studies: 
1. Results from the survey suggest that innovation indicators play a 
limited role in policy-making. In the same line, indicators were 
even considered irrelevant to decision-making by a Swiss senior 
innovation policymaker (PI5). The interviewee stated that indica-
tors are used to confirm that “we are in an excellent position” 
(PI5, line 543), an idea partially corroborated by two Swiss gov-
ernmental officials working in the Ministry of Science (PI4). This 
limited role is in line with the literature. In fact, a study about sus-
tainability indicators presented similar findings about the symbol-
ic use of indicators (Gudmundsson and Sørensen 2012), as de-
scribed in Chapter 2. Therefore, there is meagre evidence of an 
important role for indicators in innovation policy. 
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2. Results from the interviews with experts and policymakers sug-
gest that the role of indicators and, more generally, of evidence 
varies substantially. In fact, according to some interviewees most 
policy studies were driven by (i) curiosity during the decision, (ii) 
need for subsequent legitimisation of decisions, and (iii) obliga-
tion (from administrators and bureaucrats, particularly officials of 
the EU, ministers, etc.) (PI4, PI5, PI6, I10, I21, I22, I26 and CI3). 
According to some researchers, the first and second purposes for 
requesting a policy study stems from the need to communicate 
their decisions and formulate press releases (PI5 and PI6), to ad-
vocate a policy position (PI6), to increase visibility for policy pur-
poses (PI6 and PI9) and to favour personal agendas (PI6, PI11, 
PI5 and I25). These findings are in line with the argument of 
Lehtonen (2013) that scientific knowledge for sustainability (in-
cluding evaluations, assessments and indicators) seldom plays an 
instrumental role in policy-making, and is more likely to produce 
indirect, conceptual and political effects. However, intent to ma-
nipulate can be found regarding indicators and evidence when so-
liciting policy studies to advocate a particular policy position, in-
crease visibility and favour personal agendas (PI6). These 
behaviours can be framed within the context of forces of social 
regulation and social integration limiting actors’ behaviour, as 
mentioned in Chapter 2. Furthermore, the third reason to request a 
policy study (for the sake of self-preservation of bureaucracy) can 
also be framed in the same context. In these cases, studies are re-
quested to show that policy managers do something and thus legit-
imise their existence, according to one researcher (PI6). For ex-
ample, more frequently than at the national level, EU 
policymakers request studies “to throw away without any reflec-
tion on the content, because bureaucratic administrators intend to 
keep on doing the same thing”, stated a researcher (PI6, line 29-
30). Nevertheless, the majority of interviewees agreed that most 
politicians demanding studies are moved by curiosity and their 
need to monitor their systems (PI3, PI4, PI6, PI12, I11, I14, CI3 
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and CI4). In fact, most policymakers still expect a solid study with 
a reasonable scientific approach to the question, although they are 
not interested in the technical issues of studies (PI6, line 75-77).  
3. An English researcher5 of policy indicators stated that policymak-
ers increasingly use indicators to decide and are more aware of 
their dangers (CI4). However, the interviewee admitted that the 
expert community responsible for the production and analysis of 
STI indicators was not always sufficiently clear about abuses in 
the use of indicators. Furthermore, the researcher suggested, 
“there might be some countries where things are going wrong” 
(CI4, line 80-81). Nevertheless, the interviewee mentioned that at 
least in publications and evaluations based on indicators in the 
United Kingdom and Germany, policymakers are aware of limita-
tions and generally avoid relying heavily on particular indicators 
(CI4). For example, policymakers in these countries expect re-
search funding agencies and their reviewers to analyse “the pro-
posal rather than counting the publications and citations men-
tioned in the proposal” (CI4).  
4. Seven policymakers and experts agreed upon the sensitive nature 
of selecting indicators in innovation policy studies (PI6, PI9, I11, 
CI1 and CI4). According to the interviewees, the decision to use 
one indicator instead of another is significantly relevant to policy-
making (PI6, PI9, I11, I12, I15, CI1 and CI4). Three interviewees 
argued that choosing one group of indicators and leaving others 
aside could capture a single-sided view of a more complex reality 
(PI6, CI1 and CI4). These sometimes controversial decisions need 
to be transparent and as consensual as possible among actors, 
stakeholders and in society to reduce room for randomness when 
choosing parts of a complex reality, according to two researchers 
and one policymaker (PI6, I11 and CI1). The solution is to meas-
ure what is possible while knowing the limits of indicators, and 
                                                          
5  The interviewee was an English senior academic with an expertise in policy indicators for 
evaluation. 
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present what is conceivable given those limits, according to one 
researcher
6
 and a policymaker (PI6 and I11).  
5. There is also the risk of oversimplification, particularly in policy-
making, when dealing with innovation indicators, as mentioned in 
Chapter 2. In fact, a researcher in innovation policy studies assert-
ed that the policy communication process played an important role 
in his research-oriented work. He revealed that policymakers often 
required him to present “two pages and strong statements” (PI6, 
line 348). Two researchers sustained that composite indicators (or 
indexes) can be used to present a case, because they were useful 
and helped deliver a message when interpreted and used in the 
right context (PI3 and PI4). The expert researcher in innovation 
policy studies added that it was possible to find causality and 
some coherence in studies using composite indicators (PI6). This 
perspective is in line with some findings in the literature where 
policymakers consider composite indicators useful to their work, 
as mentioned in Chapter 2 (see among others Nardo et al. 2008; 
Saltelli 2007; Sébastien and Bauler 2013). Other interviewees, 
however, were cautious about the use of these composite indica-
tors (PI2, PI4 and PI9). This is in line with some literature as well. 
In fact, some authors have doubts about composite indicators 
alerting to misuses and methodological problems (Grupp and 
Schubert 2010). It can be argued, therefore, that more studies on 
the limits of composite indicators are needed, given the diversity 
of results found. 
 
To conclude, Hypothesis 2 was confirmed for business R&D&I leaders and 
policymakers, where indicators have mostly a symbolic role in their deci-
sions. However, hypothesis 2 was not confirmed for researchers, where 
indicators can either play an instrumental, symbolic or no role at all in their 
decisions. 
                                                          
6  The interviewee was a senior German researcher of one reputed research institute deliver-
ing innovation policy services. 
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4.3 How are indicators used? 
This subchapter presents results to understand how indicators are involved 
in the decision-making process of technology innovation. The subchapter is 
divided in three sections addressing the possible explanatory factors: type 
of decision, phase of decision, and context and process of construction of 
evidence. 
4.3.1 Type of decision 
As discussed in chapter 2, the type of decision can be an explanatory factor 
to understand the way indicators are used in decisions of technology 
innovation. The relevance of the type of decision was primarily captured in 
eight interviews. Researchers with specific expertise in the field confirmed 
that each type of decision requires indicators in different ways (PI6, PI7, 
I7, I11, CI1, CI2, CI3 and CI4).  
Furthermore, the survey captured the relevance of this factor. The follow-
ing table presents results related to the type of decision for those who used 
indicators. 
Table 4.6: Number and percentage of answers to the question “Do you consider indicators 
more influential to the decision than social relations?” by type of decision 
 
Table 4.6 reveals that the influence of indicators varies with the type of 
decision. In fact, the percentage of those who considered indicators more 
important than social relations varied with the type of decision: 48% for 
decisions of acquisition of equipment/technology; 42% for development of 
Answers % Answers % Answers %
15 48% 16 52% 31 100%
10 42% 14 58% 24 100%
6 30% 14 70% 20 100%
31 41% 45 59% 76 100%Total
Yes No Total
Acquisition  of equipment/technology
Development of products/technology
Policy design
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product/technology and 30% for policy design. The data about property 
rights is not sufficient for analysis.  
In addition, the survey allows categorization of the role of indicators by 
type of decision. The following table presents results from the survey 
related to the role of indicators by type of decisions. 
Table 4.7: The role of indicators by type of decisions 
 
Tabel 4.7 reveals that the role of indicators was symbolic to a vast majority 
of policy decisions (67%), but less emphatically in decisions of develop-
ment of product/technology (48%) and acquisition of equip-
ment/technology (41%). Furthermore, there is a heterogeneous pattern of 
roles in acquisition of equipment/technology and development of prod-
uct/technology (respectively 38%, 41% and 21%; and 34%, 48% and 17%). 
By contrast, findings revealed a more defined pattern for the role of indica-
tors in policy-making (respectively 67%, 34% and 16%). The data about 
property rights is not sufficient for analysis. These differences suggest that 
the type of decision is important to explain how indicators are involved in 
the decisions. 
The type of decision might also influence the indicators involved in the 
decision process. The following table presents results about the most 
relevant types of indicators to respondents by type of decision.
7
  
                                                          
7  In the survey, the respondents were asked to select the three most important typologies of 
indicators used in the decision among those identified or to indicate another category. 
Policymakers had an open question without any restrictions. 
Answers % Answers % Answers % Answers %
15 38% 16 41% 8 21% 39 43%
10 34% 14 48% 5 17% 29 32%
6 29% 14 67% 1 5% 21 23%
31 34% 45 49% 15 16% 91 100%
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Table 4.8 reveals four main features about the type of indicators per type of 
decision: First, the most significant type of indicators in decisions of 
acquisition of equipment/technology were technical characteristics of 
technology (31%), followed by costs (19%), and, to a lesser extent, by 
indicators of the use of technology by partners (13%). Second, the most 
significant type of indicators in decisions of development of prod-
uct/technology were both technical characteristics of technology (23%) and 
costs (23%), followed by indicators of the use of technology by partners 
(15%). Third, in a different way, the most significant type of indicator in 
decisions of policy design was costs (42%), followed by technical charac-
teristics of technology (32%) and, to a lesser extent, availability of infor-
mation (16%). Fourth and last, other types of indicators were not signifi-
cantly used, such as indicators of competition, suppliers, qualification of 
human resources, factors related to work organization, indicators of market 
share and benchmarking, and other financial indicators (accounting, Inter-
nal Rate of Return, Net Present Value, payback, etc.). Other types of 
indicators were not mentioned. The data about property rights is not suffi-
cient for analysis. In sum, acquisition and development decisions presented 
the same pattern: technical characteristics, costs and partners; policy 
referenced costs, technical characteristics an availability of information. 
The most mentioned types of indicators in decisions of acquisition of 
equipment/technology were the technical characteristics of technology; in 
decisions of development of product/technology were both characteristics 
of technology and costs; and in decisions of policy design were costs.
8
 
Furthermore, the interviews revealed more diversified types of indicators. 
In fact:  
 The interviews about decisions of acquisition of equipment/technology 
revealed diverse types of indicators, with an emphasis on the use of 
technical characteristics of the technology. For example, a researcher 
reported emphatically the indicator of cost and, to a smaller extent, in-
                                                          
8  The Table A.1, in the Annex 3 – Supplementary tables, complements these results with data 
about the purpose of indicators by type of decision. 
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dicators of technology characteristics (I6); another interviewee, who 
had acquired software, identified the use of indicators of technology 
characteristics and qualification of human resources (I8).  
 The interviews about decisions of development of product/technology 
also revealed diverse types of indicators. In fact, two decisions (one by 
a researcher and another by a business R&D&I leader) revealed the 
use of indicators of technical characteristics of technology, combined 
with indicators of technology used by partners and qualification of 
human resources (I3 and I5). In a slightly different way, another inter-
viewee selected other types of indicators. In fact, this interviewee from 
a small company based on the development of open-source software 
used indicators related to technology used by partners, suppliers and 
availability of information (I4).  
 The interviews about policy decisions primarily emphasized the 
technical characteristics of their policies (I9, I10, I11, I14, I15, I16, 
I17, I21 and I26), and the financial cost (I1, I10, I13, I14, I16, I25 and 
I26). Four policymakers also identified indicators related to the availa-
bility of information (I11, I12, I14, I15 and I25). It should be noted 
that some of these interviews suggested that the position of the deci-
sion maker in the policy process was important to describing the role 
of indicators: those involved with the preparation of policies empha-
sized technical characteristics (I9, I16, I17, I21 and I26); parliamentar-
ians emphasized the availability of information (I11, I12, I14 and I15); 
and those leading negotiations emphasized costs (I25 and I26).  
In sum, the interviews about decisions of acquisition of equipment/tech-
nology and development of product/technology revealed diverse types of 
indicators. Interviews about policy decisions revealed an emphasis on 
indicators of technology characteristics and costs, and suggested that the 
position in the policy process was important to understanding the role of 
indicators. 
To conclude, results suggested that Hypothesis 3 is confirmed: The type of 
decision helps to explain how indicators are used in decisions of techno-
logy innovation. First, interviewees confirmed that each type of decision 
4  Results 
112 
requires indicators in different ways. Second, surveys showed heterogene-
ous patterns of roles (between instrumental, symbolic and no role) in 
acquisition of equipment/technology and development of product/tech-
nology; by contrast, policy-making highlighted the symbolic role. Third 
and last, survey results revealed that the most used types of indicators are 
different in each decision: acquisition and development decisions presented 
the same pattern: technical characteristics, costs and partners; policy 
referenced costs, technical characteristics an availability of information. 
Interviews showed more diversified type of indicators. 
4.3.2 Phase of decision 
Results suggest that the phase of decision is an explanatory factor in 
understanding how indicators were involved in the decisions. In fact, most 
interviewees confirmed this idea by providing details of their experience. 
First, seven interviewees stated explicitly that the phase of the decision 
process influences the role of indicators at least before and after the deci-
sion (PI7, I7 and I11, CI1, CI2, CI3 and CI4). Second, other interviewees 
corroborated the existence of these and other phases in the decision process 
with different intensity of use of indicators: 
 Interviews with those involved in acquisitions of equipment/technology 
indicated use of indicators often before the decision. Two interviewees 
agreed about the need to use them to make a final decision in discus-
sions with their colleagues (I6 and I8). For example, a researcher 
pointed out that her decision to buy an expensive jet printer to create 
biosensors involved previous discussions about the benefits and nego-
tiations with her colleagues based on an indicator of the financial cost 
(I6). Furthermore, these two interviewees revealed no use of indicators 
after the decision (I6 and I8).  
 Interviews with those involved in decisions of development of prod-
uct/technology described four possible phases in the decision process: 
First, the interviewees agreed they were responsible for the prelimi-
nary judgment on potential benefits of a new product/technology 
(PI11, I3, I4, I5 and I22). Second, they described activities to collect 
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indicators and other evidence as well as specific analyses to support 
the decision (PI11, I3, I4, I5 and I22). For example, a business inter-
viewee solicited an analytical study from a think-tank previous to the 
final decision (I22). In another case, a researcher revealed that the need 
to seize a scientific opportunity led to an ad hoc collection of indica-
tors (I5). Third, four interviewees described the use of political-
behavioural methods such as discussion, networking, negotiations 
and/or consensus-building activities in the decision process (PI11, I3, 
I4 and I22). For example, an interviewee conceded that to some extent 
political pressures can determine the development of products through 
negotiations and networking activities (I22). Fourth, five interviewees 
considered the CEO to be responsible for the final decision about the 
implementation of a new product/technology (PI11, I3, I4 and I22). In 
one case, the interviewee in a large oil company disclosed that the final 
technology decision largely depended on the CEO’s decision (I22). 
Others interviews revealed that the final decision was dependent on the 
client (PI11 and I4). In sum, those involved in development of prod-
uct/technology described four different moments of the decision pro-
cess: an initial phase where they made a preliminary judgment, fol-
lowed by a rational-analytical collection of information, a political-
behavioural activity and a final decision that may include negotiations 
and networking. 
 Interviews of those involved in policy-making also identified four 
possible phases in their decisions. In fact, thirteen interviewees de-
scribed the policy process of technology innovation as having distinct 
phases (I1, I9, I10, I11, I12, I13, I14, I15, I16, I17, I21, I25 and I26): 
First, five interviewees described their involvement in the preliminary 
judgment of the potential political benefits of the policy (I11, I12, I14, 
I17 and I25). Second, six policymakers revealed to be part of the polit-
ical-behavioural approaches used to make a policy decision such as 
discussions, negotiations, networking, compromises and consensus-
building (I9, I10, I13, I15, I16 and I26). Another policymaker also dis-
closed the use of negotiations after a final decision (I25). Third, twelve 
interviewees were involved in rational-analytical activities such as col-
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lecting indicators, and other evidence and analysis to support policy-
making (I1, I9, I10, I11, I12, I13, I14, I15, I16, I17, I21 and I26). One 
policymaker mentioned that the indicator of the average number of 
students per class was often used before a decision, and seldom after-
wards (I11). In another example, an academic and a policymaker both 
involved in innovation policy emphasized that indicators can be used 
in the policy process either before or after the final decision (I7 and 
I11). Fourth and last, three interviews with policymakers revealed they 
were directly involved in making the final decision (I11, I12 and I15). 
Results, then, show that the policy process includes at least a prelimi-
nary judgment of benefits and a final decision, although sometimes 
they can also include political-behavioural approaches and rational-
analytical methods before and after the decision. 
Other results captured the relevance of the phase of a decision in explaining 
how indicators are used in these decisions. The following table presents 
results from the survey about the intensity of use of indicators before the 
decision when indicators were considered more relevant than social rela-
tions. 
Table 4.9: Number and percentage of answers that agreed that indicators were more 
influential than social relations before and after the decision 
 
Table 4.9 first reveals an intensive pattern of influential use of indicators 
before the decision. In fact, the vast majority (81%) of respondents re-
vealed the influential use of indicators often before making a decision. 
Only 19% used indicators sometimes before the decision. Furthermore, the 
table reveals a degree of heterogeneity in after a decision was made. In 
fact, the majority (45%) revealed no use of indicators after the decision, 
followed by 32% that used them often, and by 23% who used them some-
times after making a decision. These different patterns confirm the exist-
ence of two different phases of the decision process: the influential use of 
Answers % Answers % Answers % Answers %
Before 0 0% 6 19% 25 81% 31 100%
After 14 45% 7 23% 10 32% 31 100%
Never Sometimes Often Total
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indicators was significant before the decision and heterogeneous after the 
decision.  
An analysis by type of decision also confirms different intensities in the use 
of indicators in the two different phases of the decision. The following 
table presents results from the survey about the intensity of use of indica-
tors before making the decision by type of decision. 
Table 4.10: Number and percentage of intensity in the use of indicators before decision by 
type of decision 
 
Table 4.10 reveals an intensive pattern of use of indicators before the 
decision. In fact, the vast majority (83%) of all respondents used indicators 
often before making a decision. Results were higher among development of 
product/technology (88%) and acquisition of equipment/technology (87%), 
and high but less expressive in policy design (70%). The data about proper-
ty rights is not sufficient for analysis. In sum, all respondents used indica-
tors often before the decision, although less so in policy decisions. 
Furthermore, the following table presents results from the survey about the 
distribution of intensity of use given to indicators after a decision by type. 
 
  
Answers % Answers % Answers % Answers %
0 0% 4 13% 27 87% 31 100%
0 0% 3 13% 21 88% 24 100%
0 0% 6 30% 14 70% 20 100%
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Table 4.11: Number and percentage of the intensity of the use of indicators after decision by 
type of decision 
 
Table 4.11 reveals one homogenous pattern and two heterogeneous patterns 
after a decision was made. First, decisions of acquisition of equip-
ment/technology presented a homogenous pattern, where a majority of 58% 
admitted to never using indicators, 35% used indicators sometimes, and 
only 6% indicated having used them often. Second, there were two hetero-
geneous patterns among decisions of policy design and development of 
product/technology. In these two types of decisions, 35% and 25% respec-
tively admitted never using indicators after the decision, 35% and 38% 
claimed to have used indicators sometimes, and 30% and 38% 
acknowledge using them often. The data about property rights is not 
sufficient for analysis. In short, the intensity of the use after the decision 
was homogenous for acquisition of equipment/technology and heterogene-
ous for decisions of policy design and development of product/technology. 
Conclusively, the use of indicators before making a decision was intensive 
in all types of decisions, although less expressive in policy design. After 
the decision, there was one homogenous pattern in acquisitions of equip-
ment/technology and two heterogeneous patterns among policy design and 
development of product/technology. Therefore, results by type of decision 
showed different patterns before and after the decision. These patterns of 
use confirmed the existence of different phases in the decision process. 
To conclude, results confirm Hypothesis 4: the phase of decision helps to 
explain how indicators are used in decisions of technology innovation. 
Interviews confirmed two important moments - before and after the deci-
sion – with a preliminary evaluation of the potential benefits of the decision 
in terms of knowledge, competitiveness or political assessments. These 
Answers % Answers % Answers % Answers %
18 58% 11 35% 2 6% 31 100%
6 25% 9 38% 9 38% 24 100%
7 35% 7 35% 6 30% 20 100%
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processes can include political-behavioural methods before and/or after the 
final decision, such as discussion, negotiation, networking, consensus-
building and/or other social activities. The decision processes can also 
involve rational-analytical activities before and/or after the final decision, 
such as collection of indicators, other evidence and/or other analyses. 
Furthermore, the use of indicators before making a decision was intensive 
in all types of decision, although less expressive in policy design. After the 
decision, there was one homogenous pattern in acquisitions of equip-
ment/technology and two heterogeneous patterns among policy design and 
development of product/technology. 
4.3.3 Context and process of construction  
of evidence 
This section presents results to determine the relevance of the context and 
the process of construction of evidence in explaining the way indicators are 
used in decisions of technology innovation. The first sub-section presents a 
case study of a policy decision about electric mobility, and the second a 
decision to create a nanotechnology laboratory. Both sub-sections are 
structured the same way: they describe (a) the context of the decision 
process, (b) the social network organized to make a decision, and (c) the 
process of construction of evidence. The third and last sub-section com-
pares the two social networks. 
4.3.3.1 Case study on electric mobility infrastructure 
This sub-section provides a description of the context of a decision to 
promote electric mobility in Portugal, involving policymakers and business 
R&D&I leaders. Afterwards, it includes a social network analysis to 
complement the description of the organizational context. The last part 
presents an analysis of the process of construction of evidence. 
The history of electric vehicles dates back to the early nineteenth century, 
when inventions in the field of electrical science started to appear. At  
the time, there were many inventors across the globe trying to create  
an electric propulsion mechanism to propel various types of vehicles 
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(Doppelbauer 2013). For the most part, however, inventors worked in 
national contexts and knew nothing about each other’s work, according to 
Doppelbauer. Arguably, several authors traced back the first electric 
vehicle (EV) to the year 1827, when the Slovak-Hungarian Benedictine 
priest Ányos István Jedlik built the first crude but viable electric motor 
(Heller 1896; Guarnieri 2012; Chan 2013). 
The history of the development of electric mobility more broadly has been 
linked to the invention of technologies responsible for propulsion, such as 
the Internal Combustion Engine (ICE) and batteries. The availability of 
resources played an important role in the development of electric vehicles 
(EVs), such as financial constraints and raw materials. A third element to 
take into account was the emergence and influence of stakeholders, such as 
governments, lobbies, consumers, etc. Furthermore, some authors have 
characterized the repeated revival of EVs (including hybrids) as a perma-
nent “emerging technology syndrome” (Midler & Beaume 2010). Yet, the 
extent to which the present revival in EVs is part of this syndrome or a 
departure to meet another socio-technical regime remains to be seen. 
A closer look at the development process of EV in Japan can help us to 
understand the role of government in the recent commercialization of 
battery electric vehicles (BEVs). In the 1970s, the Japanese government 
started to design and implement a comprehensive, long-term strategy to 
electrify vehicles (Åhman 2006). It included an R&D programme and a 
demonstration programme, as well as the creation of niche markets, legisla-
tion and standards. The government was a driver in a long-term develop-
ment process to end Japanese oil dependency. At that time, Japan had a 
strict Basic Law for Environmental Pollution Control and faced Californian 
pressures for fewer vehicular emissions (Rosenbluth and Thies 2002; Pohl 
and Yarime 2012). However, in the early 1970s the government lacked 
credibility in industrial policy. This was partly due to the fact that most 
companies were unwilling to cooperate with the government, for fear of 
exposing industrial strategies to their national competitors (Åhman 2006). 
Nevertheless, the car industry eventually collaborated with the Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry to avoid being excluded from the group of 
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companies favoured by the central government (Åhman 2006). Further-
more, after the 1990s, the long-term government ambitions to produce an 
EV appeared to have failed. However, the ambition was instrumental in 
creating a commercially viable generation of hybrids (Åhman 2006). In 
fact, the hybrids benefited from technical development and experience 
gained through years of government support, primary aimed at BEVs. In 
1997, the sudden launch of the hybrid Prius by Toyota even caught the 
government by surprise (Åhman 2006). More than one decade later signifi-
cant developments occurred in Japan. In 2010 the long-term efforts of the 
Japanese government started to show concrete commercial results with the 
mass production of the Nissan Leaf and the Mitsubishi i-MiEV.
9
 Although 
it is too early to identify the next dominant regime in the industry, the 
Japanese efforts led to an unexpected industrial differentiation among 
automotive producers: Nissan focused on BEVs, Honda on fuel cell vehi-
cles and Toyota on hybrid electric vehicles (Pohl & Yarime 2012). Looking 
back, it is difficult to disregard the impact of having a continuous, stable 
and oriented national policy on the electrification of vehicles. In fact, 
without the influence of policymakers and their persistent investments, the 
success in sales of the hybrid Toyota Prius and the BEV Nissan Leaf (and 
Mitsubishi MIEV) may have never existed. 
Context of the decision 
In 2008-09, the government decided to create a working group on electric 
mobility and to develop infrastructure for street charging of electric vehi-
cles (EVs) across the country.
10
 This national programme, hereafter named 
Mobi.E, was a governmental programme to develop electric mobility in 
Portugal. Its pilot phase ended in June 2011, with the implementation 
across Portugal of 1300 slow charging posts for electric vehicles and 50 
fast charging stations in streets, public parking lots, service stations, air-
                                                          
9  The first successful fully electrified car was commercially introduced in Japan and the 
United States in December 2010. 
10  Resolução do Conselho de Ministros n.º 20/2009. Diário da República, 1.ª série — N.º 36 
— 20 de Fevereiro de 2009. 
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ports, hotels and shopping centres.
11
 A payment system was also imple-
mented to connect personal communication devices (e.g. tablets, smart 
phones, etc.). By enabling the user to select the most appropriate operation, 
the system allows for an analysis of mobility costs in order to optimize 
energy consumption.
12
 The charging stations of Mobi.E were supported by 
the government, through a public innovation support fund created as a 
counterpart for the granting of wind power licenses (Godinho, Mamede, 
and Simões 2013). The power company EDP also made initial investments 
to supply electricity and continues to support the maintenance of the 
system (costs of around 600 000€/year
13
). 
At the time, the political and economic contexts were stable. There was a 
single party government supported by a clear majority in the parliament. 
Policymakers working in this decision were oriented towards investments 
in technology and renewables.
14
 There were favourable economic forecasts 
until the Portuguese financial crisis started (2010–14). Furthermore, the 
decision network setup for implementing the programme was composed by 
both public as well as private decision makers, in a public-private partner-
ship with a group of mostly Portuguese companies.  
The interaction among members of this decision network can be traced 
back to at least 2005, where the government started to think about electric 
mobility. In fact, the initiative was an official partnership between the 
government and Inteli - a think-tank consultancy company associated with 
the Ministry of Economy.
15, 16 
The group included other companies such as: 
CEIIA - a non-profit private organization and a shareholder of Inteli.
17, 18
 
                                                          
11  “Electric Mobility - Portugal Showcase to the World – Institutional presentation”. 2010. 
GAMEP - Gabinete de Apoio à Mobilidade Eléctrica em Portugal.  
12  “Mobi.E Electric Mobility - Portugal Showcase to the World”. Mobi.E. November 2010. 
13  According to 2012 costs. 
14  See the programme of the government in 2005 (Programa do XVII Governo Constitucional, 
Presidência do Conselho de Ministros 2005-2009). 
15  “Inteli - Institutional Information.” Last accessed in 21/12/2014. 
http://inteli.pt/en/go/fichainstitucional. 
16  “Mobi-E Electric Mobility - Portugal Showcase to the World”. Mobi-E. November 2010. 
17  CEIIA. “CEIIA Institutional Information.” Last accessed in 21/12/2014. 
http://www.ceiia.com/general-information/. 
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The organization is mostly a publicly-funded technology centre known for 
the development of an EV prototype;
19,20
 EDP - the national energy utility 
at the time, in charge of integration with the grid; Siemens, Efacec and 
Martifer - three technology companies dealing with the charging solution; 
and Critical and Novabase - two information technology companies, in 
charge of the information technology solution.  
Furthermore, the public powerhouse EDP had interest in being part of the 
consortium of Mobi.E. The electric charging posts represented a business 
opportunity to enter a new market with a low investment, and a chance to 
be connected to an advanced technology process. On average, one electric 
car represents the equivalent of one energy client in Portugal (I18).
21
 
EDP offered free electricity until 2014 at least. Although the costs are 
relatively low for EDP, the initial expectations of 160000 electric vehicles 
in 2020 were decreased to 26000 (I18). In addition, there were other 
companies interested in the electric mobility market as well (I22). After 
settling a pilot test with EDP, the government/Inteli partnership decided to 
invite other companies.
22
 To the oil and gas company GALP, it was an 
invitation that could represent a business opportunity to expand into the 
electricity distribution market (I18). However, GALP maintained some 
distance from the project because the initial expectations were high and 
later moderated (I22 and TIS.PT 2011). 
The targets for installation of public chargers of EVs were ambitious for 
the internal market. In fact, the difference between supply of public charg-
ing posts and the actual demand can be seen both in the low number of 
EVs
23
 in the country and the consumption of energy in the system. The 
number of existent EVs in Portugal was low in 2011 and 2012. In fact, 
                                                                                                                          
18  “Inteli - Institutional Information.” Last accessed in 21/12/2014. 
http://inteli.pt/en/go/fichainstitucional. 
19  CEIIA. “CEIIA Institutional Information.” Last accessed in 21/12/2014. 
http://www.ceiia.com/general-information/. 
20  “Mobi-E Electric Mobility - Portugal Showcase to the World”. Mobi-E. November 2010. 
21  Assuming the car runs 10000 Km/year. 
22  In 2013, there were five other energy suppliers of electric mobility in Portugal. 
23  Electric cars or e-cars account for a very significant portion of EVs. 
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there were only 193 EVs sold in 2011, and only around 300 EVs used the 
Mobi.E service in 2012 (I18). Furthermore, the energy consumption in the 
Mobi.E system was equivalent to 11 vehicles in 2012 (I18). In fact, only 
4% of the electric vehicle fleet charged their batteries using the public 
infrastructure (I18). The remaining 96% of the EV fleet charged privately, 
and relatively inexpensively, at the price of 1.3 €/day (equivalent to 
39 €/month) (I18).  
Social network 
The methods used to study the Mobi.E case allow for an identification of 
the relationships between the main actors involved in the decision process. 
The relationships between the actors form a social network of those in-
volved in the collective effort of designing the electric mobility policy. The 
following social network analysis focuses on the structure of this network, 
and other measures of its cohesion and shape. 
Sociogram 
The main relationships between actors in the decision process can be 
depicted in a graph of the interrelations created during the decision. The 
following figure is a sociogram representing the structure of the Mobi.E 
network, formed by the interpersonal relations between actors during the 
decision process. The figure is based on the sociomatrix
24
 of the weighted 
interrelations between decision makers (see Table A.3 in Annex 3 – Sup-
plementary tables). 
  
                                                          
24  A sociomatrix is a two-way relational matrix where the rows and columns refer to the 
actors making up the pairs (Wasserman and Faust 1994). 
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Figure 4.2 presents three main features concerning the relationships be-
tween actors in the process. First, it reveals one group on the left side 
mainly composed of companies, and another group on the right side mainly 
composed of policymakers. Second, the figure captures the centrality of the 
Advisor to the Prime Minister and Consultancy company 1 in the decision 
process. Third, the figure reveals other less influential actors significantly 
involved in the decision process, such as the Prime Minister, Advisor to the 
Minister of Economy, the Minister of Economy, the Secretary of State of 
Innovation and the Advisor to the Secretary of State of Innovation. In sum, 
the Mobi.E decision resulted significantly from close interaction between 
two groups of actors: companies and policymakers. 
Cohesion 
The analysis of the social network also provides measures related to its 




                                                          
25  See Ucinet Log 1 – Multiple Cohesion measures Mobi.E in Annex 4 – Ucinet files. 
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Table 4.12: Network cohesion measures of Mobi.E 
 
Notes:  The centralization measure is Freeman's degree centralization. Density, connected-
ness and compactness can vary in the interval [0, 1]. The comma is used throughout 
this work to indicate decimal mark. Values were calculated using UCINET 6 for 
Windows. (Borgatti, Everett, and Freeman 2002).  
The idea of cohesion in a social network can be related to a combination of 
measures. To comprehend the cohesion of this network, three measures 
depicted in Table 4.12 are particularly relevant: density, connectedness and 
compactness. The table reveals that the density of the network of Mobi.E is 
low-medium (0,253) when compared with Richardson's (2009) study where 
a density of 0.0188 was considered sparse. Furthermore, connectedness 
(the opposite of fragmentation) provides an idea of how connections are 
distributed throughout the network (Borgatti, Martin, and Johnson 2013).
26
 
The table shows that the value of connectedness in the network is 0,716, 
                                                          
26  It is defined as the proportion of pairs of nodes that can reach each other by a path of any 
length (i.e. the proportion of pairs of nodes located in the same component). 
Network Cohesion Measures
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which represents a significantly connected process. In addition, if things 
flowing through the network can reach nodes quickly, the network has a 
certain kind of compactness, according to the authors. The table reveals the 
value of compactness to be 0,471, representing a normal flow of infor-
mation through the network. In sum, the measures indicate that the net-
works’ density is low-medium, that there is a significantly connected 
process, and that the structure presents normal values of compactness. 
Shape 
Another class of network characteristics are shape measures of the net-
work. In this case, the shape measures can include properties such as 
centralization, core-peripheriness and the existence of sub-groups (or 
factions). Centralization refers to the extent a network is dominated by 
single node (Borgatti, Martin, and Johnson 2013).
27
 The table reveals that 
the centralization value of the network is 0,538, a middle value. The 
following analysis will only consider centrality at the individual level. 
Individual centrality reveals the advantage some nodes have by virtue of 
their central position in the network, such as information, influence or 
power. It is important to identify who is central when trying to get some-
thing done. In fact, “a node might be central in the sense of being able to 
control the flow of information, whether in the sense of filtering key bits or 
passing it along but colouring it in ways that benefit the node” (Borgatti, 
Martin, and Johnson 2013). The following table presents individual central-
ity measures in the sociomatrix of the network (see Ucinet Log 1 – Multi-
ple Cohesion measures Mobi.E in Annex 4 – Ucinet files). 
  
 
                                                          
27  According to the authors, a maximally centralized graph looks like a star: the node at the 
centre of the network has ties to all other nodes, and no other ties exist. 
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Table 4.13: Individual centrality measures of the Mobi.E decision makers 
 
Notes:  Values were calculated using UCINET 6 for Windows.  
(Borgatti, Everett, and Freeman 2002). 
Table 4.13 presents three main features of individual centrality: 
1. The table reveals that the Eigenvector centrality is significantly higher 
in two nodes (1 and 2): The Advisor to the Prime Minister node has 
0,454, followed by the Consultancy company 1 with 0,379. Further-
more, the table also identifies three other actors excluded from the de-
cision process, i.e. the EV Association, Excluded company 1 and Ex-
cluded company 2 (all with 0). These measures confirm previous 
information captured during the interviews, where the central two ac-
tors were described as highly centralized decision makers (I7 and I18); 
Actors Eigenvector Closenes Between
Prime Minister 0,204 42,000 2,444
Consultancy company 1 0,379 38,000 16,290
Advisor of Prime Minister 0,454 33,000 54,154
Advisor of the Minister of S&T 0,126 44,000 6,150
Secretary of State of S&T 0,042 56,000 0,000
Minister of S&T 0,159 43,000 8,967
Electric component company 1 0,281 42,000 1,144
Software company 1 0,281 42,000 1,144
Power company 0,281 42,000 1,144
Software company 2 0,281 42,000 1,144
Electric component company 2 0,222 49,000 0,000
Consultant company 2 0,151 45,000 0,375
EV Association 0,000 95,000 0,000
Excluded company 1 0,000 95,000 0,000
Excluded company 2 0,000 95,000 0,000
R&D laboratory on EV 0,160 45,000 0,000
Advisor of the Minister of Economy 0,247 40,000 6,527
Minister of Economy 0,186 44,000 1,367
Secretary of State of Innovation 0,200 42,000 3,150
Advisor of Secretary of State of Innovation 0,133 46,000 0,000
Centrality
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and other potentially interested actors were not taken into account, 
such as the Portuguese Association for Electric Vehicles and other 
competing companies (I20, I21 and I22). In sum, the network is signif-
icantly centred on the Advisor to the Prime Minister and to a lesser ex-
tent on Consultancy company 1, while some actors were not included 
in the process. 
2. Another measure of the shape of the network is closeness centrality.28 
Closeness gives an indication of how long things take, on average, to 
reach a given node. In fact, closeness is an inverse measure of centrali-
ty in the sense that large numbers indicate that a node is highly periph-
eral, while small numbers indicate that a node is more central.
29
 In this 
context, closeness centrality can be interpreted as an inverse measure 
of influence in the decision process.  
Table 4.13 confirms that the same actors are very close to the centre, 
i.e. Advisor to the Prime Minister and Consultancy company 1 (with 
38 and 39 respectively). However, the values for most of the other ac-
tors were not substantially distant, varying from 42 to 56. Excluded ac-
tors had 95, representing the most distance. In conclusion, the network 
presents a shape closed closely around its centre. 
3. Another measure of the shape of the network is betweenness, usually 
interpreted as the potential for controlling flows through the network.
30
 
A node with high betweenness is in a position to threaten the network 
with disruption of operations or, more generally, to filter information 
and to colour or distort it as actors pass it along. In fact, a node (or 
                                                          
28  According to Borgatti, Martin, and Johnson (2013), closeness centrality can be calculated 
using Freeman’s definition: the sum of geodesic distances from a node to all others (i.e. the 
length of the shortest path connecting them). 
29  In a flow context, closeness centrality is typically interpreted in terms of the minimum time 
until arrival of something flowing through the network. According to Borgatti, Martin, and 
Johnson (2013), a node that has a highly normalized closeness score is a short distance 
from most others, so information originating at a random node can potentially reach the 
central node very quickly. The authors also argued that since the diffusion process tends to 
introduce distortion, the information received by central nodes have higher fidelity on 
average. Consequently, a highly normalized closeness is a significant advantage for a node 
(in the case of something useful is transmitted). 
30  According to Borgatti, Martin, and Johnson (2013), betweeness centrality reflects the 
amount of brokerage each node has between all other nodes in the network. 
4.3  How are indicators used? 
129 
actor) with high betweeness has power because it can threaten to stop 
transmitting, forcing nodes to use less efficient paths to reach one 
another.  
Table 4.13 presents results pointing to four main characteristics. First, 
there is a significant high score of betweenness for one core actor (i.e. 
Advisor to the Prime Minister with 54,154). This effect of control of 
information was confirmed in two interviews (I7 and I16). Second, 
Consultancy company 1 has a medium score of 16,290. Third, the ta-
ble presents medium-low scores for five secondary actors: Minister of 
S&T with 8,967; Advisor to the Minister of Economy with 6,527; Ad-
visor to the Minister of S&T with 6,15; Secretary of State of Innova-
tion with 3,15; and Prime Minister with 2,444. Fourth, the table pre-
sents null scores (or near) for the remaining thirteen actors.
31
 These 
results confirm the information previously collected, in which a pow-
erful core filtered information when passing it along (I7, I16 and I25). 
In conclusion, the network presents a shape dependent on flow, signif-
icantly controlled by the Advisor to the Prime Minister. 
In sum, the three measures of individual centrality indicate the existence of 
powerful central decision makers within a close-to-the-centre network of 
decision makers. These results also align with information collected during 
interviews. In fact, these measures confirm previous results where signifi-
cant control of the Advisor to the Prime Minister and those policymakers 
far from the small centre of a decision did not have access to parts of 
important information (I7, I16, I18 and I21). 
Another network characteristic similar in spirit to centralization of the 
network is the core-periphery structure (Borgatti, Martin, and Johnson 
2013). Measures of the core-periphery of a network essentially result from 
comparing the network with an idealized model. Core-periphery structures 
are commonly found in social network data, and have important implica-
                                                          
31  Namely, the Minister of Economy, Secretary of State of S&T, Electric component company 1, 
Software company 1, the power company, Software company 2, Electric component com-
pany 2, Consultant company 2, the EV Association, Excluded company 1, Excluded com-
pany 2, R&D laboratory on EV and the Advisor to Secretary of State of Innovation 
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tions for the functioning of networks. Figure A.1 (Annex 2 – Supplemen-
tary figures) reveals that a central core (labelled 1) and a periphery (la-
belled 2) exist in the network of decision of Mobi.E. The core is composed 
of the Prime Minister, Consultancy company 1, Advisor to the Prime 
Minister, Advisor to the Minister of Economy, Minister of Economy, and 
Secretary of State of Innovation. The periphery is composed of the remain-
ing actors of the network.
32
 These findings are in accordance with the idea 
expressed by two interviewees, who revealed the existence of a centralized 
core in the decision process (I7 and I21). It can be concluded there was a 
core composed of powerful actors, and an inherent periphery among the 
remaining decision makers. 
A network can also include inside subgroups. The analysis of cohesive 
subgroups (also referred to as communities) can help to understand the 
functioning of a network. In fact, these subgroups are portions of the 
network in which actors interact more with each other than they do with 
actors who are not in the subgroup. These types of subgroups often share 
common ideals, goals and/or attributes and form factions within the net-
work (Borgatti, Martin, and Johnson 2013). In social network analysis, 
calculating factions is a method that partitions the whole population into a 
predetermined number of cohesive subgroups.  
Figure A.2 (in Annex 2 – Supplementary figures) reveals the existence of 
three factions in the network. The first faction is composed of all instru-
mental companies in the process of implementing Mobi.E.
33
 This faction is 
the business group composed only of companies with particular commer-
cial interests in the project. The faction includes Consultancy company 1, 
which could be also part of the third faction. The second faction is com-
posed of actors who played a minor or no role at all in the decision pro-
                                                          
32  Namely, the Advisor to the Minister of S&T, Secretary of State of S&T, Minister of S&T, 
Electric component company 1, Software company 1, the power company, Software com-
pany 2, Electric component company 2, Consultant company 2, EV Association, Excluded 
company 1, Excluded company 2, the R&D laboratory on EV, and Advisor to Secretary of 
State of Innovation. 
33  Namely, Consultancy company 1, Electric component company 1, Software company 1, the 
power company, Software company 2, and Electric component company 2. 




 The third faction is composed of all actors with an active mobiliza-
tion role in policy-making.
35
 This faction functioned as the public promot-
ers of the Mobi.E project. However, two elements were controversially 
assigned to this faction by Ucinet: First, the R&D laboratory for EV is in 
reality a research laboratory significantly subsidized by the state, although 
officially a non-profit private organization.
36
 While its official alignment 
was close to the commercially oriented faction
37
, their research interests are 
more aligned with public research. Therefore, it is tolerable that it falls in 
the active policy faction. Second, Consultancy company 2 was instrumental 
in providing policymakers with evidence to pursue their policy. Its private 
interests are related to the creation of evidence for public policy. Therefore, 
the third faction is entirely composed of actors active in policy-making as 
well as two special cases. The latter actors were not significantly relevant, 
mostly instrumental to the decision-making process, and possessed a hybrid 
interest in the promotion of the policy: public and commercial. In sum, the 
analysis revealed that one faction represented commercial interests, the 
second represented those excluded or distant from the policy, and a third 
faction was composed entirely of actors active in public policy-making. To 
conclude, this social network analysis expanded upon the organizational 
context of the decision-making process of Mobi.E. In fact, the complete 
analysis of this case study penetrated and made explicit the organization 
and interest in the project. Furthermore, the tools available in social net-
work analysis provided empirically validated indicators of structure, 
cohesion and shape of the network and individual actors. The case study 
allowed an analysis with objective measures for links between decision 
makers in a network, which evolved organically to implement a policy 
decision about electric vehicles. 
                                                          
34  Namely, the Advisor to the Minister of S&T, Secretary of State of S&T, Minister of S&T, 
the EV Association, Excluded company 1, and Excluded company 2. 
35  Namely, the Prime Minister, Advisor to the Prime Minister, Consultancy company 2, R&D 
laboratory for EV, Advisor to the Minister of Economy, Minister of Economy, Secretary of 
State of Innovation, and Advisor to Secretary of State of Innovation. 
36  CEIIA. “CEIIA Institutional Information.” Last accessed on 21/12/2014. 
http://www.ceiia.com/general-information/. 
37  The R&D laboratory on EV partially owns Consultancy company 1 as a private entity. 
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Process of construction of evidence 
The rationale of this decision, or the articulation of the reasons for making 
this particular decision instead of others, included the need to decrease 
Portugal’s oil dependency.
38
 Portugal was increasingly dependent on costly 
oil imports that called for measures to de-carbonize the transport sector 
(Pinto et al. 2010). The government supported policies towards renewable 
energies, and believed that they could give a technological push to promote 
development of the country.
39
 A central argument used to justify the 
decision was that “the lack of a recharging infrastructure deters the acquisi-
tion of electric vehicles” (Pinto et al. 2010, p.15).  
There were also optimistic views of the future and claims associated with 
the programme’s rationale. The programme contained an optimistic vision 
of the future presented as a reason to setup the programme, where silent 
cars would be the edge of modernity and development. Several academics, 
policymakers and business leaders of departments of R&D and innovation 
interviewed revealed, however, that the argument included sustainability 
statements never ascertained. In fact, the argument was based on three 
future technology claims that were never materialized: the project over-
looked the effects of the shift of carbon emissions to the energy producer 
created by EVs, vowed on the future ability to charge EVs with night time 
production of renewable energy
40
 and overstated the possibility to sell 
energy to the grid from the battery of the cars.
41
 Furthermore, the argument 
included claims to improve mobility.
42
 Interviews to an academic and a 
                                                          
38  “Modelo de Mobilidade Eléctrica Para Portugal – Apresentação a Sua Excelência O 
Ministro da Economia e Inovação – Sumário Executivo”. Presentation. Roland Berger 
Strategy Consultants. Lisboa. 14/1/2009. 
39  See, for example, the Governmental strategy for energy, a framework setup in Resolução 
do Conselho de Ministros n.º 169/2005. 
40  This claim was based on the connection between electric vehicles and the investments being 
made not only in wind power but also in the linkage between wind and hydropower energy. 
41  See statements in Pinto et al. (2010), the Resolução do Conselho de Ministros n.º 81/2009 
and the Mobi.E showcase (Mobi.E. Novembro 2010. “Electric Mobility Portugal – Show-
case to the world”).  
42  See Resolução do Conselho de Ministros n.º 20/2009, Resolução do Conselho de Ministros 
n.º 81/2009 and the Mobi.E showcase (Mobi.E. Novembro 2010. “Electric Mobility  
Portugal – Showcase to the world”). 
4.3  How are indicators used? 
133 
policymaker indicated, however, that electric cars will only replace existing 
cars, leaving mobility problems in the same stance. These interviewees also 
criticized the excessive focus of Mobi.E on cars, disregarding other EVs 
(such as bicycles and scooters), and ignoring fleets owned by major utility 
companies, private companies or city councils. In addition, the argument 
included unrealistic technology claims for the electric car, such as the 
overoptimistic range of 160 kilometres for Nissan Leaf advertised through-
out the programme. An independent review in August 2011 revealed that 
the real range was 93 kilometres.
43
 An experienced business leader stressed 
that this version of the Nissan Leaf had only a working range of no more 
than 100 Km per charge, which made the car significantly limited. The 
interviewee added that the prime-minister’s occasional use of the Leaf 
helped to conveyed the erroneous idea that this specific car could be 
sufficient for governmental entourages and, consequently, useful to most 
types of drivers. Therefore, the rationale supporting this programme was 
based on the need to decrease oil dependency, the absence of recharging 
infrastructure impedes acquisition and several controversial claims of 
sustainability, mobility and autonomy range. 
The analysis of evidence used also revealed that relational tacit knowledge 
(Collins 2010) was a major determinant in the rationale to make this 
decision.
44 
In fact, according to interviews to two policy makers, a business 
leader and an academic, this relational tacit knowledge was developed 
through social interactions between government members and a leading 
director of Nissan-Renault.
45
 The information conveyed included details 
about the time to launch Nissan Leaf and the charging needs of this specific 
car, according to an interviewee. This information was later used to deter-
mine the launching of the Mobi.E and the specifications of the electric 
chargers spread throughout the country, according to a business leader. 
                                                          
43  Link: http://www.caranddriver.com/reviews/2011-nissan-leaf-sl-long-term-road-test-review 
44  Relational tacit knowledge is knowledge dependent on the relations between people, arising 
out of social interaction and not yet made explicit although it could with enough effort 
(Collins 2010). 
45  See the Presentation of Mobi.E (Pinto, M. Março 2011. “Mobi.E”). 
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The main (explicit) indicator used in practice was an indicator of market 
penetration of electric vehicles in 2020. This forecast
46
 was based on very 
optimistic scenario produced by the government and it pointed to a market 
of 750000 electric vehicles in the country in 2020 (Santos 2009). However, 
there were other existing indicators at the time. For example, in 2009 a 
master dissertation by Paulo Santos on this very topic forecasted 600000 
electric vehicles in 2020 in a very optimistic scenario (Santos 2009). Later, 
in 2010, another master dissertation by Luís Gomes forecasted less than 
322 027 electric vehicles in 2020, with a generous penetration rate of 50% 
(Gomes 2010). The governmental forecast was considered too optimistic 
and even unrealistic by two business leaders of R&D departments and one 
academic, because it represented 80% of the sales in 2020 (considering a 
sales growth rate of 1%). Interestingly, the most pessimistic scenario of the 
two pessimistic considered by Santos (2009) predicted a meagre presence 
of electric vehicles in 2020 with only 80000 units. Santos described this 
latter scenario as “catastrophic”, given the “significance of public and 
private investments expected” to create the infrastructures and fiscal 
benefits to acquire electric vehicles (Santos 2009, 44). Santos also added 
that this was a very unlikely scenario, “justified by the non-acceptance of 
this kind of technology in the automotive market” (Santos 2009, 44). 
Presently, it appears to be the most probable outcome in 2020. Thus, two 
publicly available scientific evidence existent at the time of the decision 
that deemed the governmental forecasts very optimistic were ignored in the 
government argument. 
Other evidence from grey literature also exposed the optimistic nature of 
the government’s forecast. In fact, an expert from the Portuguese Automo-
tive Business Association – a business lobby - reportedly stated that in a 
very optimistic scenario 300000 vehicles were expected to be sold in the 
year 2020 (Santos 2009). This forecast implied an optimistic increase in 
EVs both supported in the ratio of population/sales of cars existent in 
countries like Belgium and the Netherlands, as well as in the assumption 
                                                          
46  Forecasts are evidence based on a quantitative method used to structure judgement when 
there is sufficient data (Green and Armstrong 2004). 
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that in 2020 Portugal will reach these countries’ economic and social 
development (Santos 2009), which was already very difficult to achieve in 
2010 given the financial crisis. Furthermore, a major company involved in 
the development of the programme revealed that they had internal forecasts 
of 160000 electric vehicles in 2020. In addition, according to a business 
leader of an outside company, their academy-based scenarios pointed to a 
very modest growth in the market for electric car in the country. Therefore, 
there were other evidence that considered the government forecast very 
optimistic. 
Policymakers also ignored other existing scientific evidence about previous 
failed forecasts. In fact, Midler & Beaume (2010) summarized the exist-
ence of three scientific studies in the United States predicting the introduc-
tion of EVs. The first one in 1973, elaborated by the Wisconsin University, 
forecasted a penetration rate of 20% of the total sales in 1980 in the USA. 
In 1979, a Princeton University study forecasted a slower penetration rate 
(10%) in 2000. Later, in 1994 the World Resources Institute predicted a 
25% penetration rate in the US total sales in 2010. Thus, other failed 
forecasts existed in the literature and were also ignored. Furthermore, 
several sociologists have published extensively since the 1980s about the 
perils of the electric vehicles programmes in France (e.g. Callon and  
Latour 1981; Callon 1986; Callon 2012), and provided warnings about this 
type of technologically deterministic initiatives. 
In this case, the production of new evidence was used to influence the 
policy process. In fact, three policymakers revealed that the decision was 
based on its predicted political impact and not so much based on socio-
technological considerations of the policy. To these interviewees and to 
academics and company leaders interviewed, technical evidence were 
sought only after the decision was made. Social adoption was considered 
during the implementation phase of the programme and only used quantita-
tive evidence.
47 
Furthermore, in this case and following strong controver-
                                                          
47  Data. E. Março 2010. “Apresentação dos resultados do estudo de mercado - Avaliação do 
conceito da eficiência Mobi.E". Lisboa. 
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sies regarding the government forecast, additional evidence were solicited 
by government
48
 and by an excluded company
49
. In a first phase, govern-
ment subcontracted an international consultancy group to elaborate a 
technical study to provide further evidence to support the investment 
decision. The consultancy firm was hired to elaborate a technical report on 
electric mobility about the potential market, the number of chargers for 
electric vehicles in the country and specifications for the charging sta-
tions.
50
 This report forecasted an optimistic potential market of 180000 
EVs and Plug-in Hybrid Electric Vehicles for 2020. The report also opti-
mistically predicted the need for 25000 slow charging public posts and 560 
fast chargers in 2020. This firm calculated that EVs would be 11% more 
competitive than normal ICE
51
 to private owners and 12% to companies. 
Later, an energy company excluded from the decision making network 
contracted a national consultancy to develop a technical study about quo-
tas, market growth, its norms and how to regulate it. The study showed that 
the penetration forecast of the EVs would be significantly slow.
52 
Some 
elements of the study benefited the contractors’ strategy in the short-term 
and were used to influence policy-making in matters of market-share, 
norms and regulations related to EVs in Portugal. These forecasts were 
significantly cautious towards the growth of EV market, and supported the 
initial governmental claims. In sum, evidence were added after the decision 
to support government’s decision and to defend outsiders’ interests in this 
new market. 
From the business point of view, these types of programmes can be devel-
oped independently of the existing quantitative evidence. According to two 
                                                          
48  “Modelo de Mobilidade Eléctrica Para Portugal – Apresentação a Sua Excelência O 
Ministro da Economia e Inovação – Sumário Executivo”. Presentation. Roland Berger 
Strategy Consultants. Lisboa. 14/1/2009. 
49  TIS.PT. 2011. “Transportes, Energia E Fiscalidade: Desafios E Oportunidades Perante a 
Evidência Da Mudança.” GALP. Lisboa, Portugal. 
50  “Modelo de Mobilidade Eléctrica Para Portugal – Apresentação a Sua Excelência O 
Ministro da Economia e Inovação – Sumário Executivo”. Presentation. Roland Berger 
Strategy Consultants. Lisboa. 14/1/2009. 
51  ICE is the acronym of Internal Combustion Engine. 
52  At the time, Reiner et al. (2010) also forecasted an optimistic technology scenario where 
BEVs and fuel cell vehicles will have only 5% of market penetration in 2020 in Europe. 
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business R&D leaders, strategic considerations about the future of the 
energy market in the country and the link to an advanced technology 
process can be sufficient to be involved in this type of programme. A 
business R&D leader assumed that a governmental invitation to participate 
can be sufficient to develop their participation. A company peripheral to 
the decision network considered that the innovation team needs firstly to 
believe in the success of a project, according to their specific business 
interest and notions of realism and rationality, more than obtaining any 
numbers. As a criticism to the Mobi.E programme, this leader considered 
that quantitative models can be adjusted as required, using in particular the 
growth rate of the oil barrel, to produce forecasts adjusted to one’s desires. 
The mismatch between their forecast and the policy makers’ was particu-
larly important to this company, and reinforced their need to gather more 
evidence to support their business options.  
Nevertheless, these two business innovation leaders confirmed the need to 
produce quantitative evidence to account for the money that could be lost 
with involvement in the programme. They both considered that the pro-
gramme was mainly “political” (i.e. made by and for the government and 
its consultants) and their companies could not refrain themselves from 
participating at different levels of involvement. One company well in-
volved in the programme had their costs of participation and support well 
detailed. Another firm not involved in the programme also confirmed that 
the costs of involvement in this project were significantly determined and 
approved. The leader of this latter company described in detail the “irra-
tionality” of this public charging solution and the small size of this specific 
business, when aimed to the individual car owner instead of company 
fleets. This company conceded, nonetheless, that “the decision was made 
with the information existent at the moment”. According to this interview-
ee, “in the first meetings everything was on the table, meaning that every-
body had the wish and ambition for electric mobility, but there was no 
information, just blank paper sheets”. Thus, it can be concluded that busi-
ness decisions can overlook exisiting evidence, always prepare quantifica-
tion of costs and can gather other evidence to ascertain decisions. 
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In summary, an account of the best available evidence at the time of deci-
sion includes: two scientific publications about forecast for the penetration 
rate of EVs in Portugal, several historical accounts of failed forecasts, two 
supplementary technical reports produced for the government and a com-
pany elaborated by consultants and, lastly, two business studies about the 
costs involved to these companies. Some evidence were produced after the 
decision with the aim to support and influence the decision. The subcon-
tracting of think-tanks produced technical evidence to influence the policy 
process, for example. All interviewees confirmed that formal evidence 
were not sistematically considered in the decision process. Conflictual 
evidence was a lateral issue to a decision significantly based on political 
considerations and on relational tacit knowledge. This case is an example 
of the disputed nature of evidence and indicators in policy-making, as 
discussed in the literature. What constituted an indicator was debated, 
influenced by various parties, indicators lost strength through controversy; 
or were ignored if unhelpful. It can be thus argued that the failure to c 
apture the best available evidence suggests the use of evidence for  
political ends. 
4.3.3.2 Case study on the nanotechnology laboratory 
This sub-section first provides a description of the context of the decision 
to create a nanotechnology laboratory, involving policymakers and scien-
tists. Afterwards, it proceeds with a social network analysis to provide a 
comprehensive view of the organizational context of the decision. The last 
part includes an analysis of the process of construction of evidence during 
the decision process. 
Nanotechnology is frequently considered an advanced interdisciplinary 
scientific area and an emerging technology (Robinson 2009; Heinze et al. 
2007; and Barben et al. 2008). It can be defined as a heterogeneous set of 
technologies applied to or using systems at the nanoscale (Fleischer and 
Grunwald 2008; OECD 2010). Nanotechnology and nanoscience deal with 
material structures at the nanoscale, defined as a dimension between 1 to 




 Despite controversies over its definitions, a nano com-
ponent can be a decisive part of a complex product, although its content 
might not be easily detectable. Furthermore, some experts assert that 
nanotechnology has the potential to produce innovations rendering numer-
ous benefits, in particular contributions to economic prosperity and to 
sustainable development (Fleischer, Decker, and Fiedeler 2005). In fact, 
although not many innovations exist presently in the market,
54
 nanotech-
nology could potentially be used in a wide range of applications such as 
ICT
55
, food quality control, medicine and biotechnology. The few existing 
products focus on health and fitness, home and garden, food and beverage, 
electronics and computers, automotive and children’s goods (OECD 2010). 
Nevertheless, most developments still relate to scientific findings apart 
from concrete final product innovations. 
Technology decisions in nanotechnology policy face four significant 
challenges. First, the scientific controversies over its definition and scale 
are often complemented with questions on whether it is a specific technol-
ogy or even a definitive group of technologies. Consequently, scientists, 
policymakers and lay people carry their own heterogeneous conceptions of 
what nanotechnology is in their arguments during discussions, creating 
difficulties with communication, public participation and community 
involvement (Fleischer, Decker, and Fiedeler 2005). Second, decision-
making faces high uncertainty about effects and impacts. On one hand, 
nanotechnology could potentially lead to less use of scarce and polluting 
materials and it could be a critical component of sustainable development 
(Fleischer and Grunwald 2008). On the other hand, potential for side 
effects is significant. In fact, little is known regarding potential environ-
mental and health impacts of nanomaterials, despite many research initia-
tives throughout the world, according to the authors. Third, regulatory 
agencies often act in the absence of data about toxicology and effects 
                                                          
53  Some experts argue that magnitude should not be included in its definition (see Fleischer, 
Decker, and Fiedeler 2005). 
54  See for example the inventory of nanotechnology-based consumer products introduced on 
the market (Project on Emerging Nanotechnologies 2013). 
55  ICT is the acronym of Information and Communication Technologies. 
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(Morris et al. 2011). In fact, the data on the levels and identity of nano-
materials are either limited or non-existent, making it difficult to quantify 
exposures (Morris et al. 2011). Fourth and last, decision-making requires 
shared responsibility between regulators and producers of nano products. 
Some information about characteristics, performances and protection can 
only be obtained by the scientists and engineers involved in the develop-
ment of nano products (Morris et al. 2011). 
Context of the decision  
The idea to create a nanotechnology laboratory, hereafter referred to as 
INL, was initially defined in a governmental policy briefing during the 
preparation of the 2005 Summit between Spain and Portugal. The briefing 
consisted of half a page with political ideas and technical benefits of the 
proposal (I25). Both the scientific area and the location of INL were 
intentionally left open. These definitions would be the result of not only 
negotiations between the two governments, but also the outcome of discus-
sions among government members (I25). At the time, there were proposals 
in various scientific fields to be discussed between both countries, such as 
nanotechnology, grid computing, biotechnology, biomedicine, energy and 
risk management (I25). There were also proposals for different regions in 
Spain and Portugal to host the lab. Inside the Portuguese government, 
stronger candidates to headquarter the facilities were, arguably, the border 
regions of Northern Alentejo (where the Évora Summit was held), and the 
Braga district, where nanotechnology research was stronger (I25).  
At the end of the Summit, the heads of state agreed to locate the facility in 
Braga, and nominated the Spanish José Rivas to be its Director-General 
(INL 2012).
56
 The concept of an Iberian joint research laboratory was well 
received in both Spanish and Portuguese governmental circles for several 
reasons (I25): the laboratory would cement relations between countries 
separated by historical events and not prone to cooperate beyond necessary 
issues; the cooperation would lead to the creation of the first international 
                                                          
56  A Spaniard was nominated, given that the final location of the facility was in Portugal. 
4.3  How are indicators used? 
141 
research institution located in Spain or Portugal;
57
 the research facility 
would be dedicated to an advanced scientific area and an emergent tech-
nology; and the facility would be opened to participation of other countries, 
fostering international collaboration. 
The agreement reached in the Summit included setting up a bilateral 
technical committee to prepare for the creation of the INL. A newly created 
technical committee was tasked with the preparation of a detailed proposal, 
the definition of the initial lines of scientific and technical activities, the 
setting of the operation model of INL, its funding, installation modalities, 
calendar and possible partnerships (I25). The committee was composed of 
two poles in each country controlled by several institutions (INL 2011a).
58
 
Members were to be scientists in possession of a doctorate. Furthermore, 
the technical committee decided the strategic orientations of the INL along 
four main lines (Technical Committee 2006a): It determined that INL 
should assure world class research in all areas of activity; develop partner-
ships with the industry; foster the transfer of knowledge into economic 
value and jobs; train researchers; develop a skilled workforce for the 
nanotechnology industry; and prevent and mitigate nanotechnology risks. 
Second, the committee decided that the recruitment of human resources 
should hire the best teams of researchers from the beginning, to immediately 
assure good international reputation and attract talented scientists and 
graduate students. Third, the committee requested a report about nanotech-
nology activity in Spain and Portugal from two scientists, members of the 
committee and appointed Directors of the INL
59
 (INL Technical 
Committee 2006). Fourth, the technical committee designed a scientific 
                                                          
57  The Institute for Prospective Technological Studies located in Seville is a European 
research facility of the Joint Research Centre57 of the European Commission. 
58  In Spain it was controlled initially by three institutions on the part of the Ministry of 
Education and Science: the Directorate General of Research (DGI), the Directorate General 
of Technological Policy (DGTP) and the Directorate General of Universities (DGU). In 
Portugal, the control was exercised by four institutions on the part of the Ministry of Sci-
ence, Technology and Higher Education: Knowledge Society Agency (UMIC), the Science 
and Technology Foundation (FCT), the Science and International Relations Office of Sci-
ence and Higher Education (GRICES) and the Council of Associated Laboratories (CLA). 
59  Professor José Rivas related to the University of Santiago de Compostela in Spain and 
Professor Paulo Freitas related to the Technical University of Lisbon in Portugal. 
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strategy based on the former report, recommendations of an International 
Advisory Board and two organizational and legal experts: 
 The International Advisory Board played an important role in the INL 
(I25 and I26). The board was composed of influential members of the 
nanotechnology and nanoscience international community (INL 
Technical Committee 2006). It included leaders of large research insti-
tutions able to secure initial training and establish significant relation-
ships within the INL.60 It also included an influential player of a major 
initiative for nanotechnology in the USA (Roco et al. 2000). The board 
agreed on strategic directions of the committee, based on the fields that 
received fewer R&D efforts in most countries and the existing Iberian 
capabilities (I26). This strategy was oriented toward four research are-
as: Nanomedicine, environment monitoring, security and food quality 
control, nanoelectronics (beyond CMOS61), and nano-machines and 
nanomanipulation. The area of environmental monitoring, security and 
food quality control was particularly well received (I26). Second, the 
board elaborated on an advanced training scheme for the first scientists 
of the INL, which allowed the sending of the first post-docs to relevant 
research centres around the world (I26).  
 Two international consultants were also central to the setup of the INL. 
Their experience was helpful in dealing not only with legal and gov-
ernance issues, but also with administrative framework (I25 and I26). 
First, a legal advisor was hired with experience with several interna-





                                                          
60  Namely Roberto G. M. Caciuffo (European Commission, Joint Research Centre, Karls-
ruhe), Thomas Jovin (Max Planck Institute for Biophysical Chemistry, Göttingen), Emilio 
Mendez (Center for Functional Nanomaterials - Brookhaven National Laboratory, Upton, 
New York), Christopher B. Murray (University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia), Aristides A. 
G. Requicha (University of Southern California, Los Angeles) and Mihail C. Roco (Nation-
al Science Foundation, USA). 
61  CMOS is the acronym of Complementary metal–oxide–semiconductor. CMOS is a 
technology for constructing integrated circuits. 
62  European Organization for Nuclear Research. 
63  European Southern Observatory. 






 (I26).66 The legal advisor helped to elaborate on 
statutes and, later, staff rules (I25 and I26). An advice was to include 
more countries in the laboratory, as soon as possible, to avoid continu-
ous conflicts regarding legal aspects, particularly those not regulated 
by international law (I26) and that resulted from having two possible 
national frameworks. Second, the INL also included a consultant on 
administrative issues - formerly the head of the administration of the 
ESRF - who provided detailed advice in relation to personnel, finance, 
purchasing/commercial activities and general issues (INL Technical 
Committee 2006). 
The decision-making process included further negotiation activities. In fact, 
the construction of the INL comprised also two negotiation phases. First, it 
was necessary to find a city in the district of Braga to accommodate the 
INL infrastructure. After the announcement of the launching of INL in 
2005, the technical committee awaited proposals from Portuguese munici-
palities within the district of Braga (I25). The Mayor of Braga proposed 
two locations in the city (I24). Guimarães, another major city in the Braga 
district, also presented two proposals (I24 and I25). In the end, the tech-
nical committee chose a property in Braga, near the Campus of Gualtar of 
Universidade do Minho, with an area of about 47000m
2
, granted for 50 
years unless the purpose of its use changes (INL 2011b and I24). The 
second phase relates to the physical construction and setup of the INL. 
Three main steps allowed for construction in a relatively short period of 
time and avoid of cost increases (I25). First, an Installing Commission and 
a General Assembly were formed to authorize a call that included the 
architectural project, construction project and construction itself, as well as 
calls to buy equipment. Second, a team from the Portuguese National 
Laboratory for Civil Engineering was assigned to manage and control the 
construction work. Third, a Headquarters Agreement between the states 
                                                          
64  European Molecular Biology Laboratory. 
65  European Synchrotron Radiation Facility. 
66  This advisor defined the INL legally as a bilateral research centre in Europe, established 
within public international law with intergovernmental governance (INL Technical 
Committee 2006). 
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and INL was signed to establish the status, privileges and immunities of the 
laboratory and its personnel. This agreement allowed for the transference 
of funds, contracting scientists and a tax-free system.
67
  
The decision to create INL was a complex process for six main reasons: It 
resulted from of a long-term decision of the governments of Spain and 
Portugal to cooperate in future S&T joint ventures (INL Technical 
Committee 2006). Second, it involved an important co-finance of the 
European Union
68
. In fact, the initial operational costs of INL were signifi-
cant (estimated ±30 million €/year), and the installation of the facilities 
would amount to an additional investment of 30 million euros (I26).
69
 
Despite the positive economic outlooks for both countries at the time, the 
co-financing by the EU was considered critical for the decision process. 
Third, the laboratory was the first international research organisation in 
Spain and Portugal, and it was also the only one in Europe in the field of 
nanoscience and nanotechnology.
70
 According to interviewees, INL’s 
creation could stimulate a scientific presence at the international stage by 
setting significant research facilities in an emergent S&T field (I25 and 
I26) in the Iberian Peninsula.
71
 Fourth, the decision required a relatively 
                                                          
67  In the end, the buildings were constructed in circa 26000m2, comprising a main scientific 
building67, an incubator and a social building that includes a gym, a kindergarten and a 
residence to accommodate visitors and temporary researchers (INL 2011b). The cycle of 
acquisition of equipment is around 10 years, and the construction of the building should last 
for forty to fifty years (I26). 
68  “Edificação Do Laboratório Ibérico Internacional de Nanotecnologia”. Programa de 
Cooperación Transfronteriza Espana - Portugal 2007-2013. POCTEP. Last accessed in 
21/12/2014. http://www.qren.pt/np4/2271.html 
69  Most of the funds for construction came from the European Regional Development Fund 
through the Operational Programme for Cross-border Cooperation: Spain – Portugal, 2007-
2013 (“Edificação Do Laboratório Ibérico Internacional de Nanotecnologia”. Programa de 
Cooperación Transfronteriza Espana - Portugal 2007-2013. POCTEP. Last accessed in 
21/12/2014. http://www.qren.pt/np4/2271.html) 
70  Magalhães, Luís “Welcome Address in Name of Knowledge Society Agency (UMIC) and 
Science and Technology Foundation (FCT).” Lecture, Annual Forum on EPT on Smart 
Systems and Integration (EPoSS), IST, Lisboa, 8/10/2010. 
71  It should be noticed that at the time of the decision, several countries also promoted 
significant investments in nanotechnology, such as the National Nanotechnology Initiative 
in the USA (Roco and Bainbridge 2003; Roco et al. 2000; Pandza, Wilkins, and Alfoldi 
2011). 
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long period of time to be accomplished. In fact, the task took almost six 
years to be finished and to allow scientific work in the laboratory (I25 and 
I26). In some research policy circles, it was assumed that given the exam-
ples of CERN
72
 and other institutions, international research facilities were 
difficult to create and required a great deal of time to implement. Fifth, 
INL’s facilities were conceived to receive a substantial number of employ-
ees. In fact, INL was designed to accommodate 400 workers (200 scien-
tists, about 100 PhD students and the remaining related to technical and 
administrative staff)
73
. Sixth and last, the initial scientific declarations 
committed INL to a difficult human resource strategy: recruit the scientific 
staff globally and based on merit; guarantee internationally competitive 
salaries and benefits; assure immigration and family regrouping schemes 
provided by the international organization status; guarantee about 30% of 
the scientific positions with a tenure track; open post-doctoral positions and 
PhD student fellowships to be awarded globally; and guarantee oversight 
by an international scientific committee. Thus, the creation of INL was 
involved in a significantly complex and ambitious decisions. 
The model used to conceive INL was considerably based on exisiting 
international organisations. The model had three main features:  
 INL was initially planned as an institution like CERN74 in the area of 1.
nanotechnologies (I24, I25 and I26). The CERN model was a complex 
international model of cooperation in a scientific area (e.g. high-energy 
physics), open to all countries interested in participating. 
 INL included a specific strategy for employment (I26). In fact, when a 2.
principal investigator is hired, a reasonable amount of money is made 
available (c.a. 750000€ to 1000000€), including the possibility to hire 
two to four post-doctoral or junior researchers. There is a trial period 
of three to four years, after which the group is expected to start financ-
                                                          
72  The European Organization for Nuclear Research. 
73  The personnel originated from Spain, Portugal and other countries, and covered fundamen-
tal and applied research and related industrial activities. INL presently has around 85 re-
searchers although they should already be 150 (I26). 
74  The European Organization for Nuclear Research 
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ing itself through the European Union, industrial contracts and/or intel-
lectual property. Furthermore, although the human resources at INL 
are supposed to rotate, up to 30% of permanent contracts are expected 
to be signed between the fourth and the sixth year (in exceptional cases 
nine years). 
 The idea of extending INL membership to other countries existed since 3.
the beginning, as mentioned (Technical Committee 2006). In an early 
phase there were plans to extend membership to two European states, 
Latin American countries (Brazil, Argentina, Mexico and Colombia 
were possibilities) and an Asian country (India) (I26). However, the 
inclusion of other member states remains difficult. According to two 
interviewees, the recent crisis and austerity measures did not facilitate 
the project of expansion because they reflect negatively upon (I25  
and I26).  
In sum, the setting up of this laboratory had a noticeable rationale put 
forward to justify the decision.
75
 It included a narrative about the im-
portance to have visible cooperation between Iberian countries to improve 
their relationship. It involved the argument of creating an international 
research centre for the first time in Portugal and Spain. It argued that other 
developed countries (such as the US, Netherlands and EU) were making 
significant investments in nanotechnology and Iberia needed joint efforts to 
stay competitive. A Technical Committee reported that “the scientific level 
of Portugal and Spain is internationally competitive from an individual 
point of view, but it lacks specific weight, i.e, there is need for a critical 
mass beyond the main nuclei (i.e. Madrid, Lisbon) to be internationally 
sound at a higher level” (INL Technical Committee 2006, p.17). The 
rationale also included the need to use the European cross-border funds 
between Spain and Portugal. As in the former case study, the decision 
included claims about the laboratory future connections to firms and its 
                                                          
75  INL Technical Committee. 2006. “Portugal-Spain International Research Laboratory - 
International Iberian Nanotechnology Laboratory (INL).” Braga. 
http://www.umic.pt/images/stories/publicacoes4/80 Technical Committee Report.pdf. 
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The interviews conducted for this case study allows for an identification of 
the relationships between the main actors involved in the decision process 
of INL. As in the previous case study, the relationships between actors 
form a social network involved in the collective effort to launch the labora-
tory. The social network analysis focuses on the organizational context of 
the network and other measures of its cohesion and shape. 
Sociogram 
As in the previous case study, the main relationships between the actors of 
the decision-making process can be depicted in a graph of the interrelations 
created during the decision. The following figure is a sociogram represent-
ing the structure of INL organizational network. The figure is based on the 
sociomatrix of the weighted interrelations between decision makers (see 
Table A.3 in Annex 3 – Supplementary tables). 
  
                                                          
76  Stated in the report on the future activities of INL (INL. 2011. “INL – Laboratório Ibérico 
Internacional de Nanotecnologia - Novembro de 2009 a Maio de 2011 - Actualização Da 
Informação Sobre a Criação E Actividades Do INL Publicada No Volume Sobre as Ac-
tividades Do Ministério Da Ciência, Tecnologia E Ensino Superior 2.” Braga). 
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Figure 4.3 presents three main features concerning the relations between 
the actors in the decision process. First, it reveals one group on the left side 
mainly comprising policymakers, and another group on the right side 
containing scientists and two companies. Second, the figure captures the 
centrality of the governments, their top advisors and the directors of INL in 
the decision process. Third, the figure reveals other less influential actors 
involved in the decision process, such as the City Mayor, a temporary 
director, two companies, the secondary schools, and excluded scientists in 
academia from different research areas. In sum, the figure identifies that 
INL structure resulted primarily from the negotiations between policymak-
ers of the two countries, followed by decision makers acting both as poli-
cymakers and scientists. 
Cohesion 
A social network analysis of the INL case, calculated using Ucinet, pro-
vides measures related to the cohesion of the network.
77
 The following 
table presents several cohesion measures of INL’s network. 
  
                                                          
77  See more details in Annex 4 – Ucinet files (Ucinet Log 5 – Multiple Cohesion measures INL). 
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Table 4.14: Cohesion measures in the decision network of INL 
 
Notes:  Values were calculated using UCINET 6 for Windows. (Borgatti, Everett, and 
Freeman 2002). The centralization measure is Freeman's degree of centralization. 
Three measures are particularly relevant for understanding the cohesion in this net-
work: density, connectedness and compactness. 
Table 4.14 reveals that the density of the network of INL decision process 
is medium-low (0,268).
78
 Furthermore, a measure of connectedness pro-
vides an idea of how connections are distributed throughout the network 
(Borgatti, Martin, and Johnson 2013). The table shows that the value of 
connectedness in the network is 0,889, which represents a significant 
connected process, even more so than in the Mobi.E case. In addition, a 
network has a certain kind of compactness if things flowing through the 
network can reach nodes quickly, according to the same authors. The table 
                                                          
78  Here again, the value is medium-low, if one compares with the Richardson's (2009) study 
where a density of 0,0188 considered the network sparse. 
Network cohesion Measures
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reveals that the value of compactness is 0,556, which represents a normal 
flow of information through the network. The cohesion of the network is 
characterized by a medium-low density, significant connected process and 
normal compactness. 
Shape 
Another class of network characteristics is shape measures. In this case, 
these shape measures can include properties such as centralization, core-
peripheriness and sub-groups (or factions) existent in the network. Central-
ization refers to the extent a network is dominated by single node, as 
mentioned before (Borgatti, Martin, and Johnson 2013).
79
 The table shows 
the calculation of a medium value of centralization for the network (0,426).  
As mentioned previously, individual centrality reveals the advantage some 
nodes have by virtue of their central position in the network, such as 
information, influence or power. It is important to identify who is central 
when trying to get something done or attribute a certain style of decision-
making in the decision-making process. The following table presents 
individual centrality measures in the sociomatrix of the network of INL.
80
 
                                                          
79 A maximally centralized graph looks like a star: the node at the centre of the network has 
ties to all other nodes, and no other ties exist, as mentioned before (Borgatti, Martin, and 
Johnson 2013). 
80  See more details in in Annex 4 – Ucinet files (Ucinet Log 6 – Multiple Centrality measures 
INL).  
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Table 4.15: Centrality measures for the matrix of relations in the decision network of INL 
 
Table 4.15 reveals three main features of individual centrality: 
 Both the Director and Sub-Director are significantly central to the 1.
network, presenting an Eigenvector centrality of 0,433 and 0,426, re-
spectively. They were both popular actors. The Other academia group 
were excluded, with 0 Eigenvector centrality. These measures confirm 
previous results obtained in the interviews, where the former two ac-
tors were identified as key players in the decision process (I24, I25 and 
I26), and other scientists complained about exclusion from such a sig-
nificant investment in S&T (I23 and CI2).  
Actors Eigenvector Closenes Between
Prime Minister 1 0,088 41,000 1,000
Minister of S&T 1 0,163 34,000 3,819
Top advisor 1 0,279 30,000 9,795
Prime Minister 2 0,105 39,000 1,786
Minister of S&T 2 0,219 32,000 5,486
Top advisor 2 0,347 28,000 18,052
City Mayor 0,105 40,000 0,000
Director 0,426 25,000 32,369
Sub-Director 0,433 25,000 29,826
Sub-Director (Temporary) 0,307 30,000 9,050
Construction company 0,188 35,000 0,000
Equipment company 0,188 35,000 0,000
National scientific community 1 0,104 38,000 0,000
National scientific community 2 0,105 38,000 0,000
International scientific community 0,274 31,000 1,367
Scientific staff 0,216 34,000 3,450
Secondary schools 0,139 37,000 0,000
Other academia 0,000 68,000 0,000
Centrality
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 Another measure of the shape of the network is closeness centrality.81 2.
According to Borgatti, Martin, and Johnson (2013), large numbers in-
dicate that a node is highly peripheral, while small numbers indicate 
that a node is more central. Table 4.15 reveals that the three actors are 
very close to the centre, i.e. Director and Sub-Director with 25 each 
and Top Advisor 2 with 28. The values for most of the other actors 
were diverse, varying from 30 to 68 (more than in the Mobi.E net-
work). In sum, results indicate a centralized decision process in three 
actors (i.e. Director, Sub-Director and Top Advisor 2), and a less cen-
tralized network of decision makers than the Mobi.E case. 
 Another measure of the shape of the network is betweenness centrality, 3.
usually interpreted as the potential to control flows through the net-
work, by playing a gatekeeping or toll-talking role (Borgatti, Martin, 
and Johnson 2013). As previously stated, a node (or actor) with high 
betweeness has power because it can threaten to stop transmitting by 
making nodes use less efficient paths to reach one another. The analy-
sis of Table 4.15 reveals four main features: First, there are high scores 
of betweenness for two core actors, i.e. Director and Sub-Director with 
32,369 and 29,826 respectively. The previous analysis of the Mobi.E 
network, however, revealed that top betweenness was significantly 
concentrated in one actor. Second, there was a medium score for one 
actor (i.e. Top Advisor 2 with 18,052) rather than five actors as in the 
Mobi.E case. Third, the table reveals low scores in eight actors82. 
Fourth, the table presents null scores (or near) to only six actors83, sig-
nificantly different from the Mobi.E’s thirteen remaining actors.  
To conclude, INL betweenness captures a distribution of the power to 
influence the decision between several actors, vis-à-vis the concentra-
tion found in the two main Mobi.E actors. This conclusion is in line 
with the information gathered in the interviews, where all decisions of 
                                                          
81  In this context closeness centrality can be interpreted as an inverse measure of influence in 
the decision process. 
82  Namely Top Advisor 1, Sub-Director (Temporary), Minister of S&T 2, Minister of S&T 1, 
scientific staff, Prime Minister 2, the international scientific community, and Prime Minister 1. 
83  Namely, the City Mayor, construction company, equipment company, National Scientific 
Community 1, National Scientific Community 2, secondary schools, and other academia. 
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INL required previous discussions, which were sometimes long and 
complex, due to the international character of the laboratory (I24, I25 
and I26). 
The core-periphery structure is another network characteristic similar in 
spirit to centralization of the network.
84
 Core-periphery structures are 
commonly found in social network data, and have important implications 
for the functioning of networks. FIgure A.3 (in Annex 2 – Supplementary 
figures) reveals that a central core and a periphery exist in the network of 
decision of INL. The core (labelled 1) was comprised of the Ministers of 
S&T of the two countries, their top advisors and INL’s directors. The 
periphery (labelled 2) contained the remaining actors of the network.
85
 It is 
interesting to note that both Prime Minister 1 and Prime Minister 2 are part 
of the periphery of the decision process. In fact, according to the interviews 
held for the INL case, both prime ministers were mostly involved in the 
formal decision of the INL (I23, I24, I25, I26 and CI2).  
Cohesive subgroups could be interesting for further understanding the 
functioning of a network. In fact, some actors in subgroups interact more 
with each other than they do with actors who are not in the subgroup. 
These types of subgroups often share common ideals, goals and/or attrib-
utes and form factions within the network. Figure A.4 (in Annex 2 – 
Supplementary figures) reveals the existence of four factions in the net-
work. These factions appeared to be formed sharing common attributes in 
the decision process. The first faction is composed of those who played a 
minor role and were less relevant actors/groups in the decision-making 
process, those being the city mayor, secondary schools and the other 
scientists excluded from the process. The second faction comprises exclu-
sively scientific actors/groups, which have a common interest in nanotech-
nology: National Scientific Community 1, National Scientific Community 2 
                                                          
84  Measures of the core-periphery of a network result essentially by comparing the network 
with an idealized model (Borgatti, Martin, and Johnson 2013). 
85  Namely, Prime Minister 1, Prime Minister 2, City Mayor, construction company, equip-
ment company, National Scientific Community 1, National Scientific Community 2, the 
international scientific community, scientific staff, secondary schools, and other academia. 
4.3  How are indicators used? 
155 
and the Scientific staff of INL. The third faction was made up of those who 
triggered the decision-making process and launch of the INL project: the 
prime ministers and the minister of science of the two countries. And the 




Similarly to the Mobi.E case, this social network analysis expanded the 
comprehension of the organizational context of the decision-making 
process. In fact, it penetrated, mapped actors and relationships and made 
explicit the organizational processes of decision that led to INL. Further-
more, social network analysis provided empirically validated indicators of 
structure, cohesion and shape of the network and individual actors. The 
case study allowed for an analysis with objective measures about decision 
makers’ links in a network organized by project, which – as in the Mobi.E 
case - evolved organically to implement a policy decision to create a 
nanotechnology laboratory. 
Process of construction of evidence 
The rationale put forward to support the decision to create the INL required 
evidence demonstrating its relevance to society and science. Some evi-
dence existed about the international investments in nanotechnology, 
particularly in the USA but also at the EU level (Roco et al. 2000; Roco 
and Bainbridge 2003; Morrison 2005; Hullmann 2006). Previously a group 
of influential actors in the USA prepared evidence to support the approval 
of congress of a significant initiative in nanotechnology. Other countries in 
Europe followed and collected further evidence to support their invest-
ments, such as The Netherlands. The history of the Dutch engagement with 
nanotechnologies, as an important issue for consideration in society, 
politics and policymakers, had a prime mover: the Rathenau Institute. A 
report from this technology assessment institute gathered evidence and 
promoted the nanotechnologies debate on the public agenda, though with-
out any explicit positive or negative undertone (Bijker 2014). 
                                                          
86  Namely, the Top advisor 1, Top advisor 2, Director, Sub-Director, Sub-Director (Tempo-
rary), Construction company, Equipment company, and International scientific community. 
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There were significant differences in the collection of evidence in Spain 
and Portugal. At the time, Spain was preparing to negotiate significant 
investments in this research area. Detailed studies prior to the decision 
were conducted to determine the activities and necessities in the field and 
to map and improve technical skills and infrastructures in the following 
period of 2005-2010. An extensive study published in a book included 
quantified indicators at the regional, national and European level (Correia, 
Hernández, and Domingo 2004). The extensive study, based on question-
naires sent to research teams across the country, systematized the following 
indicators of nanotechnology activities: (a) cost of research projects, 
existing equipment and skills needed to develop them; (b) number of 
researchers and technicians and their skills; (c) lists of existent equipment 
in each laboratory; and (d) future projects and skills required to operate 
equipment (ordered and that might be ordered in future). Furthermore, 
Spain produced other (public) reports framing the investments in nanotech-
nology within the S&T system (Comisión Interministerial de Ciencia y 
Tecnología 2005a; Comisión Interministerial de Ciencia y Tecnología 
2005b). At the time, investments were planned for six Spanish laboratories 
(INL Technical Committee 2006). To the central government, the INL was 
part of a larger set of investments that needed to be negotiated with the 
Spanish regions, their research communities and later with Portugal. These 
negotiations required evidence that could be introduced in the assessment 
of the situation and the distribution of the investments. 
Portugal collected less evidence to support its decision. The country did not 
produce studies on nanotechnology area, despite concomitant investments 
in two new associate laboratories. The government collected indicators 
related to the costs associated to the planning, building and maintenance of 
the Iberian laboratory, according to three policy makers.
87
 The technical 
committee collected elements to map the existing research groups and their 
activities in the country (INL Technical Committee 2006).  
                                                          
87  The city council also ceded for free the property during the next 50 years. 
4.3  How are indicators used? 
157 
The needs to justify the investments in Portugal were lower than in Spain. 
On one side, the Spanish government had to negotiate investments in 
nanotechnology with its powerful regions and organized research commu-
nities. On the other side of the border, negotiations within Portugal were 
less demanding given its historical existential threats with Spain, the need 
to cooperate with other scientific networks, its small scientific system and 
loose nanotechnology community. Furthermore, the investment in the 
Iberian laboratory was concomitant with two investments in nanotechnolo-
gy associated laboratories.
88
 The government funded an associate laborato-
ry gathering the groups working in the Universidade Técnica de Lisboa and 
Universidade do Porto, and the other to the remaining working in Univer-
sidade do Minho, University Nova de Lisboa and Universidade de Aveiro. 
According to a researcher in the field, however, the creation of the Iberian 
laboratory led to long-term unfair distribution of positions and control of 
funds within this community. In addition, an academic from other field 
stated that there was also a weak involvement of the general scientific 
community beyond the specific scientific area, which appears to justify 
their general alienation from the project. 
Last, this research showed two unexpected results. First, findings revealed 
that the relational knowledge between Iberian ministers and with EU 
administrators was important to understand the way laboratory was initially 
conceived. Significant relations existed in Brussels that helped the 
laboratory to use regional and cross border EU funds, according to 
interviewees. A second unexpected finding relates to the fact that no 
studies were found in both countries that demonstrated an explicit 
opportunity of investing in nanotechnology and nanoscience versus other 
scientific areas. In fact, the justifications detected were based on the argu-
ment that the USA and other developed countries were investing in this 
research area. However, the same argument is also true for other research 
areas. 
                                                          
88  The Institute for Nanotechnology (IN) and the Institute for Nanomaterials, Nanosciences, 
and Nanotechnologies (I3N) 
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4.3.3.3 Comparative analysis of the social networks 
The social networks identified in the case studies can be further compared 
at the network and the individual level. The following table presents a 
comparison between the most relevant parameters of cohesion found in 
Mobi.E and INL’s social networks at network level.
89
 
Table 4.16: Comparison between parameters of network cohesion of Mobi.E and INL 
 
Table 4.16 reveals two main features regarding the characteristics of the 
networks. First, the Mobi.E network was more centralized than the INL. In 
fact, the measure of network centralization of Mobi.E was higher than the 
INL (0,538 vs. 0,426). A comparison of the Mobi.E and INL networks 
indicated higher values of density (0,253 vs. 0,268), connectedness (0,716 
vs. 0,889) and compactness (0,471 vs. 0,556). Therefore, at network level, 
the differences between cohesion measures suggest differences between the 
social networks. These measures are in line with other qualitative findings. 
Five interviewees pointed to the centralized nature of the Mobi.E decision 
process to tightly control the policy (I13, I21, I22 and I25). Furthermore, 
three interviewees mentioned the intensive nature of the negotiations 
undergone to reach agreements between the two countries during INL’s 
decision process (I24, I25 and I26). The negotiations required the inclusion 
of more well-connected actors to allow the development of the decision 
and to prevent delays (I24 and I25). Therefore, results are aligned with the 
idea that the two networks have different orientations: one to control the 
process and the other to negotiate. 
                                                          
89  As mentioned previously, the social network analyses were elaborated using UCINET 6 for 
Windows (Borgatti, Everett, and Freeman 2002). 
Mobi-E INL Δ
Centralization 0,538 0,426 0,112
Density 0,253 0,268 -0,015
Connectedness 0,716 0,889 -0,173
Compactness 0,471 0,556 -0,085
4.3  How are indicators used? 
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At the individual level two measures allow a comparison between actors in 
the networks: Eigenvector centrality and betweeness. The following table 
presents these normalized individual measures of Mobi.E and INL net-
works. 
Table 4.17: Individual eigenvector centrality and betweeness and their normalized values in 











Prime Minister 0,204 5% 2,444 2%
Consultancy company 1 0,379 10% 16,290 16%
Advisor of the Prime Minister 0,454 12% 54,154 52%
Advisor of the Minister of S&T 0,126 3% 6,150 6%
Secretary of State of S&T 0,042 1% 0,000 0%
Minister of S&T 0,159 4% 8,967 9%
Electric component company 1 0,281 7% 1,144 1%
Software company 1 0,281 7% 1,144 1%
Power company 0,281 7% 1,144 1%
Software company 2 0,281 7% 1,144 1%
Electric component company 2 0,222 6% 0,000 0%
Consultant company 2 0,151 4% 0,375 0%
EV Association 0,000 0% 0,000 0%
Excluded company 1 0,000 0% 0,000 0%
Excluded company 2 0,000 0% 0,000 0%
R&D laboratory on EV 0,160 4% 0,000 0%
Advisor of the Minister of Economy 0,247 7% 6,527 6%
Minister of Economy 0,186 5% 1,367 1%
Secretary of State of Innovation 0,200 5% 3,150 3%
Advisor of Secretary of State of Innovation 0,133 4% 0,000 0%
Prime Minister 1 0,088 2% 1,000 1%
Minister of S&T 1 0,163 4% 3,819 3%
Top advisor 1 0,279 8% 9,795 8%
Prime Minister 2 0,105 3% 1,786 2%
Minister of S&T 2 0,219 6% 5,486 5%
Top advisor 2 0,347 9% 18,052 16%
City Mayor 0,105 3% 0,000 0%
Director 0,426 12% 32,369 28%
Sub-Director 0,433 12% 29,826 26%
Sub-Director (Temporary) 0,307 8% 9,050 8%
Construction company 0,188 5% 0,000 0%
Equipment company 0,188 5% 0,000 0%
National scientific community 1 0,104 3% 0,000 0%
National scientific community 2 0,105 3% 0,000 0%
International scientific community 0,274 7% 1,367 1%
Scientific staff 0,216 6% 3,450 3%
Secondary schools 0,139 4% 0,000 0%
Other academia 0,000 0% 0,000 0%
Mobi-E
INL
4  Results 
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Table 4.17 shows two main individual features in the networks formed for 
these decisions. First, they are both centralized in two decision makers. In 
fact, there is almost the same normalized Eigenvector centrality around the 
prime decision makers of the two networks: 12% for the Advisor to the 
Prime Minister and 10% for Consultancy company 1 in the Mobi.E case 
study; and 12% each for the Director and Sub-Director in the INL case 
study. The control of flow of information is significantly concentrated in 
one decision maker in the Mobi.E network, but distributed among three 
actors in the INL case. In fact, there is a higher concentration of be-
tweeness in the Advisor to the Prime Minister (52%) in the Mobi.E net-
work, and relatively more distributed betweeness in the Director (28%), 
Sub-Director (26%) and Top Advisor 2 (16%) in the INL case. Therefore, 
the two networks were centred in two decision makers, and the flows of 
information were more controlled in the Mobi.E case and less in the INL 
network. 
In sum, the results of the social network analyses suggest the existence of 
two different networks formed by a project (a decision) with diverse roles 
amongst the main actors. First, the Mobi.E case revealed a close interaction 
between companies and policymakers in a cohesive small network. The 
network shape was normally centralized in its middle and significantly 
centred in the Advisor to the Prime Minister and Consultancy company 1. 
The network was also closed shortly around its centre, and significantly 
dependent on the Advisor to the Prime Minister, and actors distant from the 
core had difficulties accessing information about decisions. Second, the 
INL case revealed a small cohesive network of policymakers and scientists, 
centralized in two actors (i.e. Director, Sub-Director) and exhibiting a flow 
of information distributed among three main actors (i.e. Director and Sub-
Director and Top advisor 2). To conclude, it can be argued that the social 
network analyses expanded the comprehension of the organizational 
context of these two decisions. They improved the description gathered 
through interviews and allowed a comparison between the two networks, 
by depicting a spatial visualization of the actors and their relationships and 
by providing measures to compare the structure, cohesion and shape of the 
networks to understand the role of indicators. 
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5 Conclusions and discussion  
It was important to conduct research about the role of indicators to expand 
the understanding of decisions of technology innovation. Literature review 
detected a gap in knowledge about the role of indicators in these decisions, 
both in the innovation and technology assessment literature. Existing 
knowledge was limited to three cases of policies of sustainable develop-
ment, indicating a minor influential role of indicators in the decisions. 
Furthermore, the gap in knowledge is significantly important to technology 
assessment studies. In fact, indicators are critical to produce sound TA 
studies and to practitioners in this field, where the selection procedure of 
indicators needs to be as transparent and as thoughtful as possible. Insights 
into the policy process can also help professionals understand differences 
between policy, business and research processes. Thus, there was the need 
to expand the literature to include other innovation areas and actors and to 
focus on technology innovation with an emphasis on policy-making. 
Research needed to disentangle use from the influence of indicators, to 
determine their role, and to study how indicators were used in these deci-
sions. The latter involved the test of four possible explanatory factors: the 
type, phase of decision and the context and process of construction of 
evidence. 
The use and influence of indicators were identified in decision-making of 
technology innovation. This quantification effort was necessary to contex-
tualize and differentiate, for the first time, the extent of the use and the 
influence of indicators in this type of decision. Results showed that the use 
of indicators in these decisions is significantly high (84%), although 
slightly differentiated in each group: the vast majority of policymakers use 
indicators (92%), followed closely by business R&D&I leaders (89%), and 
then by researchers (71%). However, social relations were more important 
than indicators to the majority of decision makers (59%). These results 
were mostly emphasized by policymakers (68%) and business R&D&I 
leaders (59%), although half of the researchers (50%) considered indicators 
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as important as social influences. The gaps between use and influence of 
indicators suggest that researchers are more influenced by indicators than 
business R&D&I leaders and, to a significant extent, more than policymak-
ers. These findings confirmed that the use of indicators is different from 
their influence, as suggested by Gudmundsson and Sørensen (2012). The 
gaps between use and influence also suggest differences in the decision 
processes of these three groups. Furthermore, results revealed that the most 
important influence in these decisions came from hierarchies, knowledge 
sources and users of technology. The influence of hierarchies was empha-
sized by policymakers and business R&D&I leaders; the links to 
knowledge were most relevant to researchers and, to a lesser extent, poli-
cymakers; and the influence of users was significantly relevant to research-
ers and business R&D&I leaders. Therefore, it can be argued that there is a 
high use of indicators in these decisions in contrast with their real influ-
ence, suggesting that political-behavioural methods were involved in the 
decisions, and centred on hierarchies, knowledge-based contacts and users. 
The results suggest that indicators do not play a very significant role in 
decisions of technology innovation. There are three main reasons for this: 
First, indicators had mostly a symbolic role among policymakers (63%) 
and a limited instrumental role (29%). These results are in line with find-
ings of Gudmundsson and Sørensen (2012), where policy indicators had a 
very limited direct instrumental role. However, present findings disagree 
with the widespread non-use of indicators in policy-making, mentioned by 
MacRae (1985). In fact, only a minority of policymakers (8%) revealed 
that indicators had no role in their decisions. Second, business R&D&I 
leaders presented a similar but less emphatic pattern. For them, indicators 
mostly had a symbolic role in the decisions (53%) and a limited instrumen-
tal role (36%). Results suggest that the company’s culture was a factor 
influencing the role of indicators in the decisions. These results are in 
accordance with the literature reviewed, where company culture influences 
innovation decisions. Third, the role of indicators for researchers was 
different. Researchers shown that indicators could play, almost equally, an 
instrumental (35%) and symbolic (35%) role, as well as no role at all (29%) 
in their decisions. In sum, results suggest that indicators play mostly 
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symbolic roles in decisions of policymakers and business R&D&I leaders, 
but their role with researchers can be more differentiated. 
Other results about the role of indicators revealed that, despite their prob-
lems, they are valued by those working with innovation studies and tech-
nology assessment. Indicators have limitations that need consideration: 
using indicators is an option that implies dealing with what is possible to 
measure; they limit the perception of reality with restricted reliability; and 
they can lead to abuse or misinterpretation of data. These limitations are in 
line with the potential of indicators for deceptiveness that should not be 
underestimated, as described in subchapter 2.1. Chris Freeman (1995) 
mentioned that the use of indicators was misleading, for example, when 
trying to understand the Japanese economic miracle of the 1980s. Further-
more, in line with literature discussed, policymakers and experts agreed 
that the selection of indicators in innovation policy and technology assess-
ment studies is very sensitive. In fact, the decision to use one indicator 
instead of another is relevant to policy-making because it can capture a 
single-sided view of a more complex reality. These sometimes controver-
sial decisions need, therefore, to be transparent and as consensual as 
possible among actors, stakeholders and in society to reduce room for 
randomness when making a choice. The best solution is to measure what is 
possible knowing the limits of indicators, and present what is conceivable 
given those limits. In addition, the selection process of indicators can entail 
options that are not neutral, trivial or conscious. In fact, their selection can 
create an implicit and sometimes controversial space for “politics” in 
studies that support decision-making, as mentioned in subchapter 2.1. The 
criteria for selecting indicators may be based on policy relevance, utility, 
analytical soundness and measurability (OECD 2003). However, results 
suggest that they can also be based on other (sub)conscious factors that can 
lead to controversies. In the policy arena, a technology assessment study 
needs a clear formulation of the initial problem to enable a transparent 
selection of indicators to describe the problem. Thus, it can be argued that 
in controversial topics reports should include a detailed description of the 
decisions regarding inclusion and exclusion of indicators and reflection on 
possible consequences. In sum, indicators can be helpful to conduct a 
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reasonable interpretation of data and to balance options in technology 
assessments studies, when contextualised, described in detail and with a 
reflection about the options made. 
Results suggest that the type of decision can be an explanatory factor to 
understand the way indicators are involved in decisions of technology 
innovation. In fact, interviewees confirmed that each type of decision 
requires indicators in different ways. Survey results showed heterogeneous 
patterns of roles (between instrumental, symbolic and no role) in acquisi-
tion of equipment/technology and development of product/technology; and 
by contrast policy-making was significantly aligned with the symbolic role. 
Results also showed that the type of indicators varies by type of decision: 
acquisition and development decisions presented the same pattern: tech-
nical characteristics, costs and partners; policy referenced costs, technical 
characteristics an availability of information. Therefore, results suggest that 
the type of decision can help explain the way indicators are involved in 
decisions of technology innovation, particularly by differentiating policy-
making activities from the other types of decision. 
The phase of decision is an explanatory factor to how indicators are used in 
decisions of technology innovation. Interviews confirmed two important 
moments - before and after the decision - and these moments included a 
preliminary evaluation of the potential benefits of the decision in terms of 
knowledge, competitiveness and/or political assessments. The decision 
process can include political-behavioural methods before and/or after the 
final decision. They may include discussion, negotiation, networking, 
consensus-building and/or other social activities. The decision process can 
also involve rational-analytical methods before and/or after the final 
decision, such as collection of indicators, other evidence and/or other 
analyses. Furthermore, survey results showed that the use of indicators 
before making a decision was intensive in all types of decision, although 
less expressive in policy design. After the decision, there was one homoge-
nous pattern in acquisitions of equipment/technology and two heterogene-
ous patterns among policy design and development of product/technology. 
Hence, the phase is an explanatory factor to how indicators are introduced 
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in these decisions. In fact, they clearly distinguished two phases detected in 
all type of decisions, as well as two other phases that can be used to com-
plement the decision process and where indicators can be involved. 
The results suggest that the context of the decision and the process of 
construction of evidence are relevant factors to explain how indicators are 
involved in the decision process (Hypotheses 5 and 6). The case studies 
allowed a separation between the context and process of construction of 
evidence, as well as an identification of the methods used to decide in these 
policy processes: 
 The case studies were useful for revealing the importance of the 
context to understand how indicators were used in the decision pro-
cess. Mobi.E was created in the context of a governmental dynamic 
and a favourable economic environment conducive to new technologi-
cal developments and renewable-oriented investments. The decision 
process was also pushed by a group of companies associated with the 
government in order to promote electric mobility. The decision to cre-
ate the INL resulted from an external context of increased investments 
in nanotechnology research. The organizational process included a 
creation of a bilateral technical committee with scientists to implement 
the INL project. The strategy was influenced by international scientific 
advisors and by two experts hired to define an organizational and legal 
framework.  
 The analyses of the social networks were useful to map and understand 
the relationships organized to support the decision processes. In fact, 
the maps of the networks and their measures completed the description 
of each network by showing an organization engaged by project (a de-
cision), and allowed a comparison between them: the Mobi.E case re-
vealed a close interaction between a small cohesive network of com-
panies and policymakers, significantly centred on two actors - mainly 
the Advisor to the Prime Minister and also Consultancy company 1 – 
information being significantly controlled by the former; the INL case 
revealed a small cohesive network centralized in two actors (i.e. Direc-
tor and Sub-Director), but with a distributed flow of information based 
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on three actors. In addition, the two cases had both an internal and ex-
ternal social dynamic influencing the decisions. It included no more 
than two groups of actors in the innovation system, who managed the 
social process occurring behind the scenes: in the Mobi.E case, rela-
tionships in a public-private network grew to implement a centralized 
execution plan; in the INL case, a negotiation network was built to 
reach swift agreements between two governments and researchers. In 
sum, the actors formed relationships that grew organically using a 
combination of different methods to implement a decision. Therefore, 
the cases revealed two different contexts determined by conducive po-
litical and economic environments, and promoted by two or three in-
ternal actors in the centre of the networks of the decision.  
 The findings from the case studies revealed a different process of 
construction of evidence. In the Mobi.E case, the need for the pro-
gramme was significantly based on an indicator of penetration rates of 
EVs in 2020. Other evidence existed and was ignored. Further evi-
dence was solicited to think-tanks, and controversies occurred during 
the decision process. In the INL case, the evidence was collected to 
different depths by each country: Portugal mapped existing research 
activities in the area ad hoc; and Spain collected extensively indicators 
and other evidence to negotiate the distribution of investments with 
various regions and the nanotechnology community. Both countries 
lacked comprehensive evidence to justify the concentration of invest-
ment in the field of nanotechnology and nanoscience. Therefore, most 
evidence was collected to provide a rationale for existing policy deci-
sions, although there was an exception in Spain where indicators pre-
existed the decision to create the INL. 
The different use of evidence is in line with the literature in two ways: 
First, Flitcroft et al. (2011) signalled an abundance of possibilities for 
evidence use: in one extreme, evidence can be strictly identified with 
scientific outputs; at the other end of the spectrum, evidence can be the 
subjective selection of the available information introduced in an ar-
gument to persuade about the truthness or falsity of a statement. The 
collection of objective indicators in Spain reveals a use closer to scien-
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tific outputs, whereas the use of the indicator of market penetration in 
2020 reveals a use closer to persuasion. Second, the findings agreed 
with the literature stating that the strength and quality of evidence can 
also be related to the number of controversies that it goes through dur-
ing its lifetime (Sébastien and Bauler 2013). In fact, the indicator of 
penetration in the Mobi.E case lost much of its strength with the con-
troversies that it went through since its creation. Therefore, these cases 
argue for a broad use of evidence while also pointing to their decrease 
in strength due to controversies. To conclude, Hypothesis 6 was con-
firmed: The process of construction of evidence helps to explain how 
indicators are used in decisions of technology innovation. 
Results about the context and the process of construction of evidence 
also revealed that the role of indicators and other evidence did not par-
ticularly increase when business engineers (with Bachelor’s and Mas-
ter’s degrees) and academic scientists (with PhDs) turned into policy-
makers. In fact, despite their qualifications, these decision makers were 
not particularly engaged in deeper quests for indicators or other evi-
dence than what they needed to support their decisions. These findings 
appear to contradict the Musso and Francioni (2012) idea that the edu-
cational level is significantly relevant to the decision maker’s re-
sponse. Alternatively, the results appear to be in line with the literature 
that described contextual situations as an important factor influencing 
the role of indicators and evidence: Perri 6 (2002) argued that the situ-
ations in which policymakers find themselves shape the information 
that is selected from the complex set available, and which evidence is 
rejected or at least downplayed. However, the exception to this was the 
Spanish collection of indicators found in the INL case, where indica-
tors played a more instrumental role in discussing investments. This 
suggests that the legitimacy of policy arguments in an adversarial poli-
cy context (i.e. governmental negotiations with the regions for invest-
ments) depends on the ability of actors to present persuasive analytical 
evidence, as Sébastien, Bauler, and Lehtonen (2014) recently pro-
posed. In adversarial contexts, policymakers are more likely to use 
harder analytical indicators, closer to the concept of scientific evi-
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dence, than in a more consensual policy decision. Therefore, Hypothe-
ses 5 was confirmed: The context helps to explain how indicators were 
used in the decisions of technology innovation. 
 Last, the two case studies also detected the existence of all three 
approaches to decision-making, further describing how indicators were 
used in decisions of technology innovation. As discussed in subchapter 
2.1, approaches reveal the main type of thinking dominating attention 
of individuals during the decisions. In the Mobi.E case, networking ac-
tivities were conducted by government and businesses to lead to a pos-
itive judgment about the necessity for this policy. This procedure re-
veals a predominant political-behavioural approach combined with an 
emotional-intuitive decision. Afterwards, the actors involved in the de-
cision process needed to collect evidence to create a rationale for the 
decision. This activity reveals a rational-analytical approach in the de-
cision process. Furthermore, in the INL case a judgement was first 
made about the interest in creating a laboratory, which led to consulta-
tions and thereafter to formal negotiation activities between two gov-
ernments and researchers. These behaviours reveal a predominant po-
litical-behavioural approach combined with emotional-intuitive 
elements. On different occasions, both governments collected evidence 
to “rationalize” their decisions. These behaviours capture a rational-
analytical approach in the decision process. Therefore, the two case 
studies revealed the presence of all approaches during their decision 
processes with different emphases, which resemble muddling through 
approaches. These findings suggest that while innovation policy deci-
sions may include elements of rational thinking, they are also based on 
other methods supportive of the political process. 
In sum, the context and the processes of construction of evidence helped 
explain the way indicators and other evidence are involved in decisions of 
technology innovation. First, the analysis of the political, economic and 
organizational settings revealed the importance of the contextual situation 
of the decision makers. More importantly, the use of persuasive analytical 
evidence appears to be related with the adversity of the policy context. 
Second, the process of construction of evidence revealed that evidence and 
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indicators were brought to decision processes according to their availability 
and capacity to support the different interests of the actors and the stake-
holders. It also revealed that the process of construction of evidence in 
policy decisions is significantly different from the scientific process. This 
is particularly relevant to technology assessment professionals who need to 
engage in both processes, at least. In addition, the process of construction 
of evidence revealed the combination of three approaches during the 
decision processes. The rational-analytical approach signalled the use of 
evidence and indicators in the decision process; while the others suggested 
that there is space to employ other methods by technology assessment 
professionals. 
To conclude, this work intended to understand the phenomenon of deci-
sions of technology innovation through the lenses of the role of indicators. 
It can be said that this angle of research contributed to improving the 
knowledge base of their role in these decisions. In fact, these lenses 
brought to light the use, influence and role of indicators as well as the main 
factors affecting their involvement in these decisions. Furthermore, the 
quantification of their use and influence is important to this new field of 
research. It is a starting point to contextualize the extent of their real 
influence in decision-making, particularly in the context of increasing 
societal calls to involve evidence in the decisions. In addition, this angle 
showed that indicators are one tool among others to support decisions of 
technology innovation. In fact, their relatively minor instrumental role 
suggests that they are mostly a complementary instrument of decision. 
When used relevantly, indicators can support a decision, but there are other 
significant influences that need to be taken into account to understand the 
role they play, such as the social relations of the decision makers and their 
emotional-intuitive decisions. 
Last, it is important to reflect on the limitations of these results. In fact, 
although some interviews were conducted in other European countries, a 
significant part of the results were centred in Portugal. This focus relied on 
the assumption that the behaviour of these innovation actors is not signifi-
cantly bounded by national or geographic characteristics. However, it can 
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be argued that at least in policy processes (and possibly in business) some 
differences can be expected in other countries, where cultures and other 
social and contextual settings might affect the process of decisions. For 
example, the use of indicators in policy-making was differentiated in the 
INL case, precisely due to different national contexts. Therefore, it could 
be interesting to compare these results with other countries/regions.  
Comparative results could detect variations in the role of indicators in  
these decisions, for instance, in highly industrialized countries/regions  
such as Germany/Rhine valley, the USA/Silicon Valley/Boston area and  
even Japan. 
There are also other aspects that could be developed in the future. It could 
be interesting to study other variables of decision-making not taken into 
account in this research, such as personality traits, decision styles of the 
decision maker and competence of the decision maker. It might also be 
interesting to compare gender differences with other national/regional 
contexts where female presence in innovation groups is larger (see female 
presence in the samples in Table A.4 in Annex 3 – Supplementary tables). 
Further, a comparative study with other groups not related to innovation 
(e.g. managers of low-tech industries, clerks, farmers) could contribute to a 
better understanding of the role played by uncertainty and complexity in 
decisions of technology innovation. It could be interesting to compare 
results on property rights with other innovation systems. Present results 
suggest that the reduced number of decisions about property rights are most 
probably related to characteristics of the Portuguese innovation system 
(which is in line with the findings of Laranja 2009 and Vieira and Fiolhais 
2015). A comparative study with other innovation systems might reveal 
contrasting decision-making characteristics and, even, open up new policy 
options. Fifth and last, the experience collected during this research points 
to the need to establish a network to reflect on indicators for TA. In fact, 
the use of indicators in TA exercises present specific challenges, such as a 
sensitive selection procedure of indicators, the need to understand political 
and business processes connected to TA, and the development of multidis-
ciplinary research. This present work was the first to address specifically 
the use of indicators from a TA perspective. During the course of this 
5  Conclusions and discussion 
171 
research several scientists revealed the need to discuss the difficulties felt 
when developing their TA topics, because indicators in TA are critical and 





. Therefore, it can be argued that there is interest to 
promote discussion and a larger knowledge-base about indicators for TA 
among experts working in this field. 
                                                          
1  EU-Spri Forum is the acronym of “European Forum for Studies of Policies for Research 
and Innovation”. The forum aims to strengthen interdisciplinary community of researchers 
focusing on interdisciplinary dimensions related to policy and governance in the field of 
knowledge creation and innovation. 
2  ENID is the acronym of “European Network of Indicator Developers”. The network aims to 
promote the cooperation between institutions and individuals engaged in designing, con-
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Questionnaire of the researchers group 
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Questionnaire of the business 
R&D&I leaders group 
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Questionnaire of the policymakers group  
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Table A.4: Number and distribution of individuals and females that answer the question-
naires by group 
 
  
Individuals % Individual %
Researchers 28 36% 78 100%
Business R&D&I 18 32% 57 100%
Policy makers 5 8% 59 100%
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Input dataset:  
Dataset (C:\Users\yd4063\Dropbox\Ucinet\Mobi.E\6th time\Dataset 
Output dataset:  
Dataset-coh (C:\Users\yd4063\Dropbox\Ucinet\Mobi.E\6th time\Dataset-coh 
Ignore direction of ties:  
NO (C:\Users\yd4063\Dropbox\Ucinet\Mobi.E\6th time\NO 
Ignore reflexive ties:  
YES (C:\Users\yd4063\Dropbox\Ucinet\Mobi.E\6th time\YES 
Measures 
  Network Cohesion Measures 
1 Avg Degree 4,800 
2 H-Index 6,000 
3 Centralization 0,538 
4 Density 0,253 
5 Components 4,000 
6 Component Ratio 0,158 
7 Connectedness 0,716 
8 Fragmentation 0,284 
9 Closure 0,542 
10 Avg Distance 1,765 
11 SD Distance 0,656 
12 Diameter 4,000 
13 Breadth 0,529 
14 Compactness 0,471 
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For symmetric matrices, Centralization is Freeman's degree centralization. 
For non-symmetric matrices, Centralization is indegree centralization. 
WARNING: Network is disconnected. Distance-based measures are 
calculated within components. 
----------------------------------------- 
Running time: 00:00:01 seconds. 
Output generated: 16 Okt 14 21:58:45 
Ucinet Log 2 – Multiple Centrality 
Measures Mobi.E 
MULTIPLE CENTRALITY MEASURES 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
Input dataset: 




Treat data as: Auto-detect 
Type of scores to output: Raw scores 
Undefined dist in closeness: replace with max dist + 1 
Network Dataset is directed?  NO 
Value of Beta was: 0,147231313784649  
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Ucinet Log 3 – Core-Periphery Mobi.E 
SIMPLE CORE/PERIPHERY MODEL 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
Input dataset:  
Dataset (C:\Users\yd4063\Dropbox\Ucinet\Mobi.E\6th time\Dataset) 
Type of data: Positive 
Fitness measure: CORR 
Density of core-to-periphery ties:  
Number of iterations: 50 




Output clusters:  
CoreClasses (C:\Users\yd4063\Dropbox\Ucinet\Mobi.E\6th 
time\CoreClasses) 
Starting fitness:  0.789 
Final fitness:  0.789 
Core/Periphery Class Memberships: 
1: Prime Minister Consultancy company 1 Advisor of Prime Minister 
Advisor of the Minister of Economy Minister of Economy Secretary of 
State of Innovation 
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2: Advisor of the Minister of S&T Secretary of State of S&T Minister of 
S&T Electric component company 1 Software company 1 Power 
company Software company 2 Electric component company 2 
Consultant company 2 EV Association Excluded company 1 Excluded 
company 2 R&D laboratory on EV Advisor of Secretary of State of 
Innovation 
Blocked Adjacency Matrix 
                                                  
-------------------------------------------- 
Density matrix 
            1     2 
        ----- ----- 
    1   2.133 0.536 
    2   0.536 0.143 
 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2
1 2 3 9 7 8 5 6 4 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0
P C A S A M S M A S E C E E E R E S P A
--- - -- -- -- --- - -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- ---
1 Prime Minister | 2 3 3 3 | 2 |
2 Consultancy company 1 | 2 3 2 | 3 3 2 3 3 3 3 |
3 Advisor of Prime Minister | 3 3 3 3 2 | 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 |
19 Secretary of State of Innovation | 3 3 2 3 | 1 3 |
17 Advisor of the Minister of Economy | 2 3 2 3 | 1 1 3 |
18 Minister of Economy | 3 2 3 3 | 1 |
- --- - -- -- -- --- - -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --- -
5 Secretary of State of S&T | | 1 1 |
6 Minister of S&T | 2 1 1 | 1 1 |
4 Advisor of the Minister of S&T | 1 1 | 1 1 |
10 Software company 2 | 3 1 | 1 1 1 1 |
11 Electric component company 2 | 3 | 1 1 1 1 |
12 Consultant company 2 | 2 1 1 | |
13 EV Association | | |
14 Excluded company 1 | | |
15 Excluded company 2 | | |
16 R&D laboratory on EV | 3 1 1 | |
7 Electric component company 1 | 3 1 | 1 1 1 1 |
8 Software company 1 | 3 2 | 1 1 1 1 |
9 Power company | 3 2 | 1 1 1 1 |
20 Advisor of Secretary of State of Innovation | 3 3 3 | |
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Partition saved as dataset               
CorePartition (C:\Users\yd4063\Dropbox\Ucinet\Mobi.E\6th 
time\CorePartition) 
Faction-by-actor indicator matrix saved as dataset CoreClasses 
(C:\Users\yd4063\Dropbox\Ucinet\Mobi.E\6th time\CoreClasses) 
---------------------------------------- 
Running time:  00:00:01 
Output generated:  16 Okt 14 22:11:45 
UCINET 6.528 Copyright (c) 1992-2012 Analytic Technologies 
Ucinet Log 4 – Factions Mobi.E 
FACTIONS 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
Number of factions: 3 
Measure of fit: Hamming 
Input dataset:                           
Dataset (C:\Users\yd4063\Dropbox\Ucinet\Mobi.E\6th time\Dataset) 
Initial proportion correct:  0.732 
... Badness of fit:  76.000 
... Badness of fit:  76.000 
... Badness of fit:  76.000 
Final proportion correct:  0.800 
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Group Assignments: 
1: Consultancy company 1 Electric component company 1 Software 
company 1 Power company Software company 2 Electric component 
company 2 
2:   Advisor of the Minister of S&T Secretary of State of S&T Minister of 
S&T EV Association Excluded company 1 Excluded company 2 
3:   Prime Minister Advisor of Prime Minister Consultant company 2 R&D 
laboratory on EV Advisor of the Minister of Economy Minister of 
Economy Secretary of State of Innovation Advisor of Secretary of State 
of Innovation 
Grouped Adjacency Matrix 
 
  
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2
1 2 8 9 0 7 6 3 4 5 5 4 1 2 3 6 7 8 9 0
E C S P S E M E A S E E P C A R A M S A
--- - -- -- -- --- - -- -- -- -- -- --- - -- --- - -- -- -- -- ---
11 Electric component company 2 | 3 1 1 1 1 | | |
2 Consultancy company 1 | 3 3 3 3 3 | | 2 2 3 3 2 |
8 Software company 1 | 1 3 1 1 1 | | 2 |
9 Power company | 1 3 1 1 1 | | 2 |
10 Software company 2 | 1 3 1 1 1 | | 1 |
7 Electric component company 1 | 1 3 1 1 1 | | 1 |
- --- - -- -- -- --- - -- -- -- -- -- --- - -- --- - -- -- -- -- --- -
6 Minister of S&T | | 1 1 | 2 1 1 |
13 EV Association | | | |
4 Advisor of the Minister of S&T | | 1 1 | 1 1 |
5 Secretary of State of S&T | | 1 1 | |
15 Excluded company 2 | | | |
14 Excluded company 1 | | | |
- --- - -- -- -- --- - -- -- -- -- -- --- - -- --- - -- -- -- -- --- -
1 Prime Minister | 2 | 2 | 3 3 3 |
12 Consultant company 2 | 2 | | 1 1 |
3 Advisor of Prime Minister | 3 2 2 1 1 | 1 1 | 3 1 1 3 2 3 3 |
16 R&D laboratory on EV | 3 | | 1 1 |
17 Advisor of the Minister of Economy | 2 | 1 | 3 1 3 2 3 |
18 Minister of Economy | | | 3 1 2 3 3 |
19 Secretary of State of Innovation | | 1 | 3 3 2 3 3 |
20 Advisor of Secretary of State of Innovation | | | 3 3 3 |




           1    2    3 
        ---- ---- ---- 
    1   1.67 0.00 0.38 
    2   0.00 0.20 0.13 
    3   0.38 0.13 1.36 
Partition saved as dataset               
FactionsPart 
(C:\Users\yd4063\Dropbox\Ucinet\Mobi.E\6th time\FactionsPart) 
Faction-by-actor indicator matrix saved as dataset FactionsSets 
(C:\Users\yd4063\Dropbox\Ucinet\Mobi.E\6th time\FactionsSets) 
---------------------------------------- 
Running time:  00:00:01 
Output generated:  17 Okt 14 12:18:31 
UCINET 6.528 Copyright (c) 1992-2012 Analytic Technologies  
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Ucinet Log 5 – Multiple Cohesion measures INL 
NETWORK COHESION 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
Input dataset:  
dataset (C:\Users\yd4063\Dropbox\Ucinet\INL\2nd time\dataset 
Output dataset:   
dataset-coh (C:\Users\yd4063\Dropbox\Ucinet\INL\2nd time\dataset-coh 
Ignore direction of ties: NO  
(C:\Users\yd4063\Dropbox\Ucinet\INL\2nd time\NO 
Ignore reflexive ties: YES 
(C:\Users\yd4063\Dropbox\Ucinet\INL\2nd time\YES 
Measures 
  Network cohesion Measures 
1 Avg Degree 4,556 
2 H-Index 5,000 
3 Centralization 0,426 
4 Density 0,268 
5 Components 2,000 
6 Component Ratio 0,059 
7 Connectedness 0,889 
8 Fragmentation 0,111 
9 Closure 0,425 
10 Avg Distance 1,853 
11 SD Distance 0,659 
12 Diameter 3,000 
13 Breadth 0,444 
14 Compactness 0,556 
 
14 rows, 1 columns, 1 levels. 
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For symmetric matrices, Centralization is Freeman's degree centralization. 
For non-symmetric matrices, Centralization is indegree centralization. 
WARNING: Network is disconnected. Distance-based measures are 
calculated within components. 
----------------------------------------- 
Running time: 00:00:01 seconds. 
Output generated: 16 Okt 14 14:31:11 
Ucinet Log 6 – Multiple Centrality measures INL 
MULTIPLE CENTRALITY MEASURES 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Input dataset:        
dataset (C:\Users\yd4063\Dropbox\Ucinet\INL\2nd time\dataset) 
Output dataset:                          
dataset-cent (C:\Users\yd4063\Dropbox\Ucinet\INL\2nd time\dataset-cent) 
Treat data as:                  Auto-detect 
Type of scores to output: Raw scores 
Undefined dist in closeness: replace with max dist + 1 
Network  is directed?  NO 
Value of Beta was:  0,160460242356343 





Running time:  00:00:01 
Output generated:  16 Okt 14 14:32:19 
UCINET 6.528 Copyright (c) 1992-2012 Analytic Technologies 
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Degree 2local BonPwr 2Step ARD Closenes Eigenvec Between 2StepBet
-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- --------
1 Prime Minister 1 3,000 13,000 405,277 8,000 8,167 41,000 0,088 1,000 1,000
2 Minister of S&T 1 4,000 25,000 746,921 14,000 9,667 34,000 0,163 3,819 1,583
3 Top advisor 1 6,000 42,000 1277,094 16,000 11,000 30,000 0,279 9,795 4,167
4 Prime Minister 2 3,000 16,000 483,005 10,000 8,500 39,000 0,105 1,786 1,000
5 Minister of S&T 2 5,000 33,000 1000,514 15,000 10,333 32,000 0,219 5,486 2,667
6 Top advisor 2 8,000 50,000 1585,636 16,000 12,000 28,000 0,347 18,052 9,750
7 City Mayor 2,000 15,000 481,980 10,000 8,000 40,000 0,105 0,000 0,000
8 Director 11,000 56,000 1947,055 16,000 13,500 25,000 0,426 32,369 23,000
9 Sub-Director 11,000 57,000 1982,915 16,000 13,500 25,000 0,433 29,826 21,417
10 Sub-Director (Temporary) 7,000 43,000 1405,637 15,000 11,333 30,000 0,307 9,050 5,750
11 Construction company 3,000 29,000 859,153 14,000 9,167 35,000 0,188 0,000 0,000
12 Equipment company 3,000 29,000 859,153 14,000 9,167 35,000 0,188 0,000 0,000
13 National scientific community 1 2,000 16,000 473,211 12,000 8,333 38,000 0,104 0,000 0,000
14 National scientific community 2 2,000 16,000 478,965 12,000 8,333 38,000 0,105 0,000 0,000
15 International scientific community 5,000 41,000 1253,744 16,000 10,500 31,000 0,274 1,367 0,667
16 Scientific staff 5,000 31,000 989,566 13,000 10,000 34,000 0,216 3,450 3,000
17 Secondary schools 2,000 22,000 632,604 13,000 8,500 37,000 0,139 0,000 0,000
18 Other academia 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 68,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
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Ucinet Log 7 – Core-Periphery INL 
SIMPLE CORE/PERIPHERY MODEL 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Input dataset:                           
dataset (C:\Users\yd4063\Dropbox\Ucinet\INL\2nd time\dataset) 
Type of data:               Positive 
Fitness measure:       CORR 
Density of core-to-periphery ties:       
Number of iterations:  50 
Population size:         100 
Output partition:                        
CorePartition  
(C:\Users\yd4063\Dropbox\Ucinet\INL\2nd time\CorePartition) 
Output clusters:                         
CoreClasses  
(C:\Users\yd4063\Dropbox\Ucinet\INL\2nd time\CoreClasses) 
Starting fitness:  0.668 
Final fitness:  0.671 
Core/Periphery Class Memberships: 
1: Minister of S&T 1 Top advisor 1 Minister of S&T 2 Top advisor 2 
Director Sub-Director Sub-Director (Temporary) 
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2: Prime Minister 1 Prime Minister 2 City Mayor Construction company 
Equipment company National scientific community 1 National 
scientific community 2 International scientific community Scientific 
staff Secondary schools Other academia 




            1     2 
        ----- ----- 
    1   1.619 0.506 
    2   0.506 0.109 
Partition saved as dataset               
CorePartition 
(C:\Users\yd4063\Dropbox\Ucinet\INL\2nd time\CorePartition) 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0 2 3 8 5 6 9 4 7 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
S M T D M T S P C P C E N N I S S O
-- -- --- - --- - -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- ---
10 S ub-Director (Temporary) | 2 1 1 2 | 2 3 1 |
2 Minister of S&T 1 | 3 2 3 | 3 |
3 Top advisor 1 | 3 3 3 1 | 1 1 |
8 Director | 2 2 3 2 3 | 2 2 1 2 3 1 |
5 Minister of S&T 2 | 1 3 3 2 | 3 |
6 Top advisor 2 | 1 3 2 3 3 | 1 1 1 |
9 Sub-Director | 2 1 3 2 3 | 2 2 1 2 3 1 |
- -- -- --- - --- - -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --- -
4 Prime Minister 2 | 3 1 | 3 |
7 City Mayor | 2 1 | |
1 Prime Minister 1 | 3 1 | 3 |
11 Construction company | 3 2 2 | |
12 Equipment company | 1 2 2 | |
13 National scientific community 1 | 1 | 1 |
14 National scientific community 2 | 1 | 1 |
15 Internation al scientific community | 1 2 1 2 | 1 |
16 Scientific staff | 3 3 | 1 1 1 |
17 Secondary schools | 1 1 | |
18 Other academia | | |
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Faction-by-actor indicator matrix saved as dataset CoreClasses 
(C:\Users\yd4063\Dropbox\Ucinet\INL\2nd time\CoreClasses) 
---------------------------------------- 
Running time:  00:00:01 
Output generated:  16 Okt 14 15:19:09 
UCINET 6.528 Copyright (c) 1992-2012 Analytic Technologies 
Ucinet Log 8 – Factions INL 
FACTIONS 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
Number of factions:          4 
Measure of fit:           Hamming 
Input dataset:                          
dataset (C:\Users\yd4063\Dropbox\Ucinet\INL\2nd time\dataset) 
Initial proportion correct:  0.627 
... Badness of fit:  64.000 
.. Badness of fit:  62.000 
 Badness of fit:  62.000 
Final proportion correct:  0.797 
Group Assignments: 
1:   City Mayor Secondary schools Other academia 
2: National scientific community 1 National scientific community 2 
Scientific staff 
3:   Prime Minister 1 Minister of S&T 1 Prime Minister 2 Minister of S&T 2 
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4: Top advisor 1 Top advisor 2 Director Sub-Director Sub-Director 
(Temporary) Construction company Equipment company International 
scientific community 




           1    2    3    4 
        ---- ---- ---- ---- 
    1   0.00 0.00 0.00 0.21 
    2   0.00 0.67 0.00 0.38 
    3   0.00 0.00 2.00 0.41 
    4   0.21 0.38 0.41 1.36 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
8 7 7 3 4 6 1 2 4 5 3 6 1 0 5 2 8 9
O S C N N S P M P M T T C S I E D S
-- --- - -- -- -- -- -- --- - --- -- -- - -- --- - -- -- -- -- -
18 Other academia | | | | |
17 Secondary schools | | | | 1 1 |
7 City Mayor | | | | 1 2 |
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
13 National scientific community 1 | | 1 | | 1 |
14 National scientific community 2 | | 1 | | 1 |
16 Scientific staff | | 1 1 | | 1 3 3 |
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
1 Prime Minister 1 | | | 3 3 | 1 |
2 Minister of S&T 1 | | | 3 3 | 3 2 |
4 Prime Minister 2 | | | 3 3 | 1 |
5 Minister of S&T 2 | | | 3 3 | 3 1 2 |
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
3 Top advisor 1 | | | 1 3 | 3 1 3 1 |
6 Top advisor 2 | 1 | | 1 3 | 3 1 1 2 3 |
11 Construction company | | | | 3 2 2 |
10 Sub-Director (Temporary) | 2 | | 1 | 1 3 1 2 2 |
15 International scientific community| | 1 | | 1 1 2 2 |
12 Equipment company | | | | 1 2 2 |
8 Director | 1 | 1 3 | 2 | 3 2 2 2 2 2 3 |
9 Sub-Director | 1 | 1 3 | 2 | 1 3 2 2 2 2 3 |
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Partition saved as dataset               
FactionsPart (C:\Users\yd4063\Dropbox\Ucinet\INL\2nd 
time\FactionsPart) 
Faction-by-actor indicator matrix saved as dataset FactionsSets 
(C:\Users\yd4063\Dropbox\Ucinet\INL\2nd time\FactionsSets) 
---------------------------------------- 
Running time:  00:00:01 
Output generated:  17 Okt 14 17:24:47 
UCINET 6.528 Copyright (c) 1992-2012 Analytic Technologies 
Indicators exist as a human effort to 
simplify our understanding and governance of reality. 
They are conceptual instruments used to measure, evaluate 
and help with decisions, by summarizing characteristics or highlight-
ing what is happening in reality. Their presence increases as science and 
objectivity gradually permeates our lives. Presently, there are thousands of indica-
tors produced to support understanding and governance of our technology-intensive 
societies. Despite technological innovation being an increasing force for growth in 
our civilization, studies about the way indicators are used in these decisions are 
signifi cantly rare. This book aims to partially fi ll this gap, providing the reader with 
an overview of what is known and what was discovered in a doctoral re-
search, which used a combination of methods to collect quantitative 
and qualitative information from policymakers, innovative 
business leaders and public researchers responsible 
for technology innovation.
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